Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearhouses by Griffith, Sean J.
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Faculty Scholarship 
2012 
Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for 
Derivatives Clearhouses 
Sean J. Griffith 
Fordham University School of Law, sgriffith@law.fordham.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearhouses, 
61 Emory L. J. 1153 (2012) 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/983 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
GRIFFITH GALLEYS4 8/20/2012 8:17 AM 
 
GOVERNING SYSTEMIC RISK: TOWARDS A GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE FOR DERIVATIVES CLEARINGHOUSES 
Sean J. Griffith* 
ABSTRACT 
Derivatives transactions create systemic risk by threatening to spread the 
consequences of default throughout the financial system. Responding to the 
manifestations of systemic risk exhibited in the financial crisis, policy-makers 
have sought to solve the problem by requiring as many derivatives transactions 
as possible to be “cleared” (essentially guaranteed) by a clearinghouse. The 
clearinghouse will centralize and, through the creation of reserve accounts, 
seek to contain systemic risk by preventing the consequences of default from 
spreading. This centralization of risk makes the clearinghouse the new locus of 
systemic risk, and the question of systemic risk management thus becomes a 
question of clearinghouse governance. Unfortunately, each of the likely 
players in clearinghouse governance—dealers, customers, and investors—has 
significant incentive problems from the perspective of systemic risk 
management. I will argue that the policy-makers’ responses to these 
problems—focusing on voting caps and director independence—are 
inadequate to address the problem of systemic risk inherent in derivatives 
transactions. I argue, instead, in favor of the adoption of a new board 
structure more reflective of the public–private role of clearinghouses and 
suggest that models for this new governance structure can be found outside of 




 * T.J. Maloney Chair in Business Law, Fordham Law School, and Director, Fordham Corporate Law 
Center. For their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, thanks to Daniel Awrey, Martin Gelter, Yuliya 
Guseva, Kristin Johnson, Ruben Lee, Frank Partnoy, Elliot Ross, Richard Squire, Chuck Whitehead, and 
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INTRODUCTION 
Derivatives are newly controversial, but they are not new. Derivatives 
transactions have been going on in the United States since at least 1848 and in 
Japan since at least 1730,1 and by some estimates, derivatives go back much 
further than that.2 Recently, however, derivatives have become a magnet for 
controversy, having been famously labeled “financial weapons of mass 
destruction” and implicated in the near destruction of the global financial 
system in 2008.3 As a result, they have become a target for regulatory reform. 
Derivatives are all about risk. They are, at their core, nothing more than 
contracts by which parties agree to transfer the risk of an underlying asset or 
pool of assets.4 However, in providing a means for this transfer of risk, 
derivatives create a second risk—the risk of default on the contract.5 This 
second risk—counterparty credit risk—is inherent in derivatives transactions 
and is the basic way in which derivatives contribute to systemic risk.6 
In targeting derivatives for regulatory reform, policy-makers have fastened 
upon the idea of centralizing counterparty credit risk in a single place—a 
clearinghouse—where it can be supervised and managed. A clearinghouse is a 
public–private solution to the problem of systemic risk. Funded with private 
capital to serve both commercial ends and the public purpose of containing 
systemic risk, clearinghouses provide a means for monitoring derivatives 
trades and, more importantly perhaps, for building reserves against default so 
that, if one party to a derivatives transaction defaults on its contractual 
 
 1 See generally Don M. Chance, A Chronology of Derivatives, DERIVATIVES Q., Winter 1995, at 53, 54 
(describing the founding of the Chicago Board of Trade and the operations of the Dojima Rice Exchange). 
 2 See ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. I, ch. 11, at 1142 (Richard McKeon 
ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941) (c. 350 BCE) (noting the financial “device” attributed to 
Thales of Miletus, who effectively purchased an option on all the olive presses in Chios and Miletus ahead of a 
banner harvest). 
 3 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003), available at http://www. 
berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf. On the guilt that derivatives bear for the financial crisis, see infra 
Part I.B. 
 4 See ERIK BANKS, THE CREDIT RISK OF COMPLEX DERIVATIVES 10 (3d ed. 2004) (“Fundamentally, 
institutions enter into derivative transactions to protect against, or take advantage of, market volatility; this can 
be accomplished by establishing simple or compound derivative hedge or speculative positions in particular 
markets. If successful, the derivative position provides the necessary protection or payoff; if unsuccessful, it 
can result in a loss.”). 
 5 See ANTULIO N. BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS 267 
(2005) (“In the context of the credit derivatives market, counterparty credit risk refers mainly to the chance 
that a protection seller will fail to make good on its promise to make previously agreed-upon payments in the 
event of qualified defaults by reference entities.”). 
 6 See generally SCHUYLER K. HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES 402–04 (2d ed. 2010). 
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obligation, the consequences of the default will be contained within the 
clearinghouse and not spread throughout the broader financial system.7 For this 
strategy of containment to work, however, much depends upon how the 
clearinghouse is governed. Specifically, much depends on how the 
clearinghouse models the risk of derivatives instruments, what the 
clearinghouse requires of its members in terms of credit quality and 
contributions to collateral and reserve funds, and what products the 
clearinghouse accepts for clearing.8 These are core issues of risk management, 
and they depend ultimately on clearinghouse governance. 
Recognizing that clearinghouse governance is critically important for the 
management of systemic risk, policy-makers have sought to engineer 
governance structures for clearinghouses. Unfortunately, the policy-makers’ 
proposals have generally failed to address the pervasive free-riding problem 
underlying clearinghouse governance.9 Because no private party stands to 
enjoy a benefit equal to the costs of controlling systemic risk, no private party 
can be expected fully to internalize these costs.10 Worse, each of the major 
commercial interests involved in derivatives clearing faces a moral hazard 
problem—an incentive to engage in excessive risk taking as a result of the fact 
that a significant portion of the cost of that party’s actions are borne by 
others.11 These incentive problems are a fundamental outgrowth of the public–
private nature of the clearinghouse. 
This Article argues that solving the riddle of clearinghouse governance 
requires us to look outside of the confines of traditional American corporate 
 
 7 See DAVID LOADER, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT OF DERIVATIVES 35 (2005) (“In general terms the 
role of the clearing house is to act as a counterparty to both sides of the trade thereby breaking the direct 
counterparty relationship between the two trading counterparties. It is fundamental to the integrity and 
credibility of the market for which it operates, as its purpose is to guarantee the performance of each and every 
transaction.”). 
 8 See id. at 43 (“A very significant role of the clearing house is managing the risk created by the 
transactions on the exchange. From setting the criteria for membership of the clearing house to establishing 
default rules, using margin systems and requiring daily settlement of resulting obligations of all members, the 
clearing house controls the risk that the exchange, the members and the users of the market face.”). 
 9 See generally Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric 
Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty (Jan. 8, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340660 (noting that the formation of a central clearing 
party reduces the incentives dealers have to monitor other dealers). 
 10 See id. (manuscript at 55) (noting that, although dealers stand to benefit from fewer losses from default 
of a counterparty, clearing creates a contagion effect of spreading losses among individual dealers). 
 11 See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at 
63 (2009) (describing moral hazard as “any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much 
risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly”). 
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governance mechanisms. A model for the delicate public–private balance of 
clearinghouse governance can be found instead in continental Europe. The 
supervisory board structure of the German public corporation offers a model 
for establishing a class of directors separately accountable to the public 
purpose of managing systemic risk. This Article articulates the advantages of 
this governance model as a means of addressing the unique context of 
derivatives clearinghouses, developing specific recommendations in hopes of 
influencing policy-makers going forward. 
From this Introduction, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the 
connection between derivatives and systemic risk, describing the role of 
derivatives in the financial crisis of 2008 and the focus of the reforms that 
followed in its wake. Part II looks more closely at the problem of 
clearinghouse governance, reviewing the incentives of each of the private 
parties with an interest in clearinghouses and finding pervasive free-riding and 
moral hazard problems among these parties. Part III then reviews the attempts 
of policy-makers to address these incentive problems and critiques their choice 
of fairly standard governance mechanisms that fail ultimately to address the 
underlying problems of free-riding and moral hazard. Part IV then outlines a 
set of recommendations for establishing a formal body separately accountable 
to the public purpose of controlling systemic risk, drawing support for this 
recommendation from the governance structure of the German public 
corporation and from various suggestions of domestic regulators. The Article 
closes with a summary and conclusion. 
I. DERIVATIVES AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
The clearinghouse structure currently being contemplated by policy-makers 
and market participants arises from a particular context of crisis and reform. 
Ultimately, to understand the clearinghouse governance issue, it is necessary to 
first understand that larger regulatory context, including the ways in which risk 
inheres in derivatives instruments and derivatives transactions, and the role of 
those instruments and transactions in contributing to the global financial crisis 
of 2008. This Part seeks to provide that contextual background, offering first a 
short introduction to derivatives, followed by an overview of the role of 
derivatives in the global financial crisis and a brief description of the 
legislative and regulatory efforts that followed fast upon it. The discussion that 
follows will reveal counterparty credit risk as the fundamental risk associated 
with derivatives transactions, and it will introduce the clearinghouse as the 
solution to this basic risk inherent in derivatives transactions. 
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A. A Short Introduction to Derivatives 
Fundamentally, a derivative is nothing more than a contractual means by 
which parties allocate the risk of a fluctuation in price of an underlying 
reference value.12 The reference value can be infinitely many things—an 
interest rate or exchange rate, an index of bonds or mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs), commodity prices, or the weather.13 In the contract, the two sides, or 
counterparties, commit to one or several payments at some time in the future, 
the amount of which will depend upon the value of the underlying reference 
value at that time.14 This exchange of payments thus allows the counterparties 
to reallocate risk.15 The transfer of risk can be used to mitigate risk, as a farmer 
might seek to hedge fluctuations in grain prices or a banker might seek to 
hedge interest rate risk or to take risk on—to speculate.16 Moreover, it is 
important to realize that, although speculation is treated by some as a dirty 
word,17 both hedging and speculation are vital features of a working financial 
system—hedging because it enables parties to eliminate unwanted risk, and 
speculation because it speeds price discovery and, therefore, market 
efficiency.18 
 
 12 See HENDERSON, supra note 6, at 5 (“A derivative is, simply, a financial arrangement the value of 
which is ‘derived’ from another financial instrument, index or measure of economic value.”). 
 13 See ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: PRICING AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT 16 (2010) (explaining how structured products—like securities that result from the 
securitization process and have been successfully created with portfolios of mortgage, automobile, and boat 
loans as well as credit derivatives—relate to derivatives contracts); Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing 
Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 687 n.16 (discussing various instruments, such 
as weather derivatives and environmental derivatives). 
 14 See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 13, at 16–19. 
 15 See id. at 575–82 (discussing the use of derivatives to manage risks associated with interest rate 
fluctuations). 
 16 See id. 
 17 See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market 
for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 703 (1999) (“The public disapproves of speculators. So, traditionally, 
does the law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 18 Price discovery is the process by which trading in a market incorporates new information and market 
participants’ expectations into asset prices. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 13, at 57. As a result of relatively 
low transaction costs and high liquidity of many derivatives markets, new information about assets is often 
reflected in derivatives prices first. Id.; see also Roberto Blanco et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic 
Relation Between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps, 60 J. FIN. 2255 (2005) (providing an 
empirical study showing that the credit-default-swap market makes bond pricing more efficient); Arturo Bris 
et al., Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the World, 62 J. FIN. 1029 (2007) (providing a 
cross-sectional time-series analysis strongly supporting the view that short selling facilitates efficient price 
discovery). 
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1. Trading Underlying Risk 
Derivatives trade in the sense that the underlying risk packaged in any 
particular derivative instrument can be decomposed, repackaged, and resold in 
a variety of forms. What the counterparties exchange is not typically a 
prepackaged financial instrument, as when securities traders sell shares of 
stocks or bonds, but is rather a portion (or all) of one or the other positions 
(long or short) on the underlying risk.19 Highly standardized derivatives, such 
as futures and most options, may be traded on exchanges, such as the Chicago 
Board of Trade or the London International Financial Futures and Options 
Exchange.20 The rest of the derivatives world, however, trades only bilaterally: 
that is, on the basis of separately negotiated transactions between sellers—
typically major financial institutions acting as dealers—and buyers—often the 
“end users” of the instrument who take a position on the underlying risk either 
for purposes of hedging or speculation.21 Because the transacting parties are 
effectively negotiating a new contract, either side (long or short) of the risk of 
the underlying reference asset may be transferred, in whole or in part, in a wide 
variety of ways. This form of derivatives transaction, in which trades are 
privately negotiated, rather than traded through an exchange, is referred to as 
the “over-the-counter” (OTC) derivatives market.22 And, as we shall see, all of 
the recent controversy in derivatives transactions has surrounded OTC 
derivatives generally and credit default swaps (CDSs) in particular. 
In a typical swap contract, as the name suggests, counterparties exchange 
positions on the risk of the underlying asset. For example, in an interest rate 
swap, one party pays the other if interest rates rise and receives payments from 
the other if interest rates fall.23 A party with interest rate exposure, either 
 
 19 Unlike traditional securities trading, where sellers must either own or be able to buy or borrow 
securities in order to sell them, the sell side of derivatives transactions effectively creates the instrument by 
agreeing to one position or the other on the risk. See Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2010, at 51, 55–58 (2010) (describing the mechanics of trading in over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives). 
 20 See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 13, at 21 (explaining that exchanges trade standardized derivatives 
through a centralized structure that is organized to promote liquidity and to mutualize credit risk). 
 21 Randall Dodd, The Structure of OTC Derivatives Markets, 9 FINANCIER 41, 41–44 (2002). 
 22 See Duffie, supra note 19, at 56–58. OTC derivatives transactions may also take place among dealers 
and, less frequently, among end users. Id. at 56. 
 23 In a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap, a firm that is concerned about its exposure to interest rate 
fluctuations, due perhaps to an obligation to make payments based on a floating interest rate, might contract 
with a swap dealer to pay a fixed rate of interest in exchange for being paid the floating rate. See ROBERT E. 
WHALEY, DERIVATIVES 652–54 (2006). In this way, the firm effectively eliminates its interest rate risk, 
essentially exchanging a floating for a fixed rate. Id. As the counterparty to the swap, the dealer takes on the 
risk of fluctuations in interest rates but generally not for long, because the dealer will typically seek to enter 
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through borrowing or lending, can effectively cancel out this risk by taking the 
opposite position in a swap or, if they have a view about what interest rates are 
likely to be in the future, using a swap to speculate on their prediction.24 In 
either case, the swap effectively transfers the risk of fluctuation in interest rates 
from one party to the other. 
Similarly, a credit derivative is a privately negotiated agreement that 
explicitly transfers credit risk from one party, the “protection buyer,” to 
another, the “protection seller.”25 Credit derivatives come in a variety of 
forms,26 but the credit default swap has recently attracted much attention.27 In a 
credit default swap, the protection buyer pays a fee, or “spread,”28 to the 
protection seller in exchange for the seller’s commitment to offset any losses, 
real or hypothetical, suffered by the protection buyer in the event of a default 
or other credit event of another party, the “reference entity.”29 In this way, 
credit default swaps allow parties to hedge or speculate based on the risk of 
default of an underlying entity or index.30 
 
into a second swap, often concurrently with the original swap, with a counterparty having risk preferences that 
are the exact opposite of those of the initial firm. 
 24 See generally KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 13, at 575–86 (providing examples of various 
instruments that limit risk to buyers with interest rate exposure, including an interest rate option that allows the 
buyer to profit from a favorable move in the underlying interest rate while giving protection against an adverse 
move in the underlying interest rate). 
 25 Id. at 679. 
 26 For example, a credit-linked note is the functional equivalent of a normal note (or a bond or loan) with 
the embedded credit protection of a CDS, in which the credit-protection seller has prepaid the loss in the form 
of a bond. See BOMFIM, supra note 5, at 123–26 (describing the credit-derivatives market, major credit-
derivatives tools, and coinciding valuation models). A total return swap, on the other hand, is an over-the-
counter derivative where a dealer (total return payer) contracts to swap the total return of an asset or basket of 
assets in exchange for periodic cash flows paid by an investor (total return receiver). Id. at 83–89. Investors in 
a total return swap do not actually buy or own the underlying assets. Id. Credit-swap options allow an investor 
to purchase, from a dealer, the opportunity to buy (or sell) a CDS at a future date (exercise date) at a fixed 
price (strike price). Id. Credit-swap options allow investors to take financial positions reflecting their views on 
prospective credit and interest rate developments. Id. Additionally, credit-swap options may be used as 
hedging vehicles by banks and other institutions that have exposures to spread risk. Id. at 91–96. 
 27 See Jessica Holzer, SEC Proposes New Swaps Rules, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2011, at C3 (describing 
recent proposed rules “aimed at protecting investors in some of the complex financial instruments blamed for 
exacerbating the financial crisis,” including credit default swaps). 
 28 See WHALEY, supra note 23, at 674 (outlining the mechanics of a credit default swap as a protection 
seller who agrees, for an upfront or a continuing premium, to compensate the protection buyer upon a defined 
credit event). 
 29 See id. at 684 n.6. 
 30 In a typical CDS transaction, a fund may hold a large number of bonds of a particular debtor, thus 
exposing it to loss should the debtor default on its obligations. To hedge this risk, the fund may enter into a 
credit default swap whereby the risk of default is transferred to the protection seller in exchange for a fixed 
stream of payments. If the debtor defaults, the protection seller must make the protection buyer whole, 
typically by paying the difference between the par value of the bond and the post-default value. If the debtor 
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Seen in this way, derivatives in general and credit default swaps in 
particular operate like insurance. Both transfer risk and offset losses resulting 
from contingent future events. Following the analogy, the insured loss is the 
underlying credit event, the insurance premium is the fee or spread, and the 
policy limit is the notional amount. There are significant legal and economic 
differences that cause this analogy ultimately to break down.31 However, the 
basic intuition holds that derivatives, like insurance, transfer the risk of the 
underlying reference asset.32 By transferring the risk of the underlying 
reference asset, derivatives thus allow traders either to hedge their exposure to 
the reference asset or to speculate on its future value, both vital functions of the 
financial system. 
2. Creating Counterparty Credit Risk 
The risk of the underlying reference asset, however, is not the only risk 
involved in derivatives contracting. There is also the risk that a counterparty 
will fail to perform its obligations under the contract, leaving the other 
counterparty holding a risk that it thought it had transferred. Because 
performance is legally required under the contract, performance will only be 
excused when the counterparty is financially unable to perform—when it is 
insolvent.33 Thus, the risk of nonperformance in the derivatives context is 
referred to as “counterparty credit risk”—the possibility that the party with 
 
does not default, the protection seller enjoys the stream of payments with no payment obligation of its own. As 
with other forms of derivatives, neither party need hold the reference asset to receive payment on a credit 
default swap. Similarly, the protection buyer need not suffer any actual loss to be entitled to payment under a 
credit default swap. The payment obligation is triggered with regard to the reference entity alone and is 
calculated on the basis of the difference between the current and par values of the reference entity’s debt 
without regard to losses suffered (or not suffered) by the protection buyer. See James C. duPont, Comment, A 
Second Chance at Legal Certainty: AIG Collapse Provides Impetus to Regulate Credit Default Swaps, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 843, 846–47 (2009) (describing a typical CDS transaction where the occurrence of a 
predefined credit event, such as bankruptcy or default on an obligation, allows the protection buyer to trigger 
the contract and affect settlement). 
 31 Legally, for example, recovery under an insurance policy requires the claimant to hold an insurable 
interest and  actually suffer a loss, whereas with a credit default swap, neither party need hold the reference 
asset or suffer actual loss to be entitled to payment under the contract. See M. Todd Henderson, Credit 
Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2009) (noting this distinction and arguing that 
it is inappropriate to regulate credit derivatives as insurance because the policies underlying insurance 
regulation—consumer protection and insurance-firm-governance issues—do not apply to credit derivatives). 
 32 See generally Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1, 19 (2011) (“If a counterparty hedges a pre-existing risk with the use of a derivatives contract, he 
obtains insurance value from the derivative.”). 
 33 See Feder, supra note 13, at 689. 
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whom you have contracted is, essentially, out of business and therefore unable 
to perform on the contract.34 
Counterparty credit risk is especially dangerous in the context of credit 
default swaps. If a protection seller defaults, the buyer remains exposed to the 
risk of default of the underlying reference entity.35 If the underlying reference 
entity is not in default at the same time as the protection seller, the protection 
buyer may be able to replace the protection by entering into another credit 
default swap with another counterparty, which imposes additional transaction 
costs but does not otherwise alter the analysis.36 If, however, the reference 
entity is in default at the same time as the protection seller, then the protection 
buyer is confronted with a dangerous scenario, the “double default,” in which 
protection is unavailable precisely when it is most needed.37 When declines in 
the credit quality of the underlying entity and the counterparty are correlated, 
as may be the case in financial crises, protection may thus be illusory—in the 
words of one author, “protection sellers are least likely to pay out at the very 
moment they’re obligated to: upon someone else’s default.”38 The protection 
buyer therefore loses both the value of its derivative contract and the value of 
its investment in the underlying reference entity. 
Losses from counterparty credit risk are especially likely in periods of 
financial distress, when financial institutions, rendered unstable either by wild 
swings in the value of the underlying reference asset or by losses elsewhere in 
their portfolio, fail.39 The failure of a large counterparty spreads loss 
 
 34 See BOMFIM, supra note 5, at 15. 
 35 Note here that the counterparty risk for the protection seller is not parallel because a default of the 
protection buyer means merely that the protection seller is not receiving its fixed stream of payments. Its long 
position in the credit of the reference entity is likely unaffected, although it may have to unwind its hedge 
(offsetting short position) if it hedged that risk, but again, this is just a transaction cost, not a double default. 
See id. at 267 (noting that, although a protection seller is technically subject to the risk that the buyer will fail 
to make the agreed-upon premium payments, the seller’s potential exposure is essentially limited to the 
marked-to-market value of the contract, a function of the difference between the premium written into the 
contract and the one prevailing in the marketplace at the time of default by the protection buyer). 
 36 See id. at 268 (noting that the analysis of portfolio credit risk is impacted upon default by the reference 
entity if that entity either happens to default at around the same time as the protection seller or defaults after a 
default by the seller, and the original contract is not replaced). 
 37 See id. at 10–11 (defining a protection buyer’s greatest loss as occurring when both the protection 
seller and the reference entity default at the same time). 
 38 Charles Davi, How to Understand the Derivatives Market, ATLANTIC (July 16, 2009, 1:00 PM), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/07/how-to-understand-the-derivatives-market/21426/. 
 39 See Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, Counterparty Risk, Impact on Collateral Flows, and Role for 
Central Counterparties 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/173, 2009), available at http://www. 
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09173.pdf (“Counterparty risk largely stems from the creditworthiness of 
GRIFFITH GALLEYS4 8/20/2012  8:17 AM 
2012] GOVERNING SYSTEMIC RISK 1163 
throughout the financial system because other institutions find themselves 
holding unhedged positions precisely when they most need protection. In such 
a situation, the failure of a major counterparty may lead to the failure of its 
contracting partners, thus further spreading loss throughout the financial 
system.40 This, of course, is systemic risk. Systemic risk refers to the linkages 
and interdependencies between participants in the financial market, such that a 
significant loss initially touching only a small number of participants can 
spread and threaten to engulf the entire system.41 
Systemic risk is created by counterparty credit risk and spreads through the 
interconnected nature of derivatives transactions.42 Counterparty credit risk, 
unlike the risk of the underlying reference asset, is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to hedge and is inherent in every derivatives transaction.43 
 
an institution. In the context of a financial system . . . , counterparty risk will be the aggregate loss to the 
financial system from a counterparty that fails to deliver on its OTC derivative obligation.”). 
 40 Darrell Duffie et al., Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure 5 (Stanford 
Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2046, 2010), available at http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/ 
researchpapers/library/RP2046.pdf. 
 41 This basic theme is captured with greater formality by a leading scholar in the area, who defines 
systemic risk as  
the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic 
or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of 
significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or 
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
 42 Counterparty credit risk is not the only way in which derivatives may contribute to systemic risk, as 
defined supra note 41. Professor Whitehead offers two further examples. First, consider the case of banks 
using CDSs to transfer portfolio risk to the hedge fund industry. If an external shock were to bring down the 
hedge fund industry, even if all existing CDSs were fully paid, banks would no longer have counterparties to 
whom they could transfer risk, leading to a reduction in the amount they could lend or an increase in the cost 
of funding, potentially causing a contraction in the real economy. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule 
and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 65–67 (2011). Second, if a substantial shock to the 
financial markets, such as the Lehman collapse, were to result in a sudden increase in CDS values, prompting 
the need for all CDS writers to post additional collateral, the terms of most standardized contracts would 
require that treasuries or similar instruments be posted within twenty-four hours, forcing writers to liquidate 
other asset classes in order to post collateral. Doing so would both lower the value of assets on the banks’ 
balance sheets and increase volatility in the markets, creating a vicious cycle further increasing CDS values 
and thus requiring more collateral to be posted. See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 323, 353–56 (2011) [hereinafter Whitehead, Destructive Coordination]. The creation of 
counterparty credit risk, however, remains the basic way in which OTC derivatives contribute to systemic risk, 
and it is the aspect of systemic risk that the central clearinghouse squarely addresses. Other manifestations of 
systemic risk are outside of the scope of this Article. 
 43 If, for example, A and B enter into a CDS and B is later revealed to have weak credit, it is extremely 
difficult for A to hedge the risk of B’s default without taking on further counterparty credit risk. Most 
obviously, of course, A could enter into a new CDS with C, where the underlying reference is B, thus hedging 
A’s credit exposure to B, but in doing so, A would take on credit exposure to C. Alternatively, A could simply 
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Systemic risk, thus, can be seen as a negative externality of derivatives 
transactions.44 
This section has offered a brief overview of derivatives. The discussion has 
separated two kinds of risk involved in derivatives transactions: the risk of the 
underlying reference asset and counterparty credit risk. Derivatives are, in 
essence, a solution to the problem of risk arising from the underlying reference 
asset because they allow this risk to be hedged. In solving this risk problem, 
however, derivatives create another risk—counterparty credit risk. 
Counterparty credit risk is inherent in derivatives transactions, and it is the 
principal means through which derivatives transactions create systemic risk. 
The sections that follow describe the role of derivatives in the financial crisis 
and the way it became a focus of policy-makers in their response to the crisis. 
B. Derivatives and the Financial Crisis 
The global financial crisis began when the bubble in the U.S. housing 
market, which had been inflated by a combination of government policy,45 
unscrupulous lending practices,46 and financial engineering, finally burst in 
 
short B’s bonds so that it would have gains to offset its losses as B’s credit quality declines. This solution, 
however, may be excessively costly and difficult to manage and therefore unfeasible for many, if not most, 
derivatives transactions. The central clearing system, described below, has thus emerged as the central means 
of minimizing counterparty credit risk. 
 44 Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 13 (“[T]he systemic risk associated with uncleared derivatives 
represents a ‘negative externality’ that may be appropriately treated with regulatory pressure or incentives.”). 
 45 The government intervened directly in the housing market through the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), government-
sponsored entities (GSEs) through which the government pursued policies of widespread homeownership and 
affordable housing by purchasing subprime mortgages and related mortgage-backed securities, thereby 
offering an implicit government guaranty to bolster the market in subprime loans. See, e.g., Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, §§ 1302, 1332, 106 Stat. 3672, 3941–42, 3956–
57 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501, 4562 (2006)) (incorporating the congressional finding that 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “have an affirmative obligation to facilitate the financing of affordable housing 
for low- and moderate-income families” and requiring them to meet affordable housing goals set by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)). The initial annual goal for low- and moderate-
income mortgage purchases for each GSE was 30% of the total number of dwelling units financed by 
mortgage purchases and was increased to 55% by 2007. See Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy 
Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at A1. HUD acquiesced in allowing subprime loans to meet 
affordable-housing goals, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac played a large part in creating the subprime 
market to meet these requirements. Id. 
 46 In this environment where the highest risk loans were effectively guaranteed by the government, 
mortgage lenders adopted the “originate to distribute” business model by which mortgages would be 
underwritten and then immediately sold to mitigate risk and create funds for further underwriting. See Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the 
Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 982 (2009). As the subprime market expanded, 
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2007.47 Because the risks of the housing market had been repackaged, split into 
smaller pieces, and widely distributed, the effects soon spread throughout the 
entire economy.48 The financial technology that enabled this risk to spread 
included, principally, securitization but also included derivatives. 
1. The Culprit: Securitization 
Securitization involves, essentially, collecting cash-flow rights in a large 
pool and then selling interests in the pool in smaller chunks to investors.49 
Almost any asset with a stable income stream can be securitized, and 
mortgages, because borrowers’ interest obligations represent a predictable 
income stream, are particularly well-suited for securitization, hence the 
creation (through securitization) of MBSs, which became the principal means 
 
underwriting standards became increasingly lax, allowing for the now-infamous No-Income-No-Job-or-Asset 
(NINJA) loans to be underwritten, in part because lenders did not bear the risk of the loans they made. See 
JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT MARKETS 92 (2009) 
(analyzing data that indicates that, as more new loans were made over the period 2003 to 2006, lenders 
steadily lowered underwriting standards to maintain their volumes of business, leading to more NINJA loans); 
In a World of Overconfidence, Fear Makes a Welcome Return, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 15, 2007, at 11 
(summarizing the combination of events that led to the development of NINJA loans as large cuts in interest 
rates in 2000, followed by easy credit and “financial innovation,” which allowed lenders to collect fees but 
avoid the risks of the loans made). 
 47 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ultimately attributed the cause of the crisis to 
• [w]idespread failures in financial regulation . . . ; 
• [d]ramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial firms 
acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; 
• [a]n explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that 
put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; 
• [k]ey policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the 
financial system they oversaw; 
• [a]nd systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels. 
Press Release, Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Releases Report on the 
Causes of the Financial Crisis (Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
news/2011-0127-fcic-releases-report.pdf. 
 48 See Wilmarth, supra note 46, at 970. 
 49 In a basic securitization transaction, an originator first contributes a group of assets to a distinct legal 
entity—a so-called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)—which then sells debt securities to investors protected by 
a security interest on these assets. See Darrell Duffie, Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for 
Financial Stability 12 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 255, 2008), available at http://www.bis. 
org/publ/work255.pdf. The income received from the pooled assets is used to pay the interest rate on the 
securities sold to investors, and the proceeds from the sale of these securities are paid to the originator to 
compensate for the contribution of assets into the SPV and to fund future activities. See id. Investors in the 
assets, meanwhile, receive a stream of payments, which, because they are pooled and typically given credit 
enhancements, are less risky than they were in the hands of the originator. See id. at 12–14. 
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by which housing risk was spread throughout the financial system.50 Moreover, 
bankers often further securitized mortgage-backed securities to create another 
instrument, known as a collateralized debt obligation (CDO), which 
represented a financial claim to the cash flows generated by an underlying 
portfolio of mortgage-backed securities.51 The purpose of this second-step 
securitization was to achieve a higher credit rating through further 
diversification of the asset pool, interests that could be resold to investors 
worldwide.52 In this way, mortgage-backed securities and CDOs played a 
significant role in creating systemic risk, essentially allowing the consequences 
of the collapse in U.S. home prices and the concomitant mortgage defaults to 
spread throughout the global financial system. 
2. The Accomplice: Derivatives 
Derivatives, however, also share some of the responsibility for the global 
financial crisis.53 Derivatives contributed to the crisis in two basic ways, the 
first having to do with the stimulating of the market for the underlying 
reference asset (in this case, subprime mortgages), and the second having to do 
with the accumulation of counterparty credit risk in large financial institutions. 
First, derivatives fueled the credit boom through the creation of swaps in 
which the underlying asset was a pool of CDOs or an index of subprime 
 
 50 See Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1503–09 (2011). Housing market risk, in this context, 
is principally the risk that borrowers will default on their mortgages. Because it allowed them to raise funds 
and off-load risk, securitization arguably distorted lenders’ incentives and led to the “originate-to-distribute” 
business model. See Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis, 24 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1881, 1912 (2011). 
 51 Duffie, supra note 49, at 12. A CDO is created by combining mortgaged-backed securities in a pool 
with other debt obligations and securitizing that pool, once again, into tranches to be sold to investors with 
varying risk preferences. See id. 
 52 Mixing assets, even risky assets, reduces risk. By making a pool of mortgage-backed securities into 
CDOs, higher credit ratings were effectively generated even though the underlying loans themselves were no 
less risky. See Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 3, 
6–7 (discussing the method by which securities were manufactured by repackaging risks and creating “safe” 
assets that were viewed by investors and rating agencies as risk free); see also Frank Partnoy, Overdependence 
on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, in THE FIRST CREDIT MARKET TURMOIL OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY 175, 178–83 (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., 2009) (describing the dynamics of “second-level” 
securitizations and the role of credit ratings). 
 53 See René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 15384, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15384 (noting observers’ 
arguments that derivatives contributed to the financial crisis by (1) enabling the credit boom, (2) allowing 
financial institutions to take on massive risk, and (3) providing a total lack of transparency regarding risk 
exposures and the resulting strength of financial institutions with large positions). 
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MBSs.54 These “synthetic CDOs” created a further means by which investors 
could hedge or speculate on mortgage-backed securities and subprime loans, 
creating further liquidity in these markets and driving down the cost of capital 
even further.55 Moreover, because swaps allow parties to take on risk without 
actually owning the underlying asset, both synthetic CDOs and indexed credit 
default swaps allowed “investors to take more exposure to subprime mortgages 
than there were such mortgages.”56 Derivatives, in other words, allowed risk of 
the underlying reference asset—in this case, subprime mortgages—to spread 
even further.57 
A second way in which derivatives fueled the financial crisis was by 
allowing financial institutions to take massive but almost entirely opaque 
positions on this risk, resulting in an inability to assess their financial strengths, 
thereby creating the conditions for a bank run that would further exacerbate the 
credit crunch.58 By some estimates, the CDS market grew tenfold in the years 
 
 54 A synthetic CDO is essentially a credit default swap written on a reference index of CDOs combined 
with a pool of high-credit, quality bonds where the CDS spread plus the coupon payments from the high-
quality bonds make the interest payment on the SPV securities. See Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 
EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 10, 27 (2009). The resulting CDO is “synthetic” because it mimics the return of a CDO 
written on a pool of MBSs (or whatever the reference index is) but does not actually hold collateralized debt 
obligations. Id. Likewise, in 2006, asset-backed-swap (ABX) indices were introduced, representing a basket of 
CDS contracts on securitized subprime mortgages for a prior period (typically the past six months). Id. at 28–
29. These indices behaved like bond indices, falling when default risk rose and rising when default risk fell, 
and enabled investors to take positions on the underlying market without any ownership interest, direct or 
indirect, in MBSs. See id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 Stulz, supra note 53, at 11; see also Gorton, supra note 54, at 36–37 (commenting that investors were 
subject to greater exposure because of the complexity of synthetic CDOs and indexed credit default swaps 
preventing the valuation of the underlying mortgages). The ABX.HE index is a synthetic index that tracks the 
price of a single CDS on each of twenty individual subprime-mortgage-backed securities. See Richard Stanton 
& Nancy Wallace, The Bear’s Lair: Indexed Credit Default and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 3250, 3250–51 (2011). This tool allows market participants to trade the credit risk of a portfolio of 
pools using a single security without having to own or borrow the underlying reference assets. See id. at 1351–
52. As a result of this structure, the net notional amount of ABX.HE indexed CDSs may significantly exceed 
the underlying principle balances. See id. 
 57 This fact alone, however, does not render derivatives responsible for the financial crisis because the 
risk of the underlying reference asset can be hedged. If the risk of the underlying asset is to be blamed for the 
financial crisis, then the fault lies not with derivatives but with the traders who made foolish choices or the 
institutions that failed to hedge. On this point, consider the account of AIG offered infra Part I.B.3. 
 58 See generally Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1307 (2010) (discussing how the opaqueness of the market prevented market 
participants from knowing exactly what the exposures of their counterparties were to these entities, such as 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, which resulted in quick drying up of liquidity). 
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leading up to the crisis. In 2004, for example, the total notional amount59 of 
CDS contracts estimated by the Bank for International Settlements was around 
$5 trillion,60 while in June 2008, the peak of the market, it was $57 trillion.61 
Notional amounts, because they fail to take into account offsetting positions, 
can be misleading,62 and other means of measuring the absolute size of the 
market result in smaller estimates.63 Nevertheless, there is little dispute over 
the fact that the CDS market grew considerably in the years leading to the 
crisis and that much of that exposure was housed in financial institutions.64 
That it is difficult to say how much exposure they in fact bore only 
demonstrates the difficulty in quantifying the exposure of financial institutions 
during the crisis, which is often cited as a significant part of the problem. 
It is important to note here that, in discussing the role of derivatives in the 
financial crisis, we are focusing on OTC derivatives and, more specifically, on 
credit default swaps and other related swap instruments. As described above, 
these are highly tailored contractual instruments that did not (and still do not) 
trade on exchanges. Leading up to the crisis, many financial institutions had 
taken large positions in OTC derivatives to hedge or speculate on mortgages.65 
Moreover, insofar as we are focusing on the risk arising from financial 
institutions accumulating large derivatives positions, we are focusing primarily 
 
 59 Notional principal, or notional amount, of a derivative contract is a hypothetical underlying quantity 
upon which interest rate or other payment obligations are computed. Product Descriptions and Frequently 
Asked Questions, ISDA, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 60 See MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET 
ACTIVITY IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2005, at 9 tbl.4 (2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0511.pdf. 
 61 MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN 
THE SECOND HALF OF 2008, at 7 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0905.pdf. 
 62 Stulz, supra note 53, at 22–24 (listing various reasons that account for misleading notional amounts, 
thereby contributing to “the potential to create havoc in the financial markets”); see also Memorandum from 
J.P. Morgan to file, J.P. Morgan’s Response to FASB Statement No. 161 (FAS 161), Disclosures About 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (ASC Topic 815) 5 (Feb. 10, 2011) (on file with the Emory 
Law Journal) (“The information on notional amounts could be misleading because the gross presentation does 
not appropriately reflect the effect of some common strategies.”). 
 63 Compare Press Release, Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., DTCC Values Additional CDS Contracts 
in Trade Information Warehouse at $5.7 Trillion (Aug. 3, 2009), available at http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/ 
releases/2009/cds_contract_values.php (reporting a $26.5 trillion notional value of 2.2 million electronically 
confirmed CDS contracts in the warehouse’s registry in July 2009), with Press Release, Int’l Swaps & 
Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., ISDA Mid-Year 2009 Market Survey Shows Credit Derivatives at $31.2 Trillion 
(Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.isda.org/press/press091509.html (finding a total notional value of 
$31.2 trillion). 
 64 See Stulz, supra note 53, at 27; see also duPont, supra note 30, at 854–58 (discussing the development 
of credit default swaps). 
 65 See Stulz, supra note 53, at 2–4, 9–12. 
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on counterparty credit risk. Recall, from the previous discussion, that 
derivatives create two kinds of risk—the risk of the underlying reference asset, 
which can be hedged, and counterparty credit risk, which cannot. The risk even 
of toxic, securitized subprime mortgages can be eliminated by entering into 
offsetting swap transactions, but when financial institutions become parties to a 
vast number of derivatives transactions, they also accumulate counterparty 
credit risk—the risk that one of their transacting parties will fail to perform its 
obligations under a swap contract, leaving the dealer’s position in the 
underlying asset unhedged as a result. Because counterparty credit risk cannot 
be eliminated through hedging and, in fact, increases as one enters into more of 
such transactions, those financial institutions that acted as dealers in credit 
default swaps in the years leading up to the financial crisis accumulated a 
sufficient amount of counterparty credit risk to increase systemic risk and 
further destabilize the global financial system. 
Still, financial institutions are not totally at the mercy of counterparty credit 
risk. Dealers can and do protect themselves by taking collateral.66 Moreover, if 
they have multiple positions open with the same counterparty, dealers can 
reduce their total losses by netting positive and negative positions against one 
another.67 Because several important counterparties did in fact fail as the 
financial crisis deepened in 2008, the crisis presents a case study to evaluate 
the ability of the dealers to respond to counterparty credit risk. And, in fact, the 
credit-default-swap settlement system seems to have worked fairly well during 
the crisis.68 Both Lehman and Bear Stearns had been significant players in the 
 
 66 See Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 42, at 353–56 (describing the standardized 
system of collateral posting under ISDA’s Credit Support Annex and the way in which this system of collateral 
may have contributed to the financial crisis because “[s]tandard provisions in the CSA caused protection 
sellers to react to the increase in CDS prices in the same way and at roughly the same time, simultaneously 
driving prices lower, which in turn required additional sales to raise further funds”). 
 67 JOHN B. CAOUETTE ET AL., MANAGING CREDIT RISK: THE GREAT CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 75 (2d ed. 2008). Both collateral and netting are discussed in greater detail infra Part II.C.3. 
 68 Stulz, supra note 53, at 21; see also Press Release, LCH.Clearnet, LCH.Clearnet Successfully 
Manages Lehman Default (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.lchclearnet.com/media_centre/press_ 
releases/2008-09-23.asp (commenting on the successful management of Lehman’s default which resulted in a 
90% decrease in risk exposure); Press Release, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., ISDA CEO Notes 
Success of Lehman Settlement, Addresses CDS Misperceptions (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.isda. 
org/press/press102108.html (commenting on the success of the CDS settlement system during the Lehman 
default and the continued liquidity of CDS contracts as opposed to their cash equivalents). One tool used 
during Lehman’s credit-default-swap settlement process was default management. See id. Default management 
transfers a defaulting client’s positions to mitigate risk to nondefaulting members through a combination of 
hedging, trading out of positions, and auctioning of parts of the remaining portfolio. LCH.Clearnet’s default 
rules are available at http://www.lchclearnet.com/Images/Default%20Rules_tcm6-43736.pdf. LCH.Clearnet, 
using SwapClear’s default-management process, successfully managed Lehman’s default using only 35% of 
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credit-default-swap market, and neither did credit default swaps directly cause 
the downfall of either firm nor did the failure of either firm lead to a domino of 
failures of credit-default-swap counterparties.69 AIG, however, is another 
story. 
3. AIG: A Case Study 
AIG is often cited as proof of the inability of the market to cope with the 
risk created by derivatives transactions.70 AIG was indeed a major participant 
in the derivatives market—it was a major seller of credit-default-swap 
protection—and its failure threatened to spread throughout and potentially 
destroy the financial system, thus necessitating a massive, taxpayer-financed 
bailout.71 However, AIG neither failed nor was bailed out because of 
derivatives. Its failure is perhaps better seen as a sui generis example of 
stupidity or cupidity or both. 
 
Lehman Brothers’ margining with no loss to other market participants. See Building the New Derivatives 
Regulatory Framework: Oversight of Title VII of the Dodd–Frank Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 73–74 (2011) (statement of Ian Axe, Chief Executive, LCH.Clearnet 
Group Limited); see also Letter from Roger Liddell, Chief Exec. Officer, LCH.Clearnet, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-34-10/s73410-30.pdf 
(expressing the concern that new proposed rules that would require real-time reporting and public 
dissemination of security-based-swap-transaction information would “undermine the default management 
process and have a negative effect on market stability”). 
 69 See, e.g., Clearing Up the Credit Swaps Fog—Letting Opaque Markets Grow Unchecked Was 
Inexcusable, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 16, 2008, at 10 (“The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, 
where most CDS trades are registered, now estimates that only about $6bn need physically change hands next 
week when Lehman CDS are settled. The vast majority is netted out, and systemic risk appears marginal.”); 
Stefano Giglio, Credit Default Swap Spreads and Systemic Financial Risk 3 (Jan. 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/finance/archive/pdf/giglio_jmp.pdf 
(performing an analysis of CDS spreads and bond prices to find that spikes in CDS spreads in the month 
before Bear Stearns’s collapse and after Lehman’s default do not correspond to spikes in systemic risk but 
instead with idiosyncratic default risk of one or a small number of banks). The fear of counterparty risk did 
lead major dealers to frantically attempt to reduce exposure using novations and assignments. See Mark 
Pengelly, Rocked by Counterparty Risk, RISK.NET (Nov. 1, 2008), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/ 
1498483/rocked-counterparty-risk. Novations are a method by which to exit derivatives positions by 
transferring, rather than terminating, the transactions to alternate derivatives dealers. It is up to the transferee, 
generally a bank, to accept the assignment of the trade. See id. Many banks reported a spike in requests for 
novations in the run-up to Lehman and immediately afterwards. See id.; see also Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 
11–12 (discussing the risks posed by “counterparty runs” through novation and by other means). 
 70 See duPont, supra note 30, at 843–45. 
 71 See Brady Dennis & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., A Crack in the System, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2008, at A1 
(treating the failure as the work of rogue derivatives traders); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a. 
htm (announcing the bailout and explaining that “disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant 
levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, 
and materially weaker economic performance”). 
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AIG did not fail because of its derivatives positions. In the words of 
Professor Richard Squire: 
[I]n fact the liabilities on AIG’s derivative contracts were not big 
enough in themselves to break the company. Rather, the conduct that 
undid AIG was a company-wide affair, in which derivatives traders at 
an AIG subsidiary sold contingent debts linked to subprime 
mortgages, and then fund managers at the AIG parent company 
cranked up the internal correlations on those debts by purchasing 
risky mortgage-backed securities for the company’s general 
investment portfolio. When the housing market collapsed, it was the 
combined damage to both sides of AIG’s balance sheet that brought 
the company to the brink of bankruptcy.72 
AIG had entered the derivatives business through a subsidiary offering 
bespoke instruments that were, initially at least, fully hedged.73 Eventually, 
however, the subsidiary began to take unhedged credit-default-swap positions 
for investment purposes, many of which were based on indices of subprime 
loans.74 AIG, in other words, began to behave more like a speculative investor 
than a hedged dealer.75 Moreover, derivatives were only one means, and not 
even the principal means, by which AIG undertook subprime-mortgage risk. 
The company accumulated a portfolio of mortgage-backed securities more than 
twice the size of its credit-default-swap portfolio.76 AIG failed because of the 
speculative positions it took on subprime mortgages, and derivatives were 
merely one of several means the company used to take on that speculative 
position. 
Not only were derivatives not the underlying cause of AIG’s collapse, they 
were also not the underlying cause of its bailout. AIG’s failure may indeed 
have posed a grave danger to financial markets, but the source of this danger 
was not the typical risk inherent in derivatives transactions, which is the failure 
 
 72 Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1184 
(2010) (emphasis omitted). 
 73 The subsidiary, AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), took advantage of the AAA credit rating and 
guaranty of its corporate parent to price its products aggressively. Am. Int’l Grp., 2007 Annual Report (Form 
10-K), at 5 n.(g), 83, 179 (Feb. 28, 2008). 
 74 However, even as AIG was increasing its exposure to subprime mortgages, the company did not do so 
entirely, or even principally, by means of derivatives. Instead, the company focused on purchasing mortgage-
backed securities, in which it accumulated a portfolio more than twice the size of its $60 billion notional 
exposure to credit default swaps. See id. at 102. 
 75 See Stulz, supra note 53, at 25 (“AIG did not behave like a dealer. It did not run a matched book. It did 
not appear to hedge.”). 
 76 See Am. Int’l Grp., supra note 73, at 104. 
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of a major dealer spreading contagion to its counterparties.77 Rather, the danger 
was that AIG would default on its debt “at a time when there already was a run 
on money markets.”78 There is, in fact, little evidence to suggest that AIG’s 
collapse would have caused widespread counterparty failure.79 AIG’s 
counterparties were protected by the collateral AIG had posted against its 
positions—$35 billion by the time of AIG’s ultimate bailout in December 
2008.80 This collateral would have been available to AIG’s derivatives 
counterparties in the event of default.81 It may not have made AIG’s 
derivatives counterparties whole, but it would have cushioned the blow 
substantially.82 The far more dangerous scenario at the time was that AIG’s 
default would have led to a panic, causing short-term-credit markets to seize, 
 
 77 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (“If A.I.G. had collapsed—and been unable to pay all of its insurance claims—
institutional investors around the world would have been instantly forced to reappraise the value of those 
securities, and that in turn would have reduced their own capital and the value of their own debt.”); Eric Dash 
& Andrew Ross Sorkin, Throwing a Lifeline to a Troubled Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at C1 (“A.I.G. 
was one of the 10 most widely held stocks in 401(k) retirement plans, and . . . its collapse could potentially 
cause an enormous run on mutual funds.”); Stulz, supra note 53, at 26 (“A collapse of AIG would not have 
been a benign event for the markets.”). 
 78 Stulz, supra note 53, at 27. 
 79 CDSs are afforded special provisions under federal bankruptcy law permitting a nonbankrupt 
counterparty to offset any claims against collateral it holds without the general restraints imposed by 
bankruptcy law. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 980–81 (2009). 
Accordingly, AIG’s counterparties would have been able to retain the massive collateral posted by AIG, 
thereby decreasing the negative impact of AIG’s collapse. Id. 
 80 HENDERSON, supra note 6, at 633. 
 81 See Squire, supra note 72, at 1187–89 (discussing availability of collateral to counterparties in the 
event of default and how the operation of bankruptcy law made AIG’s general creditors, not its derivatives 
counterparties, the company’s most imperiled creditors). However, the coordinated collateral calls of various 
counterparties, uncertain about the value of their collateral, may have contributed to the collapse of the 
company. Cf. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 42, at 354–56 (discussing this phenomenon in 
the context of credit default swaps). The valuation of collateral thus may be an advantage of the central 
counterparty system described infra Part I.C.1. 
 82 Market participants use (1) collateralization, or the posting of collateral against exposures resulting 
from credit derivatives positions, and (2) netting, or offsetting exposure before collateral is posted, to reduce 
the counterparty risk of the credit derivatives market. See BOMFIM, supra note 5, at 27. Posting collateral is 
expensive, however, and therefore the amounts pledged typically cover less than the total net exposure 
between counterparties. Id. To account for this gap, market participants call for additional collateral after their 
marked-to-market exposure to a particular counterparty has risen beyond a previously agreed upon threshold 
level. Id. Netting, on the other hand, takes effect prior to the posting of collateral by allowing counterparties to 
offset aggregate positions with one another. Id. For example, where Bank A and Bank B have a large number 
of CDSs between them such that Bank A’s exposure amounts to $100 million and Bank B’s exposure amounts 
to $90 million, netting allows for the exposure of Bank A to Bank B to be limited to only $10 million. For 
further discussion of the method by which collateral is used to reduce counterparty risk, see Squire, supra note 
72, at 1187–89. For further analysis of netting in the clearinghouse context, see infra notes 96–98 and 
accompanying text. 
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resulting in corporations no longer being able to fund their short-term 
obligations.83 In other words, it could have resulted in a wave of insolvency in 
corporate America, triggering widespread layoffs and vast economic 
devastation—the possibility of which concerned policy-makers much more 
than counterparty credit risk. 
Thus, AIG is a rather poor example of how derivatives caused the failure of 
a major financial institution during the crisis. First, AIG’s failure was caused 
not by the paradigmatic risk inherent in derivatives transactions—counterparty 
credit risk. Rather, in amassing speculative risk in the underlying asset—here, 
subprime mortgages—the company behaved like an investor, not a dealer. 
Second, AIG was bailed out not because of the systemic risk it posed to 
derivatives counterparties but because of fears concerning the effect of its 
failure on short-term-credit markets. In fact, the counterparty failures that did 
occur during the financial crisis were handled fairly well with the tools 
traditionally at hand—collateral and netting. 
Having nevertheless been repeatedly offered as an example of how 
derivatives may wreak financial havoc on a firm,84 AIG has awakened 
discussion on several latent policy issues relating to derivatives regulation.85 
The financial crisis thus threw klieg lights onto the relationship between 
derivatives and systemic risk, and as systemic risk became the central focus of 
policy-makers in the wake of the crisis, these policy-makers likewise focused 
their efforts on derivatives reform. The results of these efforts, as enshrined in 
the Dodd–Frank Act and its regulatory progeny, are described in the next 
section. 
 
 83 See Holman Jenkins, The Never-Ending, Goldman–AIG Saga, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2010, at A13 
(stating that one of the chief reasons for the bailout of AIG was fear of a “wholesale run on the nation’s 
banking system”). 
 84 Craig Pirrong, The Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates 2 (CATO Inst., Policy Analysis No. 665, 2010), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA665.pdf (noting that AIG has been “routinely trotted out to 
demonstrate the need for clearing” in spite of being a misleading example). 
 85 In addition to the issues discussed below, the failure of AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman provoked a 
lively debate, beyond the scope of this Article, on the role of derivatives’ bankruptcy exemption in 
contributing to the financial crisis. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 158–63 (2010) 
(advocating the repeal of the special preferences derivatives receive in bankruptcy); Mark J. Roe, The 
Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 546 (2011) 
(arguing that existing bankruptcy rules subsidize derivatives, leading to overinvestment). 
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C. Dodd–Frank and the Mandatory Clearing of Derivatives Transactions 
Regardless, ultimately, of whether derivatives were a major causal factor in 
the global financial crisis, they were indeed a major focus of the legislative 
reforms following on the heels of the crisis. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act86 has the principal objective of 
containing financial risk by regulating the instruments and the institutions that 
package and promulgate it.87 Derivatives come under central focus in the Act 
as an instrument of financial risk, and Title VII of the Act sets forth a wholly 
new regulatory structure for OTC derivatives. 
In sum, the regulation of OTC derivatives under Title VII of the Act has 
three primary goals: (1) the minimization of systemic risk from derivatives 
transactions, (2) the establishment of transparency in derivatives markets, and 
(3) the creation of credit protection for derivatives counterparties. Moreover, 
under the statute, each of these basic goals is to be accomplished largely 
through a single structural innovation—the introduction of central 
counterparties, or “clearinghouses,” for derivatives transactions.88 The core 
idea, in other words, is to move as much OTC derivatives trading as possible 
onto clearinghouses and, wherever possible, onto exchanges, thus eliminating, 
or at least minimizing, bilateral transactions in favor of centralization.89 
 
 86 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 
U.S.C.). 
 87 23 BROKER–DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 2A:19 (Jerry W. 
Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen eds., 2d ed. 2011) (providing a brief overview of the Act’s purpose). 
 88 Central counterparties (CCPs) are a special variety of clearinghouse. Generally, a clearinghouse, such 
as the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, exists to manage counterparty risk between institutions by 
“clearing” and “settling” transactions. See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: 
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 904–06 (9th ed. 2002). Clearing transactions involves identifying 
and reconciling the obligations created by the trades, while settling includes the actual processing of the 
transaction, such as handling the details of payment and delivery. Id. In addition to handling the details of 
payment and delivery, CCPs, such as LCH.Clearnet, “guarantee” the transactions that they clear, standing 
ready to fulfill the obligations of any defaulting members. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 13, at 263; see also 
CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 67, at 72–75. Although clearinghouses are employed across all asset classes, the 
risk exposure of derivatives, and, more specifically, credit derivatives, is fundamentally different than 
traditional securities, prompting some to recommend CCPs. Viral V. Acharya et al, Regulating OTC 
Derivatives, in REGULATING WALL STREET 367, 399 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011). This Article uses the 
term clearinghouse in favor of the jargonized central counterparty, but in doing so, it is referring to the special 
problems of clearinghouses in the derivatives context, not in the more traditional securities context. 
 89 How much bilateral trading will ultimately wind up on clearinghouses is a subject of great uncertainty 
and some debate. Some estimate a substantial majority will ultimately be cleared. See SKEEL, supra note 85, at 
70 (offering the view that “a large majority of derivatives will find their way to clearinghouses and exchanges 
within a few years” and citing the prediction of Professor Duffie that “60 percent would be cleared within a 
year, [and] 80 percent within four years”). 
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Centralizing transactions on clearinghouses facilitates regulatory oversight of 
derivatives and increases the transparency of the market, but the principal 
systemic risk advantage, discussed in greater detail below, is the mitigation of 
counterparty credit risk through netting and reserving.90 The paragraphs that 
follow discuss these advantages and describe how centralized clearing is 
expected to work. 
1. Central Counterparties and Clearing 
Clearinghouses use centralization to address the systemic risk inherent in 
bilateral derivatives transactions. “Clearing” a trade effectively means that a 
clearinghouse positions itself as a “central counterparty” between two market 
participants seeking to take opposite positions—a buyer and a seller.91 Rather 
than transacting bilaterally, the buyers and sellers transact with the 
clearinghouse.92 By positioning a clearinghouse as the seller to every buyer 
and the buyer to every seller, the hitherto disorganized world of bilateral 
derivatives trading thus comes to resemble an orderly hub-and-spoke 
arrangement with the clearinghouse at the center and all other sellers and 
buyers at the periphery.93 
This rearrangement of the derivatives market has the effect of redistributing 
the risk inherent in derivatives transactions. To see this, recall the two basic 
forms of risk in derivatives: the risk of the underlying and counterparty credit 
risk. First, with regard to the underlying, the clearinghouse remains perfectly 
 
 90 In connection with the Act’s goal of making the OTC derivatives market more transparent, data, such 
as trading volumes and prices, must be gathered for all swaps. For cleared and exchange-traded swaps, this 
data will be compiled by the relevant clearing organization or exchange. For uncleared swaps, all parties must 
report their trades to a registered swap-data repository or, if no such repository exists for the relevant 
transaction, directly to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), as applicable. 7 U.S.C. § 6r(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring that each security-based 
swap not accepted for clearing by a clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization (DCO) be reported to 
a swap-data repository, or if none exists, to the SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(e) (same). 
 91 See Elizabeth Schubert & Antony Bryceson, Mechanics of Derivatives Clearing, PRACTICAL L. 
COMPANY, http://usfinance.practicallaw.com/9-505-9203#null (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) (providing a chart 
that models the relationship between the end user, counterparty, and clearinghouse). 
 92 End users will still execute their contracts with a dealer who, as a clearinghouse member, will bring 
the clearinghouse into the contract through one of two possible methods, depending upon the rules of the 
clearinghouse. First, the dealer may act as an agent of the clearinghouse, in which case the end user would 
technically contract with the clearinghouse through the dealer as the clearinghouse’s intermediary. See id. 
Alternatively, the dealer may act as a principal, facing the end user directly and then submitting the contract to 
the clearinghouse through novation, the result of which is that the clearinghouse is substituted as the 
counterparty to the transaction. See id. 
 93 See Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 6 fig.1. 
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neutral, taking on no risk at all. Instead, whatever long position it takes from 
the original seller is immediately offset by a corresponding short position with 
the original buyer and so on with every cleared trade. The clearinghouse’s 
trades offset automatically, leaving it with zero exposure to the underlying, the 
risk of which is borne entirely by the original transacting parties. 
The situation is reversed with respect to counterparty credit risk. By 
becoming the seller to every buyer and the buyer to every seller, the 
clearinghouse effectively undertakes all counterparty credit risk while the 
transacting parties have zero exposure to their original counterparties and, as 
long as the clearinghouse remains solvent, no exposure to counterparty credit 
risk. Or, to say the same thing in a slightly different way, the clearinghouse 
steps in to guarantee the performance of every cleared trade. Maintaining the 
solvency of the clearinghouse, of course, is the critical issue to which we shall 
return directly, but before we do, it is worth pausing to consider the effect of 
this reallocation of risk on systemic risk. As we have seen, systemic risk, in the 
context of derivatives transactions, is principally counterparty credit risk, 
which had been spread throughout the bilateral derivatives market. Now, to the 
extent that previously bilateral trades are cleared, counterparty credit risk will 
be centralized in one place: clearinghouses. As long as clearinghouses can 
contain counterparty credit risk, their introduction will have effectively 
removed the systemic risk inherent in derivatives transactions from the 
financial system. 
Whether clearinghouses will be able to contain counterparty credit risk thus 
becomes the all-important question. If they cannot, then the introduction of 
clearinghouses is likely to have the perverse effect of increasing systemic risk, 
rather than mitigating it, because the failure of a clearinghouse, as the 
counterparty to every buyer and every seller, will transmit losses throughout 
the financial system and, because such a failure is most likely in a period of 
extreme financial stress, either trigger still more failures or necessitate a 
government bailout. The stakes, in other words, are high. The discussion that 
follows will examine the clearinghouse in greater detail, focusing on who will 
ultimately decide such critical questions as who the clearinghouse members 
will be, what the clearinghouse reserve requirements will be, and what 
financial products the clearinghouse will clear. 
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2. Clearinghouse Membership 
A first question to answer is who the clearinghouse will be. Clearinghouse 
members are those with the authority to bring the clearinghouse into 
derivatives trades, either directly by acting as an agent of the clearinghouse in 
executing trades with a counterparty or indirectly through novation of a 
contract separately entered into with the counterparty.94 Thus, the 
clearinghouse functions only through its members. The question of 
clearinghouse membership thus becomes critical. Who will they be? From 
what pool will they be drawn, and what characteristics will they share? 
First and most obviously, its members are likely to be the large dealers that 
execute trades that, in the new world of mandatory clearing, must be cleared by 
the clearinghouse.95 But dealer membership raises the specter of 
anticompetitive behavior and the risk that large dealers will use clearinghouse 
access to protect their market share from new entrants. Recognizing this 
possibility, Congress in the Dodd–Frank Act required that clearinghouse 
membership rules be objective, be publicly disclosed, and “permit fair and 
open access.”96 In putting these policies into effect, the regulators have gone 
some distance toward defining the contours of clearinghouse membership, but 
the clearinghouse itself will still have considerable discretion in determining 
the policies and procedures relating to membership. 
Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have proposed rules forcing open 
clearinghouse membership to all market participants meeting basic financial 
tests focusing on the risks prospective members would pose to the 
clearinghouse.97 Following on the core risk requirement that clearinghouses be 
 
 94 See supra note 92. 
 95 See Antony Bryceson, Clearing OTC Derivatives: The Dodd–Frank Act and the New EU Regulation, 
PRACTICAL L. COMPANY, http://us.practicallaw.com/1-504-8968?q#null (last modified Jan. 1, 2011). 
 96 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 725(c), 
§ 5b(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1688 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c) (Supp. IV 2010)); see also Risk 
Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 3698, 3700–01 (proposed 
Jan. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39). 
 97 See, e.g., Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 
69,334, 69,415 (Nov. 8, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140) (requiring clearinghouses to “allow all 
market participants who satisfy participation requirements to become clearing members”); Clearing Agency 
Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,472, 14,479 
(proposed Mar. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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able to withstand the default of their largest member,98 the basic membership 
test is whether the prospective member has “sufficient financial resources and 
operational capacity to meet the obligations arising from participation” in the 
clearinghouse.99 The regulators therefore accept that clearinghouse 
membership standards will focus on capital requirements. Allowing capital 
requirements for membership to be set too high, however, goes against the 
principle of open access and raises the specter of anticompetitive behavior on 
the part of the clearing members. Both regulatory agencies would therefore cap 
the clearinghouse minimum-capitalization requirements at $50 million.100 In 
other words, every market participant with $50 million in capital and an ability 
to meet ongoing operational requirements gets in.101 
Having stipulated the basic admissions criteria for clearinghouse 
membership, the regulators reaffirm the authority of clearinghouses to make 
their own rules with regard to membership privileges by expressly allowing 
clearinghouses to scale a member’s activities to the risks the member poses to 
the clearinghouse.102 Members, that is, need not participate in clearing on equal 
terms. As described in the SEC’s proposed rule, “[T]he clearing agency’s 
policies and procedures could be reasonably designed to limit the activities of 
the participant in comparison to the activities of other participants that 
maintained a higher net capital level.”103 Although this principle of scalable 
membership privileges reintroduces discretion to clearinghouses, both 
regulators emphasize that any differential granting of access among members 
 
 98 Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 14,479. For further discussion of proposed capital requirements as they apply to clearinghouse’s 
“largest members,” see infra Part I.C.3. 
 99 Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 3698, 3700 
(proposed Jan. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39). 
 100 Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,355; 
Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
14,482. The SEC also expressly allows the minimum capital requirement to be raised upon a showing by the 
clearinghouse to the SEC that raising the bar is necessary for risk management purposes. Id. 
 101 In justifying the $50 million minimum-capital limit, the SEC points out that only 4% of broker-dealers 
could satisfy this test and asserts that making the test any higher “could introduce unnecessary barriers to 
clearing access.” Id. Proposed Rule 17Ad-22(d)(4) sets forth several general, ongoing operational rules 
requiring “clearing agencies to establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to identify sources of operational risk and minimize these risks through the development 
of appropriate systems, controls, and procedures.” Id. at 14,486. Only one specific example of an operational 
requirement is provided as a “business continuity plan[] that allow[s] for timely recovery of operations.” Id. 
 102 Id. at 14,482; Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
3701. 
 103 Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 14,482. 
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must be founded upon written policies and procedures and must be based upon 
principles of risk management.104 The regulators, in other words, are concerned 
that the scalability of membership privileges will become the bar to 
competition that access to membership cannot be under their proposed rule-
making. That they have sought to combat this by adopting principles, rather 
than rules, further reflects the amount of discretion that will remain with 
clearinghouses. 
Both regulatory agencies would bar clearinghouses from requiring 
members to be dealers, maintaining a swap portfolio of a certain size, or 
clearing a minimum volume of transactions.105 The CFTC goes further, adding 
to these bright-line rules several standards in principle, including a no-less-
restrictive-alternative principle under which clearinghouses are enjoined from 
adopting restrictive membership requirements if less restrictive requirements 
would achieve the same objective and not materially increase clearinghouse or 
member risk.106 The SEC rule-making, by contrast, seems to admit 
considerably more discretion on the part of the clearinghouse in designing its 
membership requirements. For example, while acknowledging that portfolio 
size and trading volumes are generally poor proxies for risk, the SEC 
emphasizes that they could be used as factors for admission as long as they are 
not absolute bars to entry.107 
In requiring the admission of nondealers as clearinghouse members, the 
regulators are seeking to promote indirect clearing arrangements. Such 
arrangements, where nonmembers clear their trades through separate 
contractual arrangements with a clearing member, are also referred to as 
“correspondent clearing.”108 For correspondent clearing to work, clearinghouse 
 
 104 Id. at 14,482–83; see also Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 3701. 
 105 Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,353–54; 
Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
14,480–82. 
 106 Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,352. 
 107 In its rule-making, the SEC states: 
[T]he proposed rule would not prohibit a clearing agency that provides CCP services from 
considering portfolio size and transaction volume as one of several factors when reviewing a 
potential participant’s operations. Rather, the proposed rule would prohibit the establishment of 
minimum portfolio sizes or transaction volumes that by themselves would act as barriers to 
participation by new participants in clearing. 
Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
14,482. 
 108 LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 353 (2003). 
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members have to be willing to enter into these arrangements with 
nonmembers. Recognizing that dealer-members may be unwilling to enter into 
these arrangements with their competitors, the regulators have sought to 
mandate clearing access for nondealers.109 While the SEC has been more 
explicit in articulating the rationale underlying this rule-making,110 the CFTC 
can be seen to have acted out of similar considerations in, for example, 
adopting its proposed rule prohibiting clearinghouses from requiring at least 
one of the parties to a trade to be clearinghouse members.111 Again, however, 
in the interest of greater competition among dealers, these proposed rules do 
not require clearinghouses to disregard considerations of risk or to compromise 
on other admissions standards in order to promote the admission of nondealers, 
instead requiring only that clearinghouses not deny membership “to otherwise 
qualified persons solely by virtue of the fact that they do not perform any 
dealer . . . services.”112 
In sum, the regulators are aware that the goal of enhancing dealer 
competition through open and fair access to clearing will occasionally clash 
with the goal of containing systemic risk.113 And it is important to note that, 
 
 109 The logic underlying this view is that large dealers have an incentive to keep new entrants—smaller 
dealers who cannot meet membership-eligibility requirements—from capturing their trading volume. It is 
predictable, therefore, that large dealers will deny correspondent clearing arrangements with small dealers to 
deny them access to this trading volume. However, nondealer clearing members, such as hedge funds, will not 
have these incentives and may therefore be willing to enter into correspondent clearing arrangements with 
small dealers. To allow these arrangements to proliferate, the regulators are seeking to protect nondealer access 
to clearing membership. Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release 
No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. at 14,481. 
 110 In the words of the Commission: 
The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring clearing agencies that perform CCP 
services to allow persons who are not dealers . . . to become members of the clearing agency will 
promote more competition in and access to clearing through facilitating indirect clearing 
arrangements, commonly referred to as correspondent clearing. Correspondent clearing is an 
arrangement between a current participant of a clearing agency and a non-participant that desires 
to use the clearing agency for clearance and settlement services. 
Id. 
 111 See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,360. 
 112 Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 14,481. 
 113 See, e.g., Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 3698, 
3700, 3701 (proposed Jan. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39) (recognizing the “tension between 
these goals” but asserting a belief that “they can be harmonized”); Ownership Limitations and Governance 
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and 
National Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, Exchange Act 
Release No. 63,107, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,886 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) 
[hereinafter Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance] (acknowledging that “affording 
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when they do clash, the regulators’ consistent choice is to prefer the objective 
of risk management to that of enhanced competition among dealers. This 
underscores once again that risk management is primary in clearinghouse 
design and that the impulse to mandate inclusiveness in membership must be 
tempered by the need to allow clearinghouses the discretion to appropriately 
manage systemic risk. At the end of the day, clearinghouses will draft their 
own criteria for admission and design their own guidelines for access, subject 
to relatively few bright-line rules, provided that they can defend their policies 
and procedures as necessary for the management of systemic risk. 
3. Loss Mitigation: Netting and Reserving 
Clearinghouses have two basic tools for managing counterparty credit risk: 
netting and reserving. Netting can be understood as a positive externality of 
centralization. Once transactions are centralized on a clearinghouse, netting 
works automatically to reduce total losses. A reserve, by contrast, must be built 
and overseen, which requires human intervention and, therefore, governance. 
Netting reduces total losses stemming from the failure of a dealer by 
offsetting the dealer’s negative (or “out of the money”) positions against its 
positive (or “in the money”) positions.114 Netting is only possible with some 
level of centralization. To see this, consider the effects of a dealer’s failure in 
the more-or-less decentralized world of bilateral transactions. In this scenario, 
the dealer may have positive trades with some counterparties and negative 
trades with others, but there would be no mechanism by which the positions 
could be combined to mitigate the aggregate loss. Contrast this with an 
environment in which all derivatives transactions are cleared by a single 
clearinghouse, in which case the aggregate loss stemming from a dealer’s 
failure could be reduced by offsetting all of the dealer’s positive trades with its 
negative trades.115 Real-world obstacles to such idealized cross-netting include 
 
greater access to the clearing agency at some point may come at the expense of sound risk management 
practices”). 
 114 SHANI SHAMAH, A CURRENCY OPTIONS PRIMER 55 (2004); see also ROBERT DUBIL, FINANCIAL 
ENGINEERING AND ARBITRAGE IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 146 (2011). 
 115 Netting through a clearinghouse may reduce systemic risk if a dealer becomes insolvent. To see this, 
assume that Dealer A is down $100 on its position to Dealer B, who is down $100 on its position to Dealer C, 
who is down $100 on its position to Dealer A. Without clearing, if Dealer A defaults, Dealer B effectively 
loses $100. A clearinghouse, however, can make adjustments across positions, reallocating the gains and 
losses so that Dealer B is made whole and Dealer C is no better or worse off than it would have been prior to 
A’s default. This form of multilateral netting effectively reduces counterparty risk, thereby mitigating the 
systemic risk posed by the failure of a significant dealer. In order to accomplish netting, however, derivatives 
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multiple clearinghouses that are not linked, as well as contractual and other 
bars to netting across instruments and asset classes.116 Nevertheless, netting 
can play a significant role in reducing aggregate loss from counterparty credit 
risk without significant human intervention.117 
The second means by which clearinghouses seek to contain counterparty 
credit risk is through the creation of reserves to settle the losses stemming from 
default. Reserving is a term from the insurance industry referring to the 
creation of pools of capital to pay expected losses.118 The term is not typically 
used in this context; however, clearinghouses clearly do build reserves against 
counterparty credit risk loss both through the taking of margin collateral and 
through the establishment of a guaranty fund, each of which is discussed 
below. 
Clearinghouses take collateral, referred to as margin, from their 
members.119 There are two forms of margin: initial margin and variation 
margin.120 Initial margin is the amount of collateral that a member must post to 
the clearinghouse to clear a trade.121 Variation margin is exchanged daily 
between the clearinghouse and the trader to reflect changes in value of the 
trader’s position over time.122 The amount of each is the product of a fairly 
complex analysis. The amount of initial margin will be based upon the risk 
posed to the clearinghouse from the cleared trade—the expected cost to the 
clearinghouse of settling the trade in the event that the defaulting member fails 
to make a required variation payment.123 The initial margin calculation thus 
 
trades must be treated differently in bankruptcy than the claims of other creditors, as indeed they are. See 
supra note 85. 
 116 See Manmohan Singh, Making OTC Derivatives Safe―A Fresh Look 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 11/66, 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1166.pdf (“[I]f 
there are multiple CCPs that are not linked, the benefits of netting are reduced, because cross-product netting 
will not take place (since CCPs presently only offer multilateral netting in the same asset class and not across 
products).”). 
 117 See Pirrong, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3–4); Manmohan Singh, Collateral, Netting and Systemic 
Risk in the OTC Derivatives Market (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/99, 2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1099.pdf. 
 118 Ronald F. Wiser, Loss Reserving, in CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC’Y, FOUNDATIONS OF CASUALTY 
ACTUARIAL SCIENCE 197, 197 (4th ed. 2001) (“Loss reserving is the term used to describe the actuarial process 
of estimating the amount of an insurance company’s liabilities for loss and loss adjustment expenses.”). 
 119 See LOADER, supra note 7, at 125. 
 120 Id. at 129. 
 121 ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, AN INTRODUCTION TO CAPITAL MARKETS: PRODUCTS, STRATEGIES, 
PARTICIPANTS 254–56 (2002). 
 122 Id. 
 123 See Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 7. Should a trader default on a required variation payment, the 
clearinghouse would liquidate the instrument to settle the trade with the holder of the opposite position. Id. 
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depends upon the volatility and liquidity of the underlying instrument, as well 
as the size of the trade.124 Variation margin, as the name suggests, changes 
depending upon fluctuations in the value of the trade. For relatively liquid 
instruments, such as interest rate swaps, the value of the trade can be marked to 
market and the variation margin easily determined by reference to the current 
market value.125 For less liquid instruments without a readily ascertainable 
market value, however, clearinghouses will be forced to mark to model,126 thus 
introducing the possibility of error inherent in such models.127 Variation 
margin can result in the transfer of funds either way—from the trader to the 
clearinghouse or from the clearinghouse to the trader—depending upon 
fluctuations in the value of the instrument, but again, the clearinghouse is 
always net zero in variation margin because the gains of one trader triggering a 
clearinghouse margin payment will be exactly offset by the losses of another 
trader triggering a transfer to the margin account of the clearinghouse. 
Margin accounts may be adequate to settle one-off failures in actively 
traded instruments. The success of margin as a defense against systemic risk, 
however, depends upon the ability of the clearinghouse to unwind positions in 
a timely and orderly manner. In the case of the default of a significant member 
holding large, inactively traded positions, it may be difficult for the dealer to 
manage the default by recourse to the defaulting dealer’s margin alone. The 
lack of active trading in an instrument may necessitate a significant reduction 
in price to liquidate the position, especially if it is a large position. Likewise, 
 
Because there will be some time lag between the calculation of and default on the variation payment, on the 
one hand, and the liquidation of the instrument, on the other, the clearinghouse must set initial margin at an 
amount equal to potential changes in market value during this time lag. See id. (“The initial margin should 
exceed, in most extreme scenarios, the change in market value of the derivatives position over this time 
window.”). 
 124 See id. (“For example, the initial margin for a credit default swap is generally greater than that for an 
interest rate swap of the same notional size because of the potential of sudden changes in the credit quality of 
borrowers referenced in most credit default swaps.”). Liquidity is a consideration because “the difference 
between the bid and offer prices for some types of derivatives could suddenly increase during a period of 
financial stress.” Id. 
 125 See Aline van Duyn & Gregory Meyer, Exchange Template for Derivatives Criticised, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 15, 2010, 8:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c222f2ae-c0dc-11df-94f9-00144feab49a.html#axzz1kt6 
kO3VU (citing a major dealer’s estimate that “the most liquid derivative was the 10-year US dollar interest 
rate swap, with just over 500 trades a day” and that “[t]he most liquid credit default swaps, used to place bets 
or hedge against defaults on debt, were contracts on General Electric, and those traded just 15 times per day”). 
 126 See STEVEN ALLEN, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 110–20 (2003). 
 127 On the failure of quantitative models and their consequences, see Felix Salmon, A Formula for 
Disaster, WIRED, Mar. 2009, at 74. Another famous example would be the failure of the quantitatively driven 
investment fund Long-Term Capital Management. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED 
(2000) (detailing the rise and fall of Long-Term Capital Management). 
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even actively traded instruments may decline significantly in value if multiple 
large positions must be sold at the same time. Such fire-sale prices may 
compound losses from default and exceed the defaulting dealer’s margin 
account, in which case an additional mechanism would be required if the 
clearinghouse is to contain systemic risk. This is the guaranty fund. 
A clearinghouse’s guaranty fund is quite simply a reserve account against 
member default.128 Each member, upon joining the clearinghouse, must make a 
contribution to the guaranty fund separate from and in addition to the 
establishment of a margin account.129 The guaranty fund is then held by the 
clearinghouse to settle losses from dealer default in excess of margin.130 Again, 
as with netting, the creation of a guaranty fund as a defense against systemic 
risk depends upon centralization. Without centralizing derivatives trading 
though a clearinghouse or other intermediary, market participants would have 
no mechanism by which to create pooled reserves and establish orderly 
default-management procedures. 
The guaranty fund is likely to be the clearinghouse’s last best means of 
containing counterparty credit risk.131 A clearinghouse may design additional 
protections, such as a further contractual right to contributions from 
clearinghouse members, but these additional protections are likely to be of less 
value in times of financial stress (when the member-guarantors are likely in 
weak financial condition themselves).132 Moreover, a contractual commitment 
from clearinghouse members to provide additional capital in times of severe 
stress does not, in any event, have the effect of containing risk because the 
required additional contributions have the effect of spreading loss to 
nondefaulting dealers.133 Thus, the likely recourse to clearinghouse resources 
in the event of member default would proceed first from the exhaustion of a 
defaulting member’s own margin account, second to the defaulting member’s 
 
 128 See Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 7 (defining a clearinghouse’s guaranty fund as an “additional layer 
of defense, after initial margin,” for the purpose of covering losses arising out of the failure of members to 
perform on a cleared derivative). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 7, 25. 
 131 See id. 
 132 Id. at 19, 22. 
 133 Moreover, banks may object to backup draws on member interests in the event that the guaranty fund 
is depleted because the existence of this contingent liability would require banks to set aside capital against 
this prospective loss, thereby incurring costs today on an event that may not occur in the future. From a policy 
perspective, of course, this does not amount to a reason not to adopt backup draws, but as a practical matter, it 
may amount to an explanation for why they may not in fact be adopted and a further example of the moral 
hazard problem affecting the large dealers, described in greater detail infra Part II.A.1. 
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own guaranty fund contributions, and third to the pooled guaranty fund. This is 
the “waterfall” of clearinghouse losses.134 Losses in excess of clearinghouse 
resources would lead to the failure of the clearinghouse and the imposition of 
loss on the clearinghouse’s counterparties—the members transacting through 
the clearinghouse. 
Both netting and reserving are means by which clearinghouses seek to 
contain counterparty credit risk.135 Failure to do so would result in 
clearinghouses, because of their central position in derivatives transactions, 
spreading loss and, ironically, increasing systemic risk. Furthermore, how the 
clearinghouses adapt and use these tools is left largely to the discretion of the 
clearinghouses themselves, underscoring again the vital importance of 
clearinghouse governance. 
With regard to margin, although Dodd–Frank requires clearinghouses to 
use margin, it does not delegate authority to set clearinghouse margin to the 
regulators but rather leaves this determination up to the clearinghouses 
themselves.136 The regulators have responded to this statutory structure by 
requiring clearinghouses to use “risk-based models” to determine margin 
requirements but leaving the substance and frequency of the risk modeling and 
margin requirements up to the clearinghouses themselves.137 The SEC, for 
example, explicitly allocates discretion to clearinghouses to “tailor” margin 
requirements to their particular needs.138 
 
 134 See Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 24 fig.3. 
 135 Id. at 4; see also JON GREGORY, COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK: THE NEW CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 50–53 (2010). Neither is necessarily unique to clearinghouses. Private parties can and 
typically do demand collateral in noncleared derivative trades. See Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 17. 
Moreover, private parties can also enter into netting agreements, allowing multiple contracts to be offset 
against each other. The main advantages of the clearinghouse would seem to be that it can accomplish netting 
more efficiently than can disaggregated private parties and that it can more easily provide for the creation of a 
guaranty fund. Insofar as clearinghouses can accomplish ex post loss mitigation more effectively through 
netting, it may be possible for them to take less collateral than private parties would ex ante and still maintain 
the same overall risk exposure. 
 136 The Act requires dealers and major swap participants to meet initial and variation margin requirements 
but delegates regulatory authority to set those requirements only for uncleared swaps. See Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731, 124 Stat. 1376, 1705 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4s(e)(2)(A)–(B) (Supp. IV 2010)) (concerning swaps); id. § 764(a), 124 
Stat. at 1786–87 (concerning security-based swaps). 
 137 Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 14,472, 14,478 (proposed Mar. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); see also Derivatives 
Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,365 (Nov. 8, 2011) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140). 
 138 Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, 76 Fed. Reg. at 14,478. The CFTC offers a 
bit more detail, requiring that the clearinghouses “appropriately address jump-to-default risk” but leaving all 
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With regard to the guaranty fund and other capital requirements, Dodd–
Frank generally requires a clearinghouse to have at least sufficient capital 
reserves to be able to withstand the default of its largest member and to cover 
operating costs for one year.139 The regulators’ proposed rules regarding 
capital requirements differ slightly. The CFTC requires sufficient capital to 
enable the clearinghouse to withstand the default of its single largest member 
unless the clearinghouse is deemed systemically important, in which case it 
must have sufficient capital to withstand the default of its two largest 
members.140 The SEC, by contrast, would require clearinghouses to “maintain 
sufficient financial resources to withstand, at a minimum, a default by the two 
participants to which it has the largest exposures in extreme but plausible 
market conditions,” unless the clearinghouse does not clear credit default 
swaps, in which case it needs to be able to withstand the default only of its 
single largest member.141 In spite of these general guidelines, clearinghouses 
retain broad discretion over how they model risk and design their reserve 
requirements. Overseeing these matters is perhaps the most vital aspect of 
clearinghouse governance. 
4. Clearing Eligibility 
The Dodd–Frank Act makes it illegal to enter into a swap transaction 
without submitting the swap to a clearinghouse “if the swap is required to be 
cleared.”142 Characteristically, the Act leaves the determination of what is 
required to be cleared to the regulators, here the SEC and the CFTC, 
enumerating a set of criteria on which the determination should be made, 
including the liquidity of the instrument and the quality of available pricing 
data.143 Liquidity and pricing data figure prominently in the determination of 
clearing eligibility because they are essential factors in valuing derivative 
 
details up to the discretion of the clearinghouses themselves. Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives 
Clearing Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 3698, 3704 (proposed Jan. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39). 
Jump-to-default risk is “the risk that the sudden onset of a credit event will cause an abrupt change in a firm’s 
CDS exposure.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-397T, SYSTEMIC RISK: REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT AND RECENT INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS RISK POSED BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 3 (2009). 
 139 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 725(c), § 5b(c), 124 Stat. at 1688 
(applying this rule to the CFTC); id. § 763(c), 124 Stat. at 1772 (applying the rule to the SEC). 
 140 See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
69,344–45. On the factors for deeming an institution to be “systemically important,” see 12 U.S.C. § 5468. 
 141 Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, 76 Fed. Reg. at 14,479. 
 142 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 723, 124 Stat. at 1675 (regarding 
swaps); id. § 763(a), 124 Stat. at 1762 (regarding security-based swaps). 
 143 Id. § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1676, 1677 (CFTC review and criteria); id. § 763(a)–(b), 124 Stat. at 
1762–69 (SEC review and criteria). 
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instruments and therefore in determining appropriate clearinghouse reserves, 
either in the form of margin or guaranty fund contributions.144 Systemic risk is 
not well managed by a clearinghouse that accepts illiquid or difficult-to-price 
instruments for clearing because it may thus find itself with inadequate 
reserves and, therefore, at greater risk of failure. Foreseeing this possibility, the 
Act prohibits the regulators from requiring a swap to be cleared if it would 
threaten the “financial integrity” of the clearinghouse.145 
Of course, requiring too little clearing also has negative implications for the 
effective management of systemic risk. Because clearinghouses are the 
principal means of containing systemic risk, allowing derivatives transactions 
to take place off of clearinghouses effectively means that the systemic risk 
inherent in those trades continues unabated.146 The larger the volume of trading 
that takes place off of the clearinghouse, the larger the lingering threat of 
systemic risk.147 In this way, both too much and too little clearing threaten to 
increase systemic risk. 
The regulatory solution to this problem appears to be to allocate 
considerable discretion to the clearinghouses themselves. Whether a swap “is 
required to be cleared” turns upon whether there is a clearinghouse that accepts 
the swap for clearing.148 It is thus for the clearinghouse to make the initial 
 
 144 Illiquid or difficult-to-price instruments pose problems for effective daily margining and, in the event 
of dealer failure, are difficult to unwind. Therefore, making the clearinghouse a party to such trades through 
clearing increases the risk of loss to the clearinghouse and, in an extreme case, increases the likelihood of 
clearinghouse failure. For a discussion of price discovery, see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 145 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 745(b), § 5c, 124 Stat. at 1737. 
 146 This is perhaps most clear when one considers banks’ incentives. If trades that are not cleared will be 
subject to higher capital charges or higher margin, a percentage of those trades will likely not be done, leaving 
the risk that the bank would otherwise have transferred on its own balance sheet. Balancing the cost of keeping 
the risk on the bank’s balance sheet against the cost of entering into the swap, indeed it seems likely that only 
the riskiest trades will then get done because less risky positions impose less cost on the balance sheet. Hence, 
either more risk remains at banks, or these high-risk, uncleared trades essentially remain subject to the 
problems experienced in the OTC market during the recent crisis—opacity as to both the value of the trade and 
the value of any collateral, difficulty in posting collateral, heightened fear of counterparty defaults, panicked 
collateral calls, and so on. 
 147 It is worth pointing out in this context, as at least one other commentator has, that “the instruments that 
brought down AIG would never have been clearable.” Pirrong, supra note 84, at 24. 
 148 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1676; see also 
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODD–FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND 
INSIGHTS 56 (2010), available at http://www.skadden.com/cimages/sitefile/skadden_insights_special_edition_ 
dodd-frank_act1.pdf. 
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determination of clearing eligibility.149 Moreover, in the regulations 
implementing the statutory mandate, the CFTC makes clear that not all swaps 
that are in fact accepted for clearing will be made a subject of mandatory 
clearing.150 Rather, “a DCO is required to submit to the Commission each 
swap . . . that it plans to accept for clearing, and the Commission is required to 
review each submission and determine whether clearing is required.”151 
However, in its review, the CFTC notes that it will take into account the 
“views [of the clearinghouse] as to whether the swaps being submitted should 
be subject to a clearing requirement.”152 
In addition to the discretion of the clearinghouse in determining whether to 
accept a particular swap for clearing, thereby triggering a submission to 
determine whether clearing should be mandatory, the Dodd–Frank Act also 
allows for regulators to make this decision on their own accord, thus 
effectively mandating clearing for a particular category of swaps.153 However, 
it is difficult to imagine that the regulators will act very aggressively in this 
context, because any error on their part essentially forces an inappropriate 
instrument onto a clearinghouse and thus increases systemic risk, the very 
opposite of the effect the regulators are seeking. Likewise, regulators may 
hesitate to disturb clearinghouse determinations regarding clearing eligibility 
in light of this fine line between mitigating and creating systemic risk. This 
conjecture is supported by the statement of the CFTC, which emphasized that 
at least its initial efforts to mandate clearing will be exclusively in reaction to 
determinations made by existing clearinghouses: “[T]he initial mandatory 
clearing determinations would only involve swaps that are either already being 
cleared or that a [clearinghouse] wants to clear. Once those determinations are 
made, the Commission will be in a better position to assess that portion of the 
swaps market that remains uncleared.”154 The greater part of the discretion on 
this point, in other words, is likely to lie with the clearinghouse. 
Some have suggested a structural solution to the clearing-eligibility 
problem, essentially advocating the adoption of punitively high margin 
 
 149 If a clearinghouse decides a particular swap should be cleared, it submits its determination to the 
appropriate regulator for approval. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 723(a)(3), 
124 Stat. at 1676. 
 150 See 17 C.F.R. pt. 39.4(c)(2) (2011). 
 151 Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,464, 44,468 (July 26, 2011) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1676. 
 154 Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,469. 
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requirements for bilateral trades, thereby incentivizing dealers to move as 
much trading onto clearinghouses as possible.155 Others have responded to this 
suggestion by arguing that, because dealers would likely pass these costs on to 
their customers in the bilateral market, imposing them would have the effect of 
penalizing small-end users who have highly specific risk management needs—
community banks, for example—thereby making it impossible for them to 
manage risk effectively.156 As a result, it is highly likely that a great deal of 
discretion in determining clearing eligibility will remain in the hands of the 
clearinghouses. 
II.  INCENTIVE PROBLEMS IN CLEARINGHOUSE OPERATION 
Thus, as we have seen, a great deal of discretion in the management of 
systemic risk will reside in the clearinghouses themselves. Although subject to 
some degree of regulatory supervision, clearinghouses have the discretion in 
the first instance to decide who their members will be and what privileges they 
will have, what reserves members will be required to set aside, and what 
products are eligible to be cleared. These decisions, of course, go to the heart 
of systemic risk management. The clearinghouses, in other words, have the 
basic responsibility for making the decisions that determine whether they will 
be successful in managing systemic risk. The question thus becomes who at the 
clearinghouse will make those decisions. Who, in other words, will direct 
clearinghouse governance? 
The first and most obvious answer to this question is that those parties with 
commercial interests in the clearinghouse, either as dealers or as customers, are 
most likely to seek a controlling role in clearinghouse governance, either by 
investing in the clearinghouse and exerting this control as owners or by 
leveraging their commercial relationships to exert influence over clearinghouse 
governance. But do these commercial parties have the correct incentives to 
manage systemic risk? The dealers, after all, are the same financial institutions 
 
 155 See, e.g., Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 
76 Fed. Reg. 23,732, 23,744 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 23) (requiring each 
covered dealer to calculate and to collect from its counterparties initial margin for each bilateral swap 
transaction that was not cleared by or through a DCO); Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 13 (“[R]egulations 
should favor the provision of collateral to counterparties and the clearing of derivatives positions.”). 
 156 See, e.g., Letter from Mark Scanlan, Vice President of Agric. & Rural Policy, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of 
Am., to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-39-10/ 
s73910-47.pdf (urging the SEC to adopt an exception to capital and margin requirements for community banks 
that would not hinder the use of customized swaps utilized by community banks, which generally have little 
risk). 
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on whose watch the housing bubble was inflated, the bursting of which nearly 
destroyed the global financial system.157 Even if derivatives dealers are not 
directly responsible for the financial crisis, their hands may not be sufficiently 
clean to leave critical decisions in the management of systemic risk largely up 
to their discretion. Likewise, the commercial incentives of end users and 
clearinghouse shareholders may be more powerful than and occasionally 
contrary to their interest in minimizing systemic risk. 
The discussion that follows examines the commercial incentives of the 
parties involved in derivatives transactions and asks how these incentives are 
likely to impact clearinghouse governance, specifically with regard to the 
management of systemic risk. Is the enlightened self-interest of the various 
commercial parties likely to result in effective governance? Or is there reason 
to doubt the ability or willingness of various commercial parties to engage in 
the effective management of systemic risk? 
A. Dealers: Large and Small 
Most derivatives transactions in the United States are concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of banks. Two frequently cited statistics from a report 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reveal that five banks—
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and HSBC—
account for 96% of the notional amounts and 83% of the net credit exposure of 
the U.S. banking industry.158 Others acknowledge the statistic but argue that it 
is misleading both to view the derivatives market as comprised only of banking 
companies and to view the market as national, rather than global.159 A 
competing study measuring the market from a global perspective not limited to 
banking companies puts the market share of the five largest U.S.-based dealers 
at 37%, rather than 96%.160 The difference in these numbers reflects the fact 
 
 157 The same could be said, of course, of the regulators. See supra Part I.B. 
 158 See ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON 
BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: FIRST QUARTER 2011, at 1, Graph 5A (2011), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq111.pdf. 
 159 See, e.g., Letter from Robert Pickel, Exec. Vice Chairman, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter ISDA Comment Letter], available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-79.pdf. 
 160 See Summaries of Market Survey Results, ISDA, http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html (last visited 
Aug. 6, 2012) (reporting results of a survey of seventy-one International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) “Primary Member firm” participants). 
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that a significant portion of the derivatives business is offshore.161 But, even 
considering the market from a worldwide perspective, trading volume remains 
fairly concentrated, with 82% of the total notional amount outstanding ($354.6 
trillion of $466.8 trillion) in the hands of fourteen dealers.162 
How did this happen? Two basic market factors may be sufficient to 
explain the concentration of trading volume in the hands of a small number of 
major dealers. First, in a world of bilateral trading and widespread counterparty 
credit risk, dealers may have developed a preference for trading with large, 
well-established financial institutions on the grounds that such institutions had 
higher credit quality and therefore represented lower counterparty credit risk. 
Second, at least with regard to credit default swaps, part of the explanation is 
in the product itself.163 Credit default swaps are uniquely difficult to hedge. 
The principal means of doing so requires either taking a position on the 
underlying debt securities or entering into an offsetting credit default swap.164 
Of these two possibilities, entering into another credit default swap is the better 
alternative for efficiency reasons—it can be done faster and can more precisely 
match the risk of the instrument to be hedged. However, because the best way 
to hedge a credit default swap is with another credit default swap, firms with 
access to a large volume of credit default swaps are in a better position to 
manage risk efficiently, which in turn enables them to price aggressively and 
capture greater volume, thus creating a self-perpetuating cycle concentrating 
the credit-default-swap market in the hands of a few major dealers. Market 
factors may thus have been sufficient to drive the vast majority of derivatives 
trading volume into the hands of a few major dealers.165 
 
 161 The total combined notional amount outstanding of interest rate, credit, and equity derivatives on June 
30, 2010, was $466.8 trillion. Id. The five largest U.S.-based dealers accounted for a notional amount 
outstanding of $172.3 trillion, representing 37% of the total global notional amount. Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Many other types of derivatives products exist aside from CDSs, with CDSs accounting for only 5.6% 
of the total derivatives market as reported by the ISDA Market Survey. Id. The unique structure of CDSs, as 
further explored in this paragraph, results in the concentration of CDS trading volume in a small group of 
dealers. 
 164 Other underlying assets may be hedged via synthetic positions created by call options, put options, or 
forward contracts. For example, buying an asset today and at the same time locking in a future selling price 
with a forward contract generates a hedged return, which does not depend on what happens to the underlying 
asset price. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 13, at 509 (defining synthetic positions). 
 165 Some have suggested other reasons for dealers’ concentration in CDSs, including the prospect of 
insider trading on the basis of the dealer’s inside knowledge of a borrower’s credit situation. See, e.g., Viral V. 
Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 110 (2007). 
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Volume, of course, means profitability, both for dealers and for market-
infrastructure providers.166 Clearinghouses, exchanges, and other market-
infrastructure providers all depend upon fee income based on trading 
volume.167 Moreover, the value of clearinghouses and exchanges to their 
participants increases on the basis of their ability to offer liquidity,168 which is 
of course closely related to trading volume. The ability to provide a high level 
of liquidity thus gives rise to another self-perpetuating cycle: more volume 
means more liquidity, which attracts further volume, creating further liquidity, 
and so on. Furthermore, the marginal cost to a market platform of taking on 
additional volume is minimal, while the benefits in providing further liquidity 
are potentially great. As a result, access to volume is extremely valuable to 
market-infrastructure providers and is a considerable source of market power 
for dealers.169 Large dealers are therefore able to extract terms from market-
infrastructure providers that smaller dealers cannot hope to receive.170 
Meanwhile, entering into these arrangements lowers large dealers’ cost of 
trading, thereby enabling them to compete more effectively on price and thus 
capture even greater volume. Moreover, because these deals based on trading 
volume are available to large dealers but not small dealers, small dealers pay 
more for market infrastructure, effectively subsidizing the cost of providing 
these services to their large-dealer competitors. 
Because of the differences in market power between large dealers and 
small dealers, the following discussion considers their incentives separately, 
examining their sources of profit and how a new regime of mandatory clearing 
is likely to affect those profits. It also discusses how large and small dealers are 
likely to react to the new regime and how their actions will affect the ability of 
clearinghouses to manage systemic risk. 
 
 166 See generally RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD’S MARKETS: THE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 9–13 (2011) (defining infrastructure and discussing the economics of providers of market 
infrastructure). 
 167 Id. at 128. 
 168 Id. at 257, 267. 
 169 See Letter from Kenneth A. Monahan, Vizier Ltd., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Feb. 8, 
2011) [hereinafter Monahan Comment Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-
107.pdf (“[E]ven the top 100 end users combined have less market impact than the smallest dealer.”). 
 170 Market platforms offer discounts, rebates, and profit-sharing arrangements to large dealers, essentially 
seeking to buy their trading volume. See Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher, President & CEO, Better Mkts., Inc., 
and Wallace C. Turbeville, Derivatives Specialist, Better Mkts., Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murray, Sec’y, SEC 3 
(Nov. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Better Markets Comment Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
27-10/s72710-88.pdf (“It [is] commonplace for Market Infrastructure providers to buy volume from dominant 
dealers by so-called commercial arrangements like revenue or profit sharing, liquidity rebates, or discounts.”). 
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1. Large Dealers 
Dealers profit from derivatives transactions through the spreads that they 
charge on their trades—the difference between the (lower) price at which they 
will buy and the (higher) price at which they will sell,171 a fee arrangement 
familiar to anyone who has ever changed currency at an airport.172 Dealer 
profits thus have both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. The 
quantitative dimension is simple volume—the more volume a dealer controls, 
the greater its profits will be even if spreads are relatively narrow. Certain 
kinds of trades, however, such as highly customized, or “bespoke,” swaps, are 
qualitatively different from more standardized trades and can therefore 
command higher spreads and significant profitability without large trading 
volumes.173 This is the qualitative dimension. 
Major dealers historically have enjoyed large profits of both types. Because 
bilateral derivatives trading is notoriously opaque, it is difficult to estimate the 
profitability of dealers’ trading activities with any precision, but at least one 
estimate put banks’ revenues from derivatives trading in the tens to hundreds 
of billions of dollars annually.174 
Clearing, it is generally supposed, will reduce major dealers’ profits from 
derivatives trading along both quantitative and qualitative dimensions.175 The 
mandate to clear as much as possible is likely to reduce the availability of 
highly customized, high-margin bilateral transactions, thus shrinking profits 
 
 171 See Duffie et al., supra note 40, at 10 
 172 LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS § 3.4.7, 
at 58–59 (2003). 
 173 See RICHARD BRUYÈRE ET AL., CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND STRUCTURED CREDIT: A GUIDE FOR 
INVESTORS 124 (Gabrielle Smart trans., 2006). 
 174 See Letter from Sherrod Brown, U.S. Senator, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC, and Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Nov. 17, 2010) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-68.pdf 
(“[B]anks’ derivatives dealing profits frequently exceed $100 billion per year . . . .”). 
 175 Why else, some have argued, would most dealers have lobbied so fiercely against it? Consider the 
reaction of Senator Harkin: 
Some market participants have argued that the types of conflicts described by the 
Commissions . . . will not emerge because clearing and executing on trading platforms is 
financially profitable or because clearing does not reduce profits in trading. This argument is 
incorrect. Indeed, if this were the case, those market participants would not have opposed the 
clearing and execution requirements of the Act in the first place. 
Letter from Tom Harkin, U.S. Senator, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC, and Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
SEC 3 (Nov. 17, 2010) (footnote omitted), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-63. 
pdf. 
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along the qualitative dimension.176 Likewise, profits derived from the 
quantitative aspect of derivatives trading are likely to be reduced as well for 
three basic reasons.177 First, bid–ask spreads are likely to shrink to the extent 
that clearing and, especially, exchange trading brings greater transparency to 
the market, enabling clients to demand narrower spreads and competitors to 
price more aggressively. Second, clearinghouses are likely to enforce more 
stringent collateral and reserve requirements than most large derivatives 
dealers had observed in their bilateral trades, thereby reducing the dealers’ 
ability to deploy this capital more productively. Although it may be possible, 
due to the efficiencies promised by clearinghouses through netting, for 
clearinghouses to demand less ex ante collateral than private parties would 
have required in the OTC market and nevertheless maintain the same level of 
risk overall,178 many have argued that derivatives transactions have been 
woefully undercollateralized relative to their risk.179 It is therefore difficult to 
imagine, especially considering the highly regulated environment in which 
they are likely to operate, that clearinghouses will be able to demand 
significantly less collateral than private parties in fact have demanded. 
Similarly, clearinghouse requirements that dealers maintain segregated 
collateral accounts may limit the ability of dealers to earn returns by investing 
client collateral.180 Third and finally, the institution of clearing, if successful, 
effectively eliminates dealers’ counterparty credit risk and, with it, the 
principal advantage of keeping the vast majority of derivatives trading among a 
 
 176 In other words, the profits of dealers’ OTC operations are likely to be eroded as more and more 
previously customized products are moved into standardized forms and brought onto clearinghouses and, 
possibly, exchanges. See Brian Bollen, Central Clearing Could Damage Pensions, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 
10, 2011, at 17, 17 (noting that the standardization of previously customized OTC products “would be felt not 
only on the technical side of the business” but would also affect “mean additional costs (widely estimated at 
the equivalent of 100–200 basis points lower performance), making it a certain drag on income”). 
 177 See, e.g., DARRELL DUFFIE, PEW ECON. POLICY DEP’T, HOW SHOULD WE REGULATE DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS? (2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/policy%20page/Pew_Duffie_Derivatives_ 
Paper_FINAL-TF-Correction.pdf; ROBERT E. LITAN, INITIATIVE ON BUS. & PUB. POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE 
DERIVATIVES DEALERS’ CLUB AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORM: A GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS, CITIZENS 
AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 29 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/ 
2010/0407_derivatives_litan/0407_derivatives_litan.pdf (discussing the likelihood that bid–ask spreads will 
decrease due to increased transparency despite dealer attempts to widen margins); Duffie et al., supra note 40, 
at 10–11. 
 178 See supra note 135. 
 179 See Singh & Aitken, supra note 39, at 12 (finding that, although CCPs are a positive initiative, the 
recent problems market participants face with derivative positions are those of insufficient collateral and initial 
margin). 
 180 Protection of Collateral of Counterparties to Uncleared Swaps; Treatment of Securities in a Portfolio 
Margining Account in a Commodity Broker Bankruptcy, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,432, 75,433 (proposed Dec. 3, 2010) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 23, 190). 
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small group of (supposedly) high-credit, quality dealers. As a result, small 
dealers may be able to compete more effectively with large dealers for trading 
volume and, if successful, eventually erode the ability of the major dealers to 
extract concessions and subsidies as a result of their control over volume. 
Some challenge the notion that clearing necessarily will reduce the 
profitability of the major dealers.181 Objectors point to at least two significant 
advantages to large dealers that may offset the reduction in per-trade 
profitability. First, clearing reduces banks’ regulatory capital requirements 
because derivatives transactions that require daily payment of variation margin 
may be excluded altogether from Basel II’s risk-based capital requirements.182 
Similarly, banks can attribute a zero-risk weight for regulatory capital purposes 
to derivative transactions when made through a clearinghouse.183 These 
reductions in banks’ regulatory capital requirements will free capital for more 
productive uses, thereby at least partially offsetting reductions in trading 
profits. Second, clearing allows large dealers to benefit from trade 
compression—essentially, the flip side of netting—whereby a dealer’s position 
with a clearinghouse is viewed on the aggregate for purposes of determining 
collateral requirements.184 Central clearing may also offer back-office savings 
to major dealers.185 
 
 181 E.g., Letter from John M. Damgard, President, Futures Indus. Ass’n, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, 
CFTC, and Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 6 (Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Damgard Comment Letter], 
available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-62.pdf (“Swap dealers and other enumerated 
entities . . . will have a significant incentive to submit their trades to a clearinghouse that outweighs any 
potential pricing advantage they might gain by trading in the OTC markets.”); Letter from Ernest C. Goodrich, 
Jr., Legal Dep’t Managing Dir., Deutsche Bank AG, and Marcelo Riffaud, Legal Dep’t Managing Dir., 
Deutsche Bank AG, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC, and Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2–3 (Nov. 8, 
2010) [hereinafter Goodrich & Riffaud Comment Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-
10/s72710-9.pdf (“Clearing itself does not adversely affect the profitability of bilateral swaps. In fact, swaps 
subject to clearing result in more favorable regulatory capital requirements, and clearing can therefore improve 
profitability.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 182 See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (2006), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf. 
 183 That is, exposure at default of zero. See generally 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. F (2011) (discussing capital-
adequacy requirements); id. pt. 225 app. G (same). 
 184 To understand trade compression, consider that, currently, if A enters into a trade with B and into 
another trade with C, there is no netting across the A–B and A–C transactions. However, if both transactions 
are centrally cleared and if A–B is positive and A–C is negative, netting will allow for A to post a lower 
amount of collateral. This compression of trades has the effect of lowering the dealer’s total cost of trading. 
 185 I am grateful to Professor Whitehead for raising this possibility. He writes: 
Today, bank A must enter into, monitor, and coordinate separate collateral arrangements with 
customers B, C and D. That requires that the trades with each of them be monitored and marked 
daily/weekly, etc., and collateral sent or received to/from each of them. With a central 
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Although large dealers’ profitability of trading through clearinghouses 
remains ambiguous and depends, in large part, on the specific rules adopted by 
clearinghouses and regulatory agencies, there are several reasons to doubt that 
the advantages to clearing will outweigh their ultimate costs to major dealers. 
Both of the principal advantages cited above amount to a liberation of 
unproductive capital from either regulatory requirements or disaggregated 
margin commitments, but high clearinghouse margin and guaranty fund 
requirements are likely to more than offset the regulatory capital advantage. 
Moreover, the advantages of compression may not be so great when compared 
with collateral requirements that previously may have been honored more in 
the breach than in the observance and that, going forward, are likely to be 
strictly enforced. In any case, the compression of spreads and the increase in 
competition from smaller dealers is likely to significantly erode the trading 
profits of the major dealers. 
All of this, then, raises the question of what dealers are going to do about it. 
Will they stoically accept reduced profits as the business changes around them, 
or will they act decisively to preserve the profitability of their business? To ask 
this question, of course, is to answer it.186 Indeed, the board of directors of a 
dealer would breach its fiduciary duties to its shareholders if it did not seek 
ways to preserve its profitability in a shifting regulatory environment. So, 
assuming a new regulatory environment of mandatory clearing, we can ask 
how the major dealers will seek to influence clearinghouse governance to 
protect the profitability of trading. 
Most obviously, perhaps, major dealers have an incentive to exert 
governance control to keep clearing-eligible products off of clearinghouses so 
that they can continue to trade in the higher margin bilateral market. The key 
factors in deciding whether a particular instrument must be cleared are 
 
counterparty, it will be much more of a one-stop system. I suspect the annual back office savings 
to the large dealers will be significant. 
E-mail from Charles K. Whitehead, Assoc. Professor of Law, Cornell Law Sch., to author (Aug. 14, 2011, 
6:19 PM) (on file with author). 
 186 Any significant doubt on this point is quickly set aside by reference to the amounts dealers have been 
spending to lobby legislators and regulators on these issues. See Brokers & Banks Group Spends $1.3M 
Lobbying in 1Q, YAHOO! NEWS (June 30, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/brokers-banks-group-spends-1-3m-
lobbying-1q-023557519.html (noting that the securities-industry trade group spent $1.33 million in the first 
quarter of 2011 to lobby the federal government on new rules governing the financial markets); Ben Protess, 
Wall Street Lobbyist Aims to “Reform the Reform,” N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 14, 2011, 11:06 AM), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/wall-street-lobbyists-try-to-reform-the-reform/?ref=business (profiling the 
work of a leading industry lobbyist in altering proposed rules for the financial industry). 
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liquidity and the ability to reliably price the instrument—both of which come 
down to, essentially, the standardization of a particular instrument.187 Dealers 
with an interest in keeping their trades on the bilateral market may therefore 
engage in faux customization and seek to use their leverage over clearinghouse 
governance to induce clearinghouses to accept their characterization of an 
instrument that is, in fact, fairly standardized as, instead, highly customized 
and therefore not eligible for clearing. Regulators may (or may not) see 
through such attempts at faux customization, but one should remember that, in 
the first instance, determinations concerning clearing eligibility are likely to be 
made by the clearinghouse, which may be subject to dealer influence. 
Moreover, regulators may be hesitant to disturb clearinghouse determinations 
concerning clearing eligibility, considering the fine line between mitigating 
systemic risk by bringing in as many appropriate instruments as possible and 
potentially increasing systemic risk by imposing clearing on illiquid or 
difficult-to-price instruments.188 Dealers may be able to take advantage of this 
deference to keep trades off of clearinghouses that should in fact be cleared. 
A significant dealer role in clearinghouse governance is therefore 
problematic because dealers have a clear incentive to protect the profits they 
receive from the bilateral market—what I have called the qualitative 
dimension—by keeping trades off of clearinghouses. Keeping trades off of 
clearinghouses has obvious systemic risk implications: a clearinghouse cannot 
contain the risk of trades that it does not clear. In this way, a significant dealer 
role in clearinghouse governance raises systemic risk concerns. 
The major dealers may also use their influence over clearinghouses to 
protect the quantitative dimension of trading profits, using the clearinghouse as 
a means of increasing their market share and excluding competitors. The 
clearinghouse offers two bases for exclusion: capital requirements or 
sophistication standards.189 Major dealers may use their influence on 
clearinghouses to cause margin collateral (or guaranty fund contributions) to 
be set at an excessively high level in an effort to limit membership to none but 
the largest financial institutions, thereby preventing smaller dealers and large 
end users from obtaining direct access to clearing and thereby preserving (or 
even strengthening) their stranglehold on trading volume. Alternately, large 
dealers might influence the clearinghouses into adopting sophistication 
 
 187 See supra Part I.C.4. 
 188 See supra Part I.C.4. 
 189 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 39.10–.13 (2011). 
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standards that limit membership to those dealers handling a high volume of 
derivatives trading as a means of excluding small dealers and end users. This 
may be an even more attractive means of controlling entry because it does not 
require the large dealers to commit large reserves of their own capital merely 
to keep less financially strong parties away. Rather, they can define the 
requisite volume requirements in such a way that only the largest dealers will 
be eligible to become members, confident that, once these sophistication 
standards are in place, smaller dealers, without the ability to clear trades 
directly, will never be able to meet them. 
As discussed in Part I.C.2, above, several proposed rules speak to some of 
these tactics, setting maximum-capital requirements and barring the use of 
volume and other sophistication standards as a means of limiting access to 
clearing. However, these rules clearly do not address every such means of 
excluding new entrants. For example, although the rules impose a maximum-
capital requirement, they do permit clearinghouses to scale membership based 
on risk.190 Moreover, although the rules bar sophistication as the sole basis for 
rejecting an applicant, they continue to allow it to be used as one of several 
factors in a determination to exclude.191 Thus, in spite of these efforts, ample 
discretion remains for major dealers to use the clearinghouse platform to 
exclude competitors. 
The major dealers have been charged with similar sharp tactics in the past. 
For example, in the fall of 2008, the hedge fund Citadel entered into a 
partnership with Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), a leading commodities 
exchange, to develop a clearinghouse and electronic-trading facility for credit 
default swaps.192 Around the same time, the major dealers entered into an 
arrangement with Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), one of CME’s key 
competitors then also in the early stages of establishing a clearinghouse for 
credit default swaps.193 Once the major dealers became a part of the ICE 
 
 190 See id. § 39.12(a)(2)(ii). 
 191 See id. § 39.12(a). 
 192 Serena Ng & Gregory Zuckerman, Crisis on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2008, at C2. End users, 
such as hedge funds, that frequently transact in derivative instruments will have strong incentives to reduce 
trading costs. See infra Part II.B. Their incentive, thus, will be to minimize dealer spreads, which pits them 
directly against dealers’ interests. 
 193 Louise Story, House Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at A1 (describing an arrangement under 
which the major dealers were entitled to a share of profits from clearing as well as influence over the 
governance structure of the clearinghouse). The history of ICE is also instructive. The major dealers, along 
with several major energy companies, had started ICE in 2000 as a platform to trade energy derivatives. Id. 
When ICE went public in 2005, the dealers cashed out much of their stake. Id. That they were able to exert so 
much influence over ICE’s efforts to clear credit default swaps three years after they had cashed out their 
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clearinghouse, they began to clear their trades exclusively through it, with the 
effect, due to their control over trading volume, that the ICE clearinghouse had 
trades to clear, and the CME clearinghouse had none.194 In this competitive 
environment, CME’s relationship with Citadel soon ended, and CME brought 
the dealers aboard on similarly preferential terms.195 Indeed, stories of dealer 
willingness to use their leverage over trading volume to extract significant 
commercial concessions abound. For example, in 2008, dealers allegedly won 
significant concessions from the London Stock Exchange by threatening to 
direct orders to their own exchange, Turquoise, instead.196 Likewise, 
Dealerweb, a dealer-backed bond-trading system, immediately captured 85% 
of the market for mortgage-bond trading within two months of its creation 
simply because the dealers directed their trading volume to it rather than to the 
competing platform.197 
Perhaps most instructive, however, are the governance arrangements that 
the major dealers won from the ICE clearinghouse in late 2008, including 
extremely high capital requirements with the effect of excluding all but the 
largest dealers from direct access to clearing. These requirements were used to 
deny membership to the Bank of New York and to State Street Corporation, as 
well as a number of smaller brokerage firms,198 decisions that generated 
sufficient controversy to induce a Bank of New York executive to comment in 
the New York Times, “‘We are not a nobody’ . . . . ‘But we don’t qualify. We 
 
ownership stake illustrates that the major dealers do not need ownership or voting stakes to effectively control 
market infrastructure for derivatives. 
 194 Id. According to the same press accounts, the dealers also used their leverage with Markit, which is an 
infrastructure provider that reports derivatives trading data and therefore is wholly reliant upon the information 
provided by the dealers, to refuse to provide market data to the CME clearinghouse unless a leading dealer was 
made a party to every trade. See id. (“Markit put . . . [the CME clearinghouse] in a tough spot by basically 
insisting that every trade involve at least one bank, since the banks are the main parties that have licenses with 
Markit.”). 
 195 Id. The dealers allegedly extracted governance concessions from CME similar to those they had won 
from ICE. Id. 
 196 See Monahan Comment Letter, supra note 169, at 6 (describing the transaction). The London Stock 
Exchange subsequently removed the nascent competitor by acquiring a 60% stake and merging the platform 
with subsidiary Baikal. Press Release, London Stock Exch., London Stock Exchange Group and Global 
Investment Banks to Partner in Pan-European Trading Venture (Dec. 21, 2009), available at http://www. 
londonstockexchange.com/about-the-exchange/media-relations/press-releases/2009/londonstockexchangeand 
globalinvestmentbankstopartnerinpaneuropeantradingventure.htm. 
 197 Matthew Leising & Jody Shenn, ICAP Loses 85% of Mortgage Bond Trading to Dealerweb, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2009, 5:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aCxa 
COeOAPBE. 
 198 See Story, supra note 193. 
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certainly think that’s kind of crazy.”199 Likewise, an executive at a brokerage 
firm commented, “It appears that the membership criteria were set so that a 
certain group of market participants could meet that, and everyone else would 
have to jump through hoops.”200 Similar allegations have surfaced surrounding 
LCH.Clearnet, a dealer-owned, European clearinghouse specializing primarily 
in interest rate swaps that requires a $1 trillion swap portfolio as a prerequisite 
to admission as a member.201 How one new entrant could acquire a $1 trillion 
swap portfolio without access to clearing is, of course, a good question and, 
perhaps, precisely the point of the admission requirement. 
None of this makes the major dealers look particularly good. However, it is 
not immediately clear what impact any of it has on systemic risk. Indeed, such 
allegations have the character of a trade dispute—when a pie is about to be 
divided, the hungry take out their knives. If our concern is principally systemic 
risk, then why not leave antitrust law to police the niceties of market power 
and appropriately competitive behavior?202 However, if the major dealers are 
able largely to exclude smaller dealers from direct access to clearing, requiring 
smaller dealers effectively to place their trades through larger dealers and 
thereby increasing their costs, then smaller dealers might have the same 
incentive as large dealers, described above, to avoid clearing and seek higher-
margin trading activity through faux customization. On balance, therefore, it 
would seem to make sense to give as many parties direct access to clearing as 
possible, including both large and small dealers as well as significant end 
users, provided that all of these parties can meet appropriate reserve 
requirements. What appropriate reserves are in this context is, of course, a 
 
 199 Id. (quoting Sanjay Kannambadi, CEO, BNY Mellon Clearing). Another possibility, however, is that 
ICE viewed BNY, which may then have been considering launching its own clearing unit, as a prospective 
competitor in clearing and therefore sought to exclude it for those reasons. See Jacob Bunge, BNY Mellon 
Launches New Derivative Clearing Unit, WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH (June 22, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://www. 
marketwatch.com/story/bny-mellon-launches-new-derivative-clearing-unit-2010-06-22 (reporting on the 
launch of a derivatives clearing unit by BNY Mellon). 
 200 Story, supra note 193 (quoting Marcus Katz, Senior Vice President, Newedge) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 201 LCH.CLEARNET LTD., CLEARING HOUSE PROCEDURES 6 (2012), available at http://www.lchclearnet. 
com/Images/Section%201_tcm6-57514.pdf. 
 202 See generally Letter from Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust 
Div. et al., to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Dec. 28, 2011), available at http://comments. 
cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26809 (follow “26809ChristineVarney.pdf” hyperlink) 
(urging the implementation of more stringent rules regarding ownership, conflicts of interest, and independent 
directors for designated contract markets, DCOs, and swap execution facilities out of concern that such entities 
may be able to use their control over trading platforms to limit competition). 
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question of clearinghouse governance that is perhaps not wise to leave in the 
hands of the major dealers. 
Still another objection that might be raised to the account up to this point is 
that, even accepting that the major dealers are not perfect and may suffer from 
the temptation to engage in anticompetitive conduct, they nevertheless have 
better incentives to manage systemic risk than any other interested party 
because they are in a position to bear the greatest share of losses from 
counterparty credit risk. The waterfall of losses inside the clearinghouse hits 
them first, and the failure of the clearinghouse to contain counterparty credit 
risk is a threat, primarily, to those dealers that most often transact through it. 
We ought, therefore, to trust in major dealers’ self-interest to protect both these 
resources and their solvency generally in granting them a leading role in 
clearinghouse governance. 
Nevertheless, drawing upon such familiar incentive problems as moral 
hazard203 and agency costs,204 as well as several well-documented cognitive 
biases, several strong reasons emerge for not simply entrusting dealers with the 
responsibility for managing systemic risk. First, and perhaps most obviously, 
dealers are likely to understand that, regardless of what politicians might say to 
the contrary, the federal government will not be able to keep itself from bailing 
out a failing clearinghouse.205 Knowing that they are thus the implicit 
beneficiaries of a federal guarantee, dealers may seek to impose excess risk on 
the clearinghouse in order to reap the benefits of higher fees through trading 
 
 203 See Y. Kotowitz, Moral Hazard, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY ECON. ONLINE, http://www. 
dictionaryofeconomics.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/article?id=pde2008_M000259&edition=current&q=mora
l%20hazard&topicid=&result_number=1 (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) (“Moral hazard may be defined as actions 
of economic agents in maximizing their own utility to the detriment of others, in situations where they do not 
bear the full consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to uncertainty 
and incomplete information or restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of full damages (benefits) to 
the agent responsible.” (emphases omitted)). 
 204 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“[I]t is generally impossible for the principal 
or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s 
viewpoint. . . . [T]here will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which 
would maximize the welfare of the principal.” (footnote omitted)). 
 205 Indeed, Dodd–Frank evinces a federal commitment to bail out clearinghouses. The so-called Pushout 
Rule in Dodd–Frank’s § 716 that prohibits “[f]ederal assistance . . . to any swaps entity with respect to any 
swap, security-based swap, or other activity,” Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 716(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1648 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305(a) (Supp. IV 2010)), 
does not include clearinghouses, id. § 716(d)(3), 124 Stat. at 1649. Moreover, § 806 authorizes the Federal 
Reserve to assist clearinghouses under “exigent circumstances.” Id. § 806(b), 124 Stat. at 1811. 
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volume.206 This is textbook moral hazard—essentially, playing with house 
money—and it has the predictable effect of inducing dealers to take excessive 
risk through the clearinghouse. 
Second, it is important to remember that dealers are not cohesive, 
monolithic entities but are far-flung institutions suffering from agency costs in 
the same way as any other large business. Agency costs harm organizations as 
a result of the disconnect between the incentives of the actors and interests of 
those for whom they are acting.207 In this case, the trading activity of major 
dealers is likely to be undertaken by a relatively small group of individuals 
who, because they have a history of producing large profits for the institution, 
are likely to be well-regarded and highly compensated.208 In fact, these traders 
are customarily paid through incentive compensation arrangements that award 
them for their productivity—the more trading profits they generate, the more 
highly they are paid.209 It does not take much effort to see that these traders 
may not have the same incentives as the organization as a whole because they 
may be able to maximize their personal compensation by taking on excessive 
trading risk that will be borne by the institution, not themselves personally. 
This dynamic is well illustrated by the many stories involving rogue traders at 
derivative desks in particular.210 
Dealers, of course, well understand this threat and have strong incentives to 
design controls to minimize it. Their ability to do so, however, may be 
constrained by a handful of well-documented behavioral biases that cause them 
predictably to underestimate the risk the institution bears as a result of trading 
activity. One set of biases suggests that individuals and institutions will 
systematically underestimate the likelihood of low-probability, high-impact 
events because of a tendency to focus only on risks that rise above an often-
 
 206 See Better Markets Comment Letter, supra note 170, at 9 (“It is predictable that, in an asymmetrical 
and anti-competitive market, an oligopoly of banks will take on excessive market price risk . . . .”). 
 207 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 204. 
 208 See, e.g., GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD 3–22, 41–56 (2009) (describing the importance of derivatives 
traders to banks). 
 209 Bonus compensation schemes provide traders with little or no incentive to lower risks, instead creating 
heavy inducements for increased risks. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 13, at 319–25 (describing trader 
incentive compensation plans and highlighting various financial disasters, such as at Barings and SocGen, 
caused by traders). 
 210 See, e.g., David Gauthier-Villars, Rogue French Trader Sentenced to 3 Years, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 
2010, at C1 (describing the sentencing of low-level trader Jerome Kerviel for hiding risky trading, at one time 
making an unauthorized bet of 50 billion euro); Jeremy Grant, Conduits of Contention, FIN. TIMES (London), 
June 16, 2011, at 9 (discussing the systemic importance of rogue traders, such as Singapore-based Nick 
Leeson, who triggered the collapse of the U.K.’s Barings Bank in 1995). 
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informal, experientially determined threshold.211 These suggest that dealers 
may often fail to appreciate the risks that their traders are taking in driving up 
profits. Similarly, recent accounts of major institutions’ failures to account for 
“tail risk” leading up to the most severe financial crisis have emphasized 
overoptimism and a similar tournament atmosphere where market-topping 
performance is valued more highly than conservative risk selection.212 Another 
candidate for the systematic underestimation of risk in this context is the 
“expert effect,” where higher level managers, several steps removed from the 
mathematical complexities of trading models, may be overly deferential to the 
financial expertise of star traders and their teams.213 These behavioral biases 
further suggest that the agency costs of major dealers are at the very least 
highly difficult to resolve, suggesting that incentives favoring excessive risk 
taking will persist. 
Third, and quite apart from accounts suggesting that excessive risk taking 
is in fact a mistake that dealers would like but are somehow unable to avoid, 
there is the possibility that dealers in fact act in their shareholders’ interests by 
taking on excessive risk, which, in the new regulatory environment, they will 
impose on clearinghouses. In an insightful theoretical account that he refers to 
as “correlation-seeking,” Professor Squire suggests that managers may in fact 
seek to correlate their firm’s contingent debt obligations with insolvency 
risk.214 By correlating contingent obligations to insolvency, a firm gets all of 
 
 211 See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise 
of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1488 (1993) (review essay) (describing the role of 
“threshold effects” in derivative regulation). For more on the cognitive science underlying threshold effects, 
see John C. Hershey et al., Sources of Bias in Assessment Procedures for Utility Functions, in DECISION 
MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS 422, 428 (David E. Bell et al. eds., 
1988); Howard Kunreuther, The Economics of Protection Against Low Probability Events, in DECISION 
MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRY 195, 195 (Gerardo R. Ungson & Daniel N. Braunstein eds., 1982); 
and Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 468–70 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 212 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES 136–46 (2010) (accounting for the causes and consequences 
of tail risk—essentially, low-probability, high-impact events occurring at the edges of a probability 
distribution); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate 
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 973–74 (2002) (discussing tournament 
incentives and their impact on managers). 
 213 See Hu, supra note 211, at 1491 (discussing the expert effect as applied to derivatives trading). The 
example of Long-Term Capital Management is also apt here. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 127, at 58 
(describing the demise of Long-Term Capital Management and the willingness of partners to defer monitoring 
of traders). 
 214 See Squire, supra note 72, at 1153 (“[It] creates an incentive for a firm’s managers to sell contingent 
claims against their firm that correlate—or that through asset purchases can be made to correlate—with the 
firm’s insolvency risk.”). 
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the upside of the contingent debt—fee income from undertaking the 
obligation—and none of the downside—if the triggering event should in fact 
occur, the firm will be insolvent and therefore excused of its obligation to 
pay.215 Squire views this as a form of opportunism and suggests it may have 
been present among firms—especially AIG—leading to the financial crisis.216 
If dealers were to engage in correlation-seeking, they would not mistakenly 
underestimate risk but intentionally undertake large amounts of contingent risk 
correlated to other events likely to lead to their insolvency. Although such a 
strategy might perversely benefit a dealer’s shareholders, it would also have 
the clear effect of imposing excessive risk on the dealer’s contractual 
counterparties—in this case, the clearinghouse. 
The purpose of this discussion has not been to prove that dealers will 
engage, for example, in correlation-seeking, but rather to demonstrate that the 
incentives of major dealers are sufficiently problematic not simply to entrust 
them with clearinghouse governance in spite of the fact that they are likely to 
suffer most directly in the event of clearinghouse failure. If they do not seek to 
keep clearable instruments off of the clearinghouse to preserve the qualitative 
dimension of trading profits, then they will be tempted to maximize the 
quantitative dimension by taking on additional risk and imposing that risk on 
the clearinghouse. In fact, they will very likely do both. 
2. Small Dealers 
Unlike the major dealers, small dealers do not have the trading volume to 
exert market power or extract concessions. Moreover, trading effectively costs 
small dealers more than large dealers because the various price concessions 
that infrastructure providers do offer to large dealers to buy volume are, in 
essence, subsidized by the smaller dealers who must use the same 
infrastructure service without pricing concessions. A similar situation is likely 
to develop on clearinghouses, where small dealers, if they are admitted at all, 
will in all likelihood be made to cross-subsidize large dealers. In this context, 
 
 215 Essentially, correlation-seeking creates an opportunity to benefit shareholders at unsecured creditors’ 
expense. Corporate managers may engage in correlation-seeking, first because the law charges them with a 
duty to make decisions in shareholders’ best interests, and second because their compensation plans create 
powerful incentives to do so. Id. at 1183 (“[T]he concept of correlation-seeking explains how managerial 
decisions that caused the firms to suffer deep losses may in fact have been consistent with the managers’ duty 
to maximize shareholder value.”). 
 216 Id. 
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small dealers will have two clear incentives: either avoid clearing altogether or 
reduce the cost of the clearinghouse. 
The small dealers’ incentives to avoid clearing are much the same as those 
of large dealers. Trades that are not cleared can be executed at larger spreads. 
Additionally, trades that are not cleared require less use of infrastructure 
services and therefore lower costs from the small dealers’ perspective. Small 
dealers may therefore seek to engage in faux customization and, if they have a 
voice in clearinghouse governance, to induce the clearinghouse to acquiesce. 
However, small dealers are also likely to seek to clear many of their trades 
because first, in a world of mandatory clearing, they will have no choice and 
second, without access to clearing, they will face difficulties in building their 
book of business and will always be at the mercy of larger dealers with direct 
access to clearing. However, because small dealers do not have the market 
power to extract concessions, clearing trades will remain a significant source 
of cost for smaller dealers. A central concern of small dealers, therefore, will 
be to reduce these costs, and one obvious means of doing so is through the 
reduction of reserve requirements. Moreover, the interest of small dealers in 
driving down reserve requirements is likely to be even greater than that of 
large dealers if, as discussed above, the lion’s share of the reserve account is 
effectively contributed by others—the large dealers. Small dealers in this 
situation will predictably take on more risk because they are effectively 
playing with other peoples’ money—yet another manifestation of moral hazard 
exposing the clearinghouse to systemic risk. 
Putting aside, again, the differences between large and small dealers, it is 
possible to view the incentive problems facing all dealer members of the 
clearinghouse as a variation of the traditional prisoners’ dilemma game.217 
Even assuming that all dealer members would prefer ex ante to maximize 
systemic stability, each would also recognize the moral hazard created by a 
clearinghouse structure that allows members to enjoy all of the benefits of 
trading (i.e., profits) without internalizing all of the costs (because losses, in 
the event of default, will be borne by other clearinghouse members). 
Understanding this, clearinghouse members could choose either to increase the 
 
 217 See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 211 (2009) (describing the prisoners’ dilemma as the basic coordination game in legal 
scholarship but emphasizing that game theory has evolved several other, potentially more applicable, models 
of various coordination problems); Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 42, at 330–36 (applying 
the Stag Hunt, Dove–Hawk, and Battle of the Sexes games to illustrate various coordination problems in 
financial markets). 
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monitoring of their fellow members or to capture some of these abnormal 
profits themselves by likewise engaging in activities that undermine the 
stability of the clearinghouse. The prisoners’ dilemma teaches that, without an 
opportunity to coordinate their activities and credibly commit to bringing about 
the outcome they favored ex ante, participants in such a game are likely to 
engage in ex post opportunism. The governance structure of the clearinghouse 
must ultimately respond to this incentive problem. 
B. End Users 
End users are dealers’ customers. They are the parties who buy and sell 
derivatives instruments to hold the risk for some period of time, not as in the 
case of dealers, for immediate resale to maintain a balanced book. End users 
may thus be industrial corporations or financial institutions seeking to hedge 
various exposures—to currencies or interest rates, for example. But, in terms 
of trading volume, they are more likely to be hedge funds and other financial 
investors often seeking to speculate on a particular risk.218 
The principal exposure to risk of end users in derivatives trading is the risk 
of the underlying, rather than, as in the case of dealers, counterparty credit risk. 
To be sure, end users will not want their counterparties to default—an end user 
who suffers losses in the underlying asset and faces simultaneous default from 
the counterparty with which the end user thought it had created a hedge faces a 
situation similar to the double-default scenario described above.219 In other 
words, while end users will be concerned about the credit quality of the 
counterparties to their trades—an interest they can address themselves through 
their contracts—they are likely to be less concerned about the systemic effects 
of counterparty credit risk. Moreover, the trading activity of end users engaged 
in hedging has much less potential to create systemic risk because their trades, 
driven by individual exposures to particular risks, are idiosyncratic and not 
interconnected.220 
Even more significantly, from the perspective of clearinghouse governance, 
end users engaged in hedging transactions are generally exempt from 
 
 218 See MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET 
ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2010 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1105.pdf. 
 219 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Giglio, supra note 69, at 3 (finding that spikes in systemic risk were linked to idiosyncratic default 
risk of one or a small number of banks, not CDSs in general). 
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mandatory clearing.221 Policy-makers’ rationale for exempting end users from 
mandatory clearing was essentially the fear of damaging commercial firms 
(and thereby consumers and investors) by burdening them with additional costs 
associated with mandatory clearing.222 The likely result of this exemption, of 
course, is that end users engaged in hedging are likely to be little more 
interested in clearinghouse governance than the average citizen in the street. 
End users whose activities do not meet the requirements for the exemption—I 
am speaking primarily of hedge funds and other investment vehicles that either 
fail to qualify as nonfinancial institutions or whose trading activities fail to 
qualify as commercial hedging—because they will have to clear their trades 
may still have an interest in how clearinghouses operate. The question remains, 
then: What will their interest be? 
The reduction of trading costs would seem to be an interest that all end 
users can agree on. Moreover, they are likely to view clearinghouses as a 
platform for doing so. Indeed, in a comment letter on the question of 
clearinghouse governance, TIAA-CREF makes this point explicitly, arguing 
that “the primary function of the Clearinghouse is to provide fair, open and 
transparent access to reasonably priced swap contracts.”223 Reducing costs 
from the customer’s perspective, of course, likely means reducing revenue—at 
least per-trade revenue—from the dealer’s perspective.224 Insofar as this is a 
 
 221 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723(a)(3), 
124 Stat. 1376, 1679 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7) (Supp. IV 2010)) (providing exceptions to the 
clearing requirement for swaps); id. § 763(a), 124 Stat. at 1762 (providing exceptions to the clearing 
requirement for security-based swaps); End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 
80,747 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39); End-User Exception to Mandatory 
Clearing of Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act No. 63,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 79,992 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 222 According to a letter from Blanche Lincoln and Christopher Dodd addressed to Barney Frank and 
Collin Peterson, the principal reason for the end-user exemption was the “substantial public interest in keeping 
costs low [for end users] (i.e., to provide consumers with stable, low prices, promote investment, and create 
jobs.).” 156 CONG. REC. H5248 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Collin Peterson). Likewise, Texas 
Senator Kay Hutchinson expressed the fear that, rather than hedging, end users might “choose market volatility 
instead of risk-controlling derivatives altogether, exposing Americans to higher prices, slower economic 
growth, and more job losses.” 156 CONG. REC. S5881 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kay 
Hutchinson). 
 223 See Letter from Jon Feigelson, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Head of Corporate Governance, 
TIAA-CREF, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, and David A. Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC 4 (Mar. 7, 2011) 
[hereinafter TIAA-CREF Comment Letter] (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
27-10/s72710-110.pdf. 
 224 This need not necessarily be the case if significant cost savings are also achieved. See supra note 185 
and accompanying text. 
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zero-sum game, the more success end users have in reducing fees, the greater 
the dealers’ need will be to seek revenue elsewhere. 
Dealers may seek to make up this lost revenue either by increasing volume, 
thereby pushing more and potentially inappropriate products across the 
clearing platform, or by innovating new products that are sufficiently 
customized to trade bilaterally where spreads are higher. As noted above, 
either one of these responses creates systemic risk. In this way, although it is 
true that end users, unlike dealers, do not have a direct interest that will result 
in increasing systemic risk, success in attaining their principal interest may 
indirectly spur dealers to do so.225 
C. Clearinghouse Shareholders 
The only other interest so far left out of this discussion of clearinghouse 
governance is that of investors in the clearinghouse other than dealers and end 
users. The reason for this is simple: There aren’t likely to be any. 
Dealers provide first-loss capital to clearinghouses through their 
contributions to margin accounts and guaranty funds, for which they are 
certain to demand a return.226 They may seek to extract rewards as equity 
holders—by providing some amount of equity capital in addition to their 
contributions to various clearinghouse reserves—or they may just as easily 
contract for a share of clearinghouse returns through price concessions and 
profit-sharing agreements. Both of these arrangements are common.227 But 
either method of allocating clearinghouse revenue to dealer interests, of course, 
has the effect of reducing the amount of such revenue available to other 
investors. Worse, these investors will not be able to free themselves of dealer 
influence because dealers’ control over trading volume—an absolute necessity 
for any clearinghouse because order flow not only generates fees but also 
provides the liquidity necessary to attract other traders—can effectively be 
used as a weapon to destroy a noncompliant clearinghouse.228 Additionally, 
dealers are a vital source of expertise in clearinghouse management. 
 
 225 See TIAA-CREF Comment Letter, supra note 223, at 5 (“[C]ustomers will not be bound by the same 
profit motives as owner and clearing member constituencies, and will serve as a counterweight against efforts 
either to open the Clearinghouse to products that may introduce unnecessary risks or strategies not currently 
sought by market participants . . . .”). 
 226 See supra Part I.C.3. 
 227 See supra Part II.A. 
 228 For a discussion of the self-perpetuating cycle between trading volume, liquidity, and clearinghouses, 
see supra Part II.A. 
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Clearinghouses with significant links to the dealer community, either through 
equity participation or contractual arrangement, may be able to call upon this 
expertise at low or no cost, while clearinghouses seeking independence from 
dealers will be forced to hire this expertise at significant cost.229 All of this 
suggests that much of the revenue generated from clearinghouses will, in one 
way or another, be captured by dealers, which in turn suggests that 
clearinghouses will be at a disadvantage in seeking equity capital from other 
sources.230 
If, contrary to the foregoing analysis, a class of nondealer clearinghouse 
shareholders should arise, this class would not necessarily have optimal 
incentives to manage systemic risk. This is so, again, because dealers bear, by 
far, the greatest amount of risk in clearinghouses. Only after the dealer-funded 
reserve accounts are exhausted do the equity holders suffer.231 This 
arrangement creates a strong incentive on the part of nondealer equity holders 
to impose excessive risk on the clearinghouse because, as owners, they would 
enjoy the full upside (in the form of additional clearing fees) of this risk and 
only a fraction of the downside (because dealers, through their reserve 
contributions, are in the first-loss position). This, once again, is moral hazard, 
and it leads to increased systemic risk, this time as a result of the fact that 
nondealer shareholders would not sufficiently internalize the risk of 
clearinghouse losses. Worse, nondealer shareholders and the managers that 
serve them may also be tempted to engage in correlation-seeking, which has 
the effect of increasing the risk of the clearinghouse and thereby increasing 
systemic risk.232 
 
 229 See Damgard Comment Letter, supra note 181, at 7 (arguing that dealers have expertise to contribute 
to the running of clearinghouses that nondealers would have to hire, therefore causing nondealer-owned 
clearinghouses to run at greater cost). 
 230 See Letter from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. Vice President, Pub. Policy & Advocacy, SIFMA, to 
David A. Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC, and Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 5 (Nov. 12, 2010), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-21.pdf (“Swap dealers, in particular, are among the most likely 
equity investors in new DCOs and Clearing Agencies.”). 
 231 See 23 BROKER–DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW, supra note 87, 
§ 5:5. 
 232 See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text (discussing correlation-seeking). 
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D. Commercial Incentives and the Public Good of Protection from Systemic 
Risk 
Another way of analyzing the foregoing incentive issues is to view 
protection from systemic risk as a public good.233 We all would suffer if the 
systemic risk inherent in derivatives transactions broke the confines of the 
clearinghouse—either because of the havoc such an outbreak would wreak 
upon the financial system or because of our status as the ultimate payers in a 
taxpayer-funded bailout aimed at keeping the clearinghouse afloat. The parties 
with commercial interests in derivatives trading—dealers and end users—
would suffer, too. But because some of their suffering would be borne by the 
rest of us (and because they stand to benefit by undertaking some forms of 
risk), they are not induced to internalize the entire burden of controlling 
systemic risk. The management of systemic risk thus has the character of a 
public good, the basic consequence of which, economic theory teaches, is a 
pervasive free-rider problem.234 
Seeing the containment of systemic risk as a public good changes one’s 
perspective on clearinghouse governance. Because no private party can enjoy 
the full benefit of eliminating systemic risk, no private party has an incentive 
to fully internalize the cost of doing so. As a result, no private party can simply 
be entrusted with the means of doing so because it is more likely to use those 
means to some other ends, described above. In other words, none of the 
commercial parties has the right incentives. Rather, each will choose, on the 
margin, to increase systemic risk by keeping standardized trades off of the 
clearinghouse, suppressing margin and reserve requirements, or seeking to 
clear inappropriate instruments through the clearinghouse. 
 
 233 A leading economist working in this area comes to a similar conclusion. See Craig Pirrong, The 
Clearinghouse Cure, REG., Winter 2008–2009, at 44, 48 (“There is thus a public goods problem that weakens 
the CCP’s incentive to create a good model [for evaluating risk].”); Pirrong, supra note 84, at 3 (“Risk sharing 
through a clearinghouse makes the balance sheets of the clearinghouse members public goods, and encourages 
excessive risk taking. That is, the clearing mechanism is vulnerable to moral hazard.”). 
 234 Public goods are goods that are either nonexcludable (i.e., nonpayors cannot be denied access), 
nonrival (i.e., one person’s consumption does not diminish the amount of the good available for others), or 
both. See Tyler Cowen, Introduction to PUBLIC GOODS & MARKET FAILURES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 1, 3–
4 (Tyler Cowen ed., Transaction Publishers 1999) (1988). Paradigmatic examples are lighthouses and national 
defense. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 358 (1974). 
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III.  RULE-MAKING ADDRESSING THE INCENTIVE PROBLEMS 
In enacting legislation to address the problem of systemic risk following 
the financial crisis, Congress showed some level of awareness of the incentive 
problems in the trading of derivatives and ultimately adopted specific 
provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act to address the problem.235 Speaking from 
the floor of the House, Representative Stephen Lynch characterized the 
problem as follows: 
Mr. Chairman, I want to call your attention to sections 726 and 
765 of the bill. These two provisions require the CFTC and the SEC 
to conduct rulemakings to eliminate the conflicts of interest arising 
from the control of clearing and trading facilities by entities such as 
swap dealers and major swap participants. 
This problem arises because, right now, 95 percent of all the 
clearinghouses in this country are owned by just five banks. So, 
while we are relying on the clearinghouses to reduce systemic risk, 
we have the banks now owning the clearinghouses.236 
The solution that Representative Lynch had originally drafted to address the 
conflicts he foresaw—the so-called Lynch Amendment—would have limited 
the major dealers’ voting interests in swap clearinghouses to 20% and would 
have prevented the majority of the members of clearinghouse boards from 
being drawn from major dealers.237 The Lynch Amendment, however, failed to 
win sufficient support to be included in the final bill.238 Representative Lynch 
therefore settled for what ultimately became sections 726 and 765 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act. 
Sections 726239 and 765240 of Dodd–Frank direct the CFTC and the SEC, 
respectively, to review the conflict of interest problems affecting clearinghouse 
governance and, if they deem it necessary and appropriate, to adopt rules 
 
 235 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, secs. 726, 765, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1695–96, 1796–97 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8323, 8343 (Supp. VI 2010)) (sections 
directed to rulemaking on conflicts of interest). 
 236 156 CONG. REC. H5217 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Lynch). 
 237 See H.R. REP. No. 111-370, at 188–92 (2009); 155 CONG. REC. H14,710–12 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2009) 
(reprinting the proffered amendment and floor debate). In the sections that follow, this Article generally uses 
the term incentive problem to refer to what Representative Lynch and Congress referred to as conflicts of 
interest. 
 238 See Sarah N. Lynch, Rep. Frank Plans Two Key Changes to Derivatives Bill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 
2009, 2:52 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125735995425928573.html. 
 239 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 726(b), 124 Stat. at 1695. 
 240 Id. § 765(b), 124 Stat. at 1797. For language focusing on the source of the conflict of interest in equity 
ownership and voting power, see id. §§ 726(c), 765(c), 124 Stat. at 1695–96, 1797. 
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aimed at improving governance, mitigating systemic risk, promoting 
competition, and mitigating conflict of interest arising from equity ownership 
or voting power. Although the statute can be read to encourage the agencies to 
adopt rules addressing these issues, it no more than suggests voting limits as a 
means of doing so. The agencies are directed to “adopt rules which may 
include numerical limits on the control of, or the voting rights with respect to” 
clearinghouse governance.241 The discretionary nature of voting or ownership 
rules suggested by this language again reflects the failure of the Lynch 
Amendment to win support in the final bill. Undeterred, Representative Lynch 
urged his colleagues in the house to “agree [with] my reading . . . [that] 
sections 726 and 765 affirmatively require these agencies to adopt strong 
conflict of interest rules on control and governance of clearing and trading 
facilities.”242 
Dodd–Frank further directs clearinghouses to adopt governance 
arrangements that “fulfill public interest requirements” and “permit the 
consideration of the views of owners and participants” and ensure that the 
governing boards of clearinghouses include market participants.243 The Act 
also requires clearinghouses to adopt fitness standards for directors, members, 
and clearing affiliates.244 The detail work in turning these concepts into rules, 
of course, was left to the regulatory agencies, here, principally, the SEC and 
the CFTC, and the efforts of each are described below. 
A. The Regulators’ Proposed Rules for Clearinghouse Governance 
Starting from the statutory mandate, the regulatory agencies acknowledged 
the presence of incentive problems on the part of the various commercial 
parties that might lead to a reduction in clearinghouse access, on the one hand, 
or to a failure to manage and contain systemic risk, on the other. Noting the 
potential for conflict between these goals, the regulatory agencies sought to 
design governance structures that would respond to each problem.245 The 
 
 241 Id. secs. 726(a), 765(a), 124 Stat. at 1695, 1796–97 (emphasis added). Here and elsewhere in Dodd–
Frank, Congress targets a list of enumerated entities for special attention, including large bank holding 
companies and their affiliates, as well as swap dealers, major swap participants, and associated persons, a 
focus that is picked up by the CFTC in its rule-making, described below. 
 242 156 CONG. REC. H5217 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Lynch). 
 243 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 725(c), § 5b(c), 124 Stat. at 1692. 
 244 Id. 
 245 See, e.g., Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 3698, 
3701 (proposed Jan. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39) (recognizing the “potential for tension 
between these goals” but asserting a belief that “they can be harmonized”); Proposed SEC Rule Regarding 
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governance structures they propose have two basic foci: voting power and 
governance. The voting-power rules impose a set of caps on clearinghouse 
members’ voting interests,246 and the governance rules focus on the 
independence of the clearinghouse board of directors and the composition of 
certain board committees. 
Both agencies propose to give clearinghouses a choice between two sets of 
voting-power rules, with each rule set offering a tradeoff between individual 
and aggregate voting power.247 There is, however, a subtle but important 
difference in the voting power that each agency seeks to cap. The SEC’s 
proposed voting caps are aimed at member voting interests only—any 
clearinghouse member or affiliate, whether it is a large or small dealer, end 
user, or any other entity.248 The CFTC’s proposals, by contrast, also target 
specific enumerated entities, including bank holding companies and their 
affiliates, as well as swap dealers, major swap participants, and associated 
persons.249 So although each agency proposes similar caps—individual caps of 
either 5% or 20%, and a potential 40% aggregate entity cap250—the SEC 
applies these caps to all clearinghouse members, while the CFTC takes special 
aim at the enumerated entities and grants greater leeway to other members. 
A further complication of the voting-power rules is that they are written in 
the alternative. A clearinghouse therefore is given a choice between a 
relatively low individual voting cap in exchange for no aggregate entity cap on 
the one hand and a higher individual voting cap with an additional aggregate 
voting cap on the other hand. Under the first alternative, the voting interest of 
 
Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,886 (“[A]ffording greater access to the clearing agency at 
some point may come at the expense of sound risk management practices.”). 
 246 Members of a clearinghouse are likely to consist largely of dealers because these are the parties most 
likely to be able to meet admissions criteria. 
 247 See Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, 65,893 (SEC proposal 
for alternative voting rules); Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract 
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 
63,743–44 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 37, 38, 39, 40) (CFTC proposal for 
alternative voting rules). 
 248 See Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,894–95 
(discussing the application of the rules to “related persons”). 
 249 These enumerated entities include (i) bank holding companies with over $50 billion in total 
consolidated assets; (ii) a “nonbank financial company . . . supervised by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System”; (iii) an affiliate of (i) or (ii); (iv) a swap dealer; (v) a major swap participant; or (vi) 
an associated person of (iv) or (v). Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract 
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
63,750. 
 250 See id. at 63,733–34. 
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an individual member (under the SEC proposal)251 or an enumerated entity 
(under the CFTC proposal)252 would be capped at 5%, and no limit would be 
placed on members’ or enumerated entities’ voting power in the aggregate. 
Under the second alternative, the voting interest of any member (under both 
the SEC and CFTC proposals) would be capped at 20%253 while members 
(under the SEC rule)254 or enumerated entities (under the CFTC rule)255 would 
have their aggregate voting interests capped at 40%.256 The tradeoff facing 
clearinghouses is thus whether to accept low individual limits in exchange for 
no aggregate limits on the regulated class or to accept higher individual limits 
along with an aggregate limit for the regulated class. 
The agencies also part ways slightly on the relationship between the 
governance rules and the voting-power rules. The CFTC prescribes a single set 
of governance rules,257 while the SEC offers two alternatives tied to the 
clearinghouse’s choice of voting-power rules.258 In either case, the governance 
rules focus on the independence of the clearinghouses’ directors and the 
composition of certain board committees. Under the CFTC’s proposed 
governance rules, clearinghouse boards must consist of at least 35% 
independent directors, with a minimum of two such directors.259 To prevent 
boards from circumventing the independence rules by delegating authority to 
committees, any committee with authority to act as the board must meet the 
same independence requirements as the board as a whole.260 In addition, two 
board committees are mandated under the CFTC’s proposed rules: a 
 
 251 Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,900. 
 252 Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap 
Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,743–44. 
 253 Id. at 63,733; Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,895. 
 254 Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,895. 
 255 Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap 
Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,733. 
 256 Members’ affiliates and related persons are counted together under each rule. See Proposed SEC Rule 
Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,894; Requirements for Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of 
Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,743. 
 257 Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap 
Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,737–38. 
 258 Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,893–94. 
 259 Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap 
Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,738. CFTC “public 
directors” are functionally equivalent to the SEC-termed independent directors because the proposed rules 
include a definition of public directors that serves to bring the CFTC definition in line with the SEC’s 
currently accepted practices. Id. at 63,742. 
 260 Id. at 63,738. 
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nominating committee and a risk management committee.261 The nominating 
committee—whose role, as in a public corporation, is to nominate directors to 
the board—must have a majority of independent directors and must have an 
independent director chair.262 The risk management committee, meanwhile, is 
given responsibility for advising on risk modeling and default procedures, 
determining eligibility for membership, approving or denying application for 
membership, and determining which derivatives are eligible for clearing.263 
Like the board as a whole, the risk management committee must consist of 
35% independent directors, but, interestingly, 10% of its members must 
represent customers.264 The rules also specify that the CFTC must be notified 
any time a recommendation of the risk management committee is not followed 
by the board.265 Finally, the CFTC’s proposed rules would require that any 
disciplinary panel convened by a clearinghouse include at least one 
independent person—a person, whether a member of the board, meeting the 
board test for independence—as well as an independent chair.266 According to 
the CFTC’s proposal, this set of governance rules applies regardless of which 
voting-power alternative a clearinghouse selects.267 
The SEC, by contrast, offers two sets of proposed governance rules 
depending upon the clearinghouse’s choice of voting-power rules.268 If, on the 
one hand, the clearinghouse chooses the higher individual voting cap (and 
therefore the 40% aggregate-member voting limit), then the concomitant 
governance rules essentially parallel the CFTC’s rules.269 Under this 
alternative, the board must consist of at least 35% independent directors, as 
 
 261 Id. at 63,733. 
 262 Id. at 63,740. 
 263 Id. at 63,749. 
 264 Id. at 63,740. If the risk management committee delegates authority to a subcommittee meeting these 
composition requirements, then the risk management committee need not meet these requirements. Id. at 
63,740–41. 
 265 See id. at 63,741 n.65 (“The Commission is contemplating requiring the DCO to report to the 
Commission . . . whenever the Board of Directors overrules the Risk Management Committee.”). 
 266 Id. at 63,740. 
 267 See id. at 63,737 (noting that the Commission’s proposed rules impose structural governance 
requirements and regulate the exercise of voting power to accomplish two different goals, and affirming the 
Commission’s belief that stricter governance requirements do not necessarily justify more lenient limits on the 
exercise of voting power). 
 268 See Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,893. 
 269 Compare id. at 65,896–98 (summarizing governance requirements under the Voting Interest Focus 
Initiative), with Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap 
Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,738–41 
(summarizing governance requirements for DCOs). 
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must any committee empowered to act on behalf of the board.270 The 
nominating committee must consist of a majority of independent directors, and 
any disciplinary panel must include at least one person who would qualify as 
independent.271 If, on the other hand, the clearinghouse chooses the lower 
individual voting cap (and thus no limit on member voting power in the 
aggregate), then the corresponding governance rules differ somewhat. Rather 
than meeting the 35% board-independence standard, clearinghouse boards (and 
any subcommittees acting for the board) must have a majority of independent 
members.272 Moreover, nominating committees must be wholly (as opposed to 
majority) independent, and as above, any disciplinary panel must have at least 
one person qualifying as independent.273 Finally, unlike the CFTC, the SEC 
does not expressly mandate a risk management committee, but the composition 
of such a committee, if formed, must be either 35% or majority independent, 
depending upon which alternative rule structure the clearinghouse chooses.274 
The various rule choices are summarized in the table below: 
 







20% per member, 40% 
aggregate enumerated entities. 
A: 20% per member, 40% 
aggregate members. 
5% per enumerated entity, no 
aggregate. 



















35%, plus 10% customers. If adopted, then: 
A: majority, or  
B: wholly. 
 
 270 Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,896–97. 
 271 Id. at 65,897–98. 
 272 Id. at 65,901. 
 273 See id. at 65,902 (noting that the Governance Focus Alternative would impose special composition 
requirements on disciplinary panels of security-based-swap clearing agencies similar to those proposed under 
the Voting Interest Focus Alternative). 
 274 Id. at 65,897, 65,902. 
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The regulatory agencies’ foci on voting caps and independence is designed 
to put in place structural governance features to accomplish the dual desiderata 
of open access and systemic risk management. The logic of these rules is fairly 
clear from the perspective of promoting competition and open access. It is the 
major dealers, after all, that are likely to have both the power and the incentive 
to use the clearinghouse structure to exclude new entrants and otherwise 
engage in anticompetitive behavior. The strategy of the regulators therefore 
appears to be to use voting caps and independence requirements to separate the 
major dealers from clearinghouse governance to prevent decisions affecting 
access—such as decisions on membership applications and reserve 
requirements—from being motivated by a desire to exclude competitors. That 
the rules are aimed at the major dealers is perhaps especially clear in the 
CFTC’s special focus on enumerated entities, but it also inheres in the SEC’s 
more general focus on members because the membership of clearinghouses, in 
the first instance at least, is likely to consist mainly of the major dealers. This 
focus may well make sense from the perspective of open access and promotion 
of competition, because separating major dealers from control of the 
clearinghouse may leave control in the hands of smaller dealers or customers 
who are less likely to use the clearinghouse to stifle competition among 
dealers. 
From the perspective of controlling systemic risk, however, it is harder to 
articulate the underlying rationale of rules focusing on voting caps and director 
independence. From the perspective of controlling systemic risk, driving a 
wedge between the major dealers and control of the clearinghouse is not such 
an unambiguously good idea because the major dealers, in the first instance at 
least, bear the vast majority of the risk from clearinghouse failure and therefore 
have a strong incentive to prevent it. It is true, as discussed above, that their 
incentives are not perfect, but this of course raises the question of whose 
incentives are better. With regard to risk management, as opposed to 
clearinghouse access, the incentives of smaller dealers and end users are 
similarly problematic. 
Still, taking the proposed rules on their own terms, the underlying principle 
seems to be to vest significant governance control in representatives of 
nonmember shareholders who, as such, have no particular interest in profit 
from trading but do have an interest in the success or failure of the 
clearinghouse. Because these shareholders would lose their investment if the 
clearinghouse failed, the thinking seems to be that they will have the right 
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incentives to prevent that from occurring by taking appropriate steps to manage 
systemic risk. 
As noted in the prior discussion, however, there is strong reason to doubt 
both whether there ever will be a significant constituency of nonmember 
clearinghouse shareholders and, even if there were, whether they would have 
optimal incentives from the perspective of risk management. These 
considerations return immediately below in the critique of the regulators’ 
proposals. 
B. Critiquing the Proposed Rule-Making 
The previous section of this Article described the two principal means by 
which the regulators propose to address incentive problems in clearinghouse 
governance: voting caps and independence requirements. The current section 
argues that each of these is misguided. Neither is likely to be effective in doing 
the job that policy-makers have set out for it, nor is either the best approach for 
addressing the central problem faced by clearinghouses—the effective 
containment of systemic risk. 
1. Voting Caps 
Voting caps are the most controversial aspect of the proposed rules. Many 
of the public comment letters sent to the regulators complained that some of 
the rule permutations failed to impose mandatory caps on dealers and that, as a 
result, dealers could band together as a group to exert majority voting control 
over clearinghouses.275 On the other side, banks and industry groups argued 
that the independence rules alone would be adequate to curtail dealers’ 
incentive problems and that voting caps would likely constrain clearinghouse 
development by deterring investment from the most important capital provider 
 
 275 See, e.g., Letter from David W. Brown to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 17, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-43.htm; Letter from Ian Magruder, President, 
Cal. Coll. Democrats, to SEC (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-
41.htm; Letter from Laurie McBride, Chair, Cal. Democratic Party LGBT Caucus (North), to SEC (Nov. 16, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/s72710-42.htm; Letter from Paula Villescaz, 
Member, Cal Berkeley Democrats, to SEC (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-
10/s72710-40.htm. Several of these letters appear to be form letters generated by politically affiliated 
organizations. See Letter from Karrie McMillan, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
SEC, and David A. Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-27-10/ 
s72710-69.pdf (supporting measures to limit the influence and control that any one set of enumerated entities 
may attempt to exert over others by putting its interests and those of its members ahead of its regulatory 
responsibilities). 
GRIFFITH GALLEYS4 8/20/2012  8:17 AM 
2012] GOVERNING SYSTEMIC RISK 1219 
for clearinghouses—large dealers.276 Each of these lines of argument, however, 
misses the two most basic problems with voting caps. First, because they fail to 
account for dealers’ greatest source of power—their total control over order 
volume—voting caps simply will not work to constrain dealer influence in 
clearinghouse governance. Second, because they break the traditional 
alignment of economic and voting interests, they increase the opportunity for 
moral hazard, thereby increasing systemic risk. Voting caps, in other words, 
are both ineffective and dangerous. 
Voting caps are likely to be ineffective in reducing dealer control over 
clearinghouses because dealers do not require ownership or voting interests to 
exert a controlling influence over market infrastructure. Their greatest source 
of power is their virtual lock on trading volume and the concomitant ability to 
direct order flow. The discussion in Part II revealed several examples of how 
dealers have used the ability to direct order flow to obtain concessions—
including the victory of the ICE credit-default-swap clearinghouse over the 
CME platform, the threatened competition and then ultimate merger between 
Turquoise and the London Stock Exchange, and the market domination of 
Dealerweb only weeks after its launch.277 The lesson is that dealers exert 
power through their control over trading volume, to which voting caps speak 
not at all. Voting caps are therefore likely to be ineffective in limiting dealer 
control over clearinghouses. 
But, perhaps more fundamentally, voting caps conflict with the basic 
corporate law premise that voting interests should be aligned with ownership 
interests. This is so because, when an investor has voting control that is 
disproportionate to her ownership interest, she has an incentive to use her 
voting power to increase her distribution of benefits from the firm at the 
expense of other owners’ proportional interests. The misalignment of 
ownership and voting, in other words, creates moral hazard. 
The moral hazard problem may be especially acute in clearinghouses. 
Recall again that dealers bear by far the greatest amount of risk in 
 
 276 See, e.g., Goodrich & Riffaud Comment Letter, supra note 181, at 3 (arguing that the incentive 
problems are overstated and that the proposed voting control limitations “would increase systemic risk due to 
the misalignment of interest” between those “who make the decisions and those who bear the risks of loss”); 
Letter from R. Glenn Hubbard, Co-Chair, Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation et al., to David A. Stawick, 
Sec’y, CFTC, and Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3 (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/ 
s7-27-10/s72710-32.pdf (“[T]o the extent conflicts of interest actually do pose a problem, . . . voting 
restrictions are . . . ill-suited to address the problem.”). 
 277 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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clearinghouses.278 If voting caps function as intended, they will limit the ability 
of dealers to exert a level of control commensurate with the risk they bear. 
Instead, nondealer equity holders, who suffer loss only after the dealer-funded 
reserves have been exhausted, will enjoy significantly greater control than the 
amount of risk they bear. 
Equity owners who enjoy voting rights in excess of their risk may seek to 
clear inappropriate instruments or to underweight risk to capture additional 
volume, understanding that they suffer only when losses are large enough to 
destroy the clearinghouse but that they benefit from dollar one of profit. These 
incentives feed into some of the behavioral explanations explored above, in 
which the likelihood of low-probability, high-severity events is systematically 
underestimated.279 Here, equity holders have an economic interest in 
downplaying such possibilities because, by lowering risk weights and 
permitting more trading, they extract greater fees.280 Unfortunately for the rest 
of us, clearinghouses run in this way have the effect of increasing, rather than 
minimizing, systemic risk. 
It is possible under such an arrangement that dealers, well aware of these 
risks, would not provide capital to clearinghouses. Understanding the dangers 
of moral hazard, in other words, they will refuse to invest their capital unless 
they receive control rights commensurate with their risk. Consider, too, that 
clearinghouses will likely need to call upon dealers not only for capital but also 
for expertise and understanding, which dealers may be unwilling to provide if 
their benefits are enjoyed disproportionately by others.281 As a result, the 
argument goes, clearinghouses will be unfunded or underfunded and will not 
develop into the robust bulwarks against systemic risk that policy-makers 
intend for them to become.282 
This outcome, however, seems unlikely, at least as the current proposed 
rules stand, simply because the voting-interest cap is likely to be totally 
ineffective at limiting the control of large dealers. That is, precisely because 
the voting-cap rule is unlikely to have its intended effect, it is also unlikely to 
 
 278 See supra Part II.A.1–2. 
 279 For a discussion of the behavioral biases impacting incentive, see supra Part II.A.1. 
 280 For a discussion of the nondealer shareholder’s incentive to either clear too much or seek to reduce 
reserve requirements to increase trading volumes and the concomitant fees, see infra Part III.B.2. 
 281 See Damgard Comment Letter, supra note 181, at 7 (noting that it is “impractical” to think dealers will 
contribute the capital and other resources necessary to form clearinghouses if they can have no “meaningful 
role in its governance and operations”). 
 282 See id. 
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result in the dire predictions of either dooming undercapitalized clearinghouses 
to failure or increasing systemic risk through moral hazard. Dealers will retain 
effective control over clearinghouses through their power over volume. Only if 
rules were enacted that also effectively limited the ability of dealers to leverage 
their market power into effective control would it be necessary to seriously 
consider this moral hazard problem.283 As long as dealers retain effective 
control, however, it remains a hypothetical issue. 
It is sufficient, therefore, to reject the current voting-cap proposals as 
ineffective. The moral hazard problem, however, teaches us that we ought to 
be careful in seeking to improve them by adding other means of limiting dealer 
control. Because of the importance of aligning control and risk, dealers must 
exert a level of control over clearinghouse operations that is commensurate 
with their exposure to risk through the clearinghouse. This cannot be achieved 
through simple voting caps but rather will require a delicate governance 
structure, explored in Part IV below. 
2. Independence 
The other key component of the regulatory agencies’ proposed governance 
rules is mandatory minimum numbers of independent directors on 
clearinghouse boards and board committees. That the regulators should seize 
upon director independence in the clearinghouse context is, in one sense, 
unsurprising because director independence is, after all, a familiar corporate 
governance remedy. It has been suggested as the solution to incentive 
problems arising from the demand requirement in derivative suits,284 
management buyouts,285 takeover defenses,286 self-dealing transactions,287 and, 
 
 283 Dealer power would also be diminished if there were only one clearinghouse. A single clearinghouse 
would effectively eliminate the dealers’ threats to take their order volume to a competing clearinghouse with 
more amenable rules. Indeed, many have suggested that a single clearinghouse would be optimal for a host of 
reasons, including maximum efficiencies in netting. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central 
Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, REV. ASSET PRICING STUD., Dec. 2011, at 74, 74–75 
(“[C]ounterparty credit risk in the OTC derivatives market is exacerbated by a multiplicity of CCPs.”); Craig 
Pirrong, Clearing Up Misconceptions on Clearing, REG., Fall 2008, at 22, 24 (emphasizing that clearing is 
subject to strong economies of scale and scope). So far, however, the regulators have not sought to enter this 
debate, and no rule-making on this point appears imminent. 
 284 See, e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933–34 (Del. 1993) (explaining that the relevant inquiry in 
assessing demand futility is only whether the board can exercise its independent and disinterested judgment in 
responding to a demand). 
 285 In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 
2004). 
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perhaps most famously, in Sarbanes–Oxley as a cure for accounting scandals, 
such as those that occurred at Enron and Worldcom.288 In those contexts, 
however, independence has a different meaning than it does here. There, and 
indeed generally in discourse about corporate governance, independence 
means that a director is not also a member of management or controlled by 
someone else who is.289 Here, however, independence means, basically, that 
one is not a large dealer. This is not quite (indeed not nearly) the same idea, 
and the unintended consequences that this distinction is likely to have on 
clearinghouse governance constitute a good reason to reject the attempt to use 
independence to solve the governance problems of clearinghouses. But it is not 
the only reason. Another equally good, if not better, reason is that 
independence simply does not work. There is no good reason to believe that 
independence solves corporate governance problems generally or that it will 
solve clearinghouse governance problems in particular. 
Corporate board independence from management is not the same as 
clearinghouse board independence from dealers. The basic problem that 
independence is meant to solve in the context of corporate boards is the 
principal–agent problem between managers and shareholders.290 Since Berle 
and Means, corporate law theorists have recognized that managers have 
incentives to behave in ways that are not in the best interests of shareholders 
by, for example, consuming excessive compensation or perquisites, engaging 
in related-party transactions, or resisting acquisition for reasons of 
 
 286 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that the standard for the 
reasonable takeover defense is more easily met when the action has “the approval of a board comprised of a 
majority of outside independent directors”). 
 287 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2006) (providing that conflict of interest transactions are not 
voidable if approved by a majority of disinterested directors). 
 288 See P.M. Vasudev, Default Swaps and Director Oversight: Lessons from AIG, 35 J. CORP. L. 757, 782 
(2010) (discussing how the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, in the aftermath of Enron and Worldcom, 
promoted the idea of independent directors). 
 289 See ZABIHOLLAH REZAEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POST-SARBANES–OXLEY: REGULATIONS, 
REQUIREMENTS, AND INTEGRATED PROCESSES 101 (2007) (“An independent director is someone whose only 
nontrivial professional, financial, or non-financial connection to the corporation, its chairman, CEO, or any 
other executive officer is his or her directorship.” (quoting Corporate Governance Policies, COUNCIL OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%20Corp%20Gov%20Policies%20Full%20 
and%20Current%2012-21-11%20FINAL%20(2).pdf (last updated Dec. 21, 2011))). In addition, independent 
is sometimes used as a synonym for disinterested in the sense of identifying directors without a direct interest 
in an underlying transaction or dispute. See id. 
 290 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 138 (2010) 
(“The principle corporate-governance response to the agency problem has been the independent director.”). 
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entrenchment.291 Independent board members are thought to be part of the 
solution to this problem because, as nonmembers of management, they do not 
have the same incentive to favor managers over shareholders.292 However, in 
the clearinghouse context, the problem for which independence is being 
offered as a solution is not at all the same. True, in the clearinghouse context, 
there is a similar concern that dealers will engage in rent-seeking behavior, but 
in doing so, they are not, like managers in the corporate context, behaving as 
disloyal agents. Instead, the fear is that clearinghouse members will seek to 
extract rents by imposing excessive risk on the clearinghouse and thereby on 
the financial system or society generally.293 There is no principal–agent 
relationship but rather the possibility that members will seek their own gain by 
imposing an externality on others. 
Independence makes some sense in the corporate context because it not 
only creates a class of directors who are, theoretically at least, immunized from 
management’s self-serving incentives but also gives these directors a clear 
constituency—shareholders—and a clear group over which to ride herd—
managers. In the clearinghouse context, by contrast, directors who are 
independent from the major dealers are neither immunized from the incentives 
of the major dealers nor given a clear constituency to serve. The regulators’ 
understanding of independence seems to be purely negative—it means only 
nondealer. And although there is a clear affirmative interest to protect—the 
interest of the public in containing systemic risk in clearinghouses—it is not 
clear how or to whom independent clearinghouse directors are to be made 
accountable to that interest. 
All of this can be seen most clearly by asking whose interests independent 
clearinghouse directors are likely to represent. The most obvious suggestion 
 
 291 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932) (detailing the rise of the modern corporation and the resulting 
divergence between directors’ incentives and shareholder interests). The field of corporate governance grew 
out of the classic work of Berle and Means, which continues to be widely cited. See William W. Bratton, Berle 
and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001) (discussing the rare longevity of 
Berle and Means’s theory in the field, despite decades of critical scholarship); Nicola Faith Sharpe, The 
Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1440 n.16 (2011) (“Ten years 
later, the number of citations to Berle and Means has more than doubled. As of May 4, 2011, the database 
shows 1,561 citations when searching with Bratton’s search terms ‘berle/10 “modern corporation and 
private.”’”). 
 292 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 290, at 178 (“Independent directors’ independence from the corporation 
means that they have no direct tie to the corporation and thus may not have incentives to advance corporate 
and shareholder interests.”). 
 293 See Mark Roe, Derivatives Clearinghouses Are No Magic Bullet, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2010, at A19. 
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would be small dealers and end users, because these are the commercial parties 
with the greatest commercial interest in clearinghouses after the major dealers, 
but there is also the (slim) possibility that there may be a separate nondealer, 
non-end-user shareholder constituency as well. Unfortunately, the incentives of 
these parties are no better with regard to systemic risk than are those of major 
dealers and indeed may be worse. This is so, again, for reasons of moral hazard 
because ensuring any of these communities of board representation in excess 
of the residual risk they bear creates an incentive on the part of each to impose 
additional risk on the clearinghouse. 
To see this as applied to each of the private interests in the clearinghouse, 
recall that small dealers, as discussed above, have an incentive either to keep 
trades off of the clearinghouse or impose additional risk by, for example, 
seeking to reduce reserve requirements.294 Likewise, nondealer shareholders 
have an incentive either to clear too much or to seek to reduce reserve 
requirements to increase trading volumes and the concomitant fees. With 
respect to end users, the story is similar but not the same. As noted above, end 
users’ principal incentive in derivatives trading is to reduce costs—that is, to 
minimize spreads, which of course means reducing dealer per-trade revenue. 
This, in turn, may have the effect of inducing dealers, either by pushing 
inappropriate products onto the clearinghouse or by creating new products to 
trade bilaterally, to increase systemic risk. Of course, one possible response to 
these hypothetical reactions is the assertion that the best defense against this 
possibility is the inclusion of end users on clearinghouse boards (and risk 
committees) to prevent it. But end users have no special incentive to monitor 
this risk. Worse, there is a potential for side deals between end-user and dealer 
constituencies on clearinghouse boards. For example, dealers could offer a 
concession on derivatives spreads in exchange for end users’ acquiescence in a 
reduction on margin requirements. Such a deal would make all parties happy—
end users receive lower trading costs and dealers offset their losses by reducing 
the amount of margin collateral they need to make available—but it would 
increase systemic risk. 
All of this is to say that the problem with independence as a solution to the 
governance problem of clearinghouses is that, unlike independent corporate 
boards, it does not create a constituency to solve the problem. Independent 
corporate directors are supposed to represent shareholders, not managers. Who 
are independent clearinghouse directors supposed to represent? As we have 
 
 294 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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seen, the most interested private parties do not have an adequate incentive to 
solve the systemic risk problem. What is needed, as articulated in greater detail 
in Part IV below, is a board specifically designed to represent the public 
interest in solving the problem of systemic risk. 
But, before getting there, another deficiency of the independence 
mechanism proffered by the regulatory agencies is worth consideration. Quite 
simply, it doesn’t work. Or, perhaps less provocatively, there is not strong 
evidence to support the view that it does work. In a seminal metastudy 
analyzing the body of empirical work on the effect of director independence on 
corporate governance, Professor Roberta Romano found that, “[a]cross a 
variety of analytical approaches, the learning of that literature is that 
independent boards do not improve performance and that boards with too 
many outsiders may, in fact, have a negative impact on performance.”295 Share 
price performance, it is true, is not the same as effective corporate governance, 
which may have other benefits, for example, in reducing accounting fraud.296 
But Professor Romano’s article analyzed this question as well, specifically 
with respect to independent audit committees, gathering studies on whether 
firms with independent audit committees had fewer accounting misstatements 
than other firms. Of the sixteen studies she found addressing this question, ten 
failed to support a relationship between complete independence and fewer 
misstatements, while the data on majority (as opposed to complete) 
independence was mixed.297 Taking into account the relative weakness of these 
findings, along with the typical problems associated with regression analyses, 
such as the difficulty in establishing causality, it is difficult to find strong 
support in the literature for independence as the cure to all governance 
ailments.298 The literature since Professor Romano’s 2005 study does not 
disrupt this basic conclusion in spite of the fact that board independence is 
often repeated, like a mantra, by policy entrepreneurs.299 
 
 295 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005). 
 296 See Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J.L. & 
ECON. 371, 374–75 (2005). 
 297 Romano, supra note 295, at 1532. 
 298 The difficulty in establishing causation with a regression study comes down to the basic point that 
correlation does not prove causation. Positive findings may be explained by other factors, such as better 
management generally, that firms that establish independent audit committees happen to possess more often 
than firms without independent audit committees. Id. 
 299 See Sharpe, supra note 291, at 1435 (addressing the “pervasive misperception on the part of regulators 
that director independence significantly increases the efficacy of corporate boards”); Vasudev, supra note 288 
(performing a case study of AIG to test the efficacy of the contemporary models of governance, which 
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Finally, for those who prefer anecdotal to statistical evidence, I will point 
out that the board of directors of AIG—the bête noir of the financial crisis, 
whose downfall was caused in no small part by its derivatives transactions—
had a supermajority of independent directors.300 From 2006 to 2009, all but 
two members of the holding company board, which ranged from twelve to 
sixteen total members, were independent.301 Enron, too, had a highly 
independent board—eleven of fourteen of its members were independent prior 
to its fall—which nevertheless failed to uncover massive, hidden risk taking.302 
Nor did the independent directors of Citigroup, a solid majority of the board, 
prevent the company from becoming embroiled in the subprime lending 
market and taking on assets that later became toxic.303 The anecdotes, in other 
words, support the statistics—independent directors have not demonstrated any 
special ability to monitor or manage risk. 
That policy-makers would settle on board independence as a solution to the 
problem of clearinghouse governance suggests both a lack of imagination and 
a failure to reflect deeply on the causes of the basic clearinghouse problem. As 
weak a governance solution as it is for corporate governance generally, 
independence is particularly ill suited to the clearinghouse context. In the Part 
that follows, this Article suggests a governance structure better suited to 
respond to the unique problems of clearinghouses. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The basic undercurrents of the discussion to this point have been problems 
of moral hazard and free-riding. A recurring moral hazard problem underlies 
the incentives of each of the parties most likely to become involved in 
clearinghouse governance. And the central function of the clearinghouse—the 
 
emphasize director independence, to conclude that such emphasis may impede effective business oversight by 
directors and undermine directorial accountability). 
 300 As described above, the chaos at AIG was caused by a wholly owned subsidiary, AIGFP, which had its 
own board of directors that was, of course, appointed by and answerable to the holding company board. See 
supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the AIG situation). 
 301 See Am. Int’l Grp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 13–15 (June 6, 2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Proxy 
Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 6–9 (Apr. 4, 2008); Am. Int’l Grp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 7–10 
(Apr. 6, 2007); Am. Int’l Grp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 3–6 (Apr. 5, 2006). 
 302 Enron Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 4–8 (Mar. 27, 2001). 
 303 See Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 7–8 (Mar. 13, 2008); Citigroup Inc., Proxy 
Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 7 (Mar. 13, 2007); see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 
A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (dismissing a derivative suit against Citigroup directors for failure to monitor and 
manage company risks). 
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management of systemic risk—has revealed itself to have the character of a 
public good, leading to a pervasive free-rider problem. 
Putting these two insights together, the optimal clearinghouse governance 
structure would seem to require a separate governing body with a public 
charge—the containment of systemic risk. Additionally, to be rendered 
accountable to that public interest, the governing body must be appointed 
directly by electors representing that interest. The optimal clearinghouse 
governance structure thus would have a dual aspect, guided in part by 
commercial interests seeking to ensure the sustainability of the clearinghouse 
from a business perspective304 and in part by the public interest in managing 
systemic risk. These two aspects of clearinghouse governance would interact 
for the good of the clearinghouse—the failure of either interest dooms both—
but their separate foci and separate lines of accountability assure that neither 
interest absorbs the other. 
Although such a structure, where separate organs of a firm’s board are 
appointed by and accountable to different interests, is unusual in American 
corporate governance, there is a model for it in the supervisory board structure 
of continental Europe. In the sections that follow, this Article develops the 
European model as a source for designing such a dual governance structure, 
then argues that, in spite of its foreign origins, many aspects of this structure 
are not dramatically different from certain suggestions of the regulatory 
agencies in their proposed rule. Finally, the Article ties these threads together 
to weave a structural solution to the problem of clearinghouse governance. 
A. The Supervisory Board in Europe 
Companies from certain continental European countries have long 
functioned with a dual-board structure consisting of management and 
supervisory boards. The paradigmatic example is the German public company 
(Aktiengesellschaft, or AG), but companies in other countries, most of them in 
Europe—such as Austria, Sweden, and Holland—follow similar models.305 
The dual-board structure is formally separate from, but often intertwined with, 
another principle of German corporate governance: codetermination. Together 
 
 304 This, of course, is an essential aspect of clearinghouse governance. If the clearinghouse fails as a 
sustainable business model, it must also fail as a solution to the problem of systemic risk. 
 305 Martin Gelter, Tilting the Balance Between Capital and Labor? The Effects of Regulatory Arbitrage in 
European Corporate Law on Employees, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 792, 803–04 (2010) (listing countries 
following board models in some way similar to that of Germany). 
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these principles offer a promising model for solving the governance problem 
faced by derivatives clearinghouses. 
The dual-board structure of the German AG is mandated by statute.306 The 
German Federal Stock Corporation Act requires that all companies, regardless 
of size or public trading of shares, have a management board (der Vorstand) 
and a supervisory board (der Aufsichtsrat).307 From the unitary board 
perspective of American corporations, this structure may seem quite alien. 
However, the German dual-board structure can be seen as a mere variation in 
conceptualizing the basic locus of authority in firms: whereas German firms 
separate management and oversight functions into separate boards, American 
firms split these functions between officers and directors. 
Under German law, the management board is charged with responsibility 
for the day-to-day operation of the firm.308 It acts on behalf of the corporation 
as a whole,309 with fiduciary duties to the corporation.310 In addition to 
responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the corporation, the 
management board is charged with what in American corporate governance 
 
 306 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] 
at 1089, last amended by Restrukturierungsgesetz [RStruktG] [Restructuring Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 
1900, art. 6, §§ 76, 95 (Ger.), translated in NORTON ROSE, STOCK CORPORATION ACT (2011), available at 
http://www.nortonrose.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-2010-english-translation-pdf-59656.pdf. The 
statute is the Aktiengesetz or AktG, translated here as the “German Federal Stock Corporation Act.” For a 
general description of the Act and its similarities and differences to other European governance models, see 
Klaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe—Recent Developments of Internal Corporate 
Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, 1 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 
135 (2004); and Carsten Jungmann, The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier 
Board Systems—Evidence from the UK and Germany, 3 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 426 (2006) 
(comparing the single-tier U.K. system with the two-tier German system). 
 307 Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, §§ 76, 95 (Ger.), translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 39–40, 50. The 
Act also mandates a shareholders’ meeting (die Hauptversammlung). Id. art. 6, §§ 118–119, translated in 
ROSE, supra note 306, at 66–68. 
 308 See id. art. 6, § 76, para. 1, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 39 (delegating to the management 
board direct responsibility for the management of the company). 
 309 See id. art. 6, § 78, para. 1, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 40 (requiring the management board 
to represent the company both in and out of court). 
 310 See id. art. 6, § 93, para. 1, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 48. Members of the management 
board face personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duty to the corporation. See id. art. 6, § 93, para. 2, 
translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 49. Fiduciary duty breaches are policed, in the first instance, by the 
supervisory board, which may, if it deems it necessary and appropriate, bring an action on behalf of the 
corporation against the members of the management board. See JEAN J. DU PLESSIS ET AL., GERMAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 139–40 (2d ed. 2012). Whether a 
German board member’s fiduciary duty to the corporation is the same as a duty to the corporation’s 
shareholders is debatable. See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder–
Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 641, 694–99 (2011). 
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would be traditional responsibilities of corporate officers, including the 
maintenance of books and records,311 regular reporting to the supervisory 
board,312 and the holding of a shareholders’ meeting.313 
Likewise, the German supervisory board is, in some ways, just another way 
of conceptualizing the role of a typical American board of directors.314 The 
supervisory board is elected and granted authority to appoint, remove,315 and 
supervise the members of the management board,316 just as American boards 
are elected by shareholders and empowered to do all of the same with respect 
to corporate officers.317 Similarly, although the supervisory board is not 
involved in day-to-day management of the company, certain fundamental 
decisions must be approved by the supervisory board.318 The main statutory 
duties of the supervisory board are to elect and remove members of the 
management board319 and to supervise the management board.320 Although 
 
 311 Compare Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, § 91, para. 1, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 48 (“The 
management board shall ensure that the requisite books of account are maintained.”), with DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 142(a) (2006) (providing that corporate officers must keep records of meetings). The supervisory board 
has the power to examine the books and records as part of their supervisory authority. Stock Corporation Act, 
art. 6, § 111, para. 2, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 62. 
 312 Compare Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, § 90, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 46–47 (requiring 
the management board to regularly report to the supervisory board on several issues), with DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 141(e) (allowing the board of directors to rely in good faith on reports of the corporation’s officers or 
employees). 
 313 Compare Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, § 121, para. 2, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 68 
(providing for meetings of shareholders), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (providing for meetings of 
stockholders). 
 314 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2d ed. 2009). 
 315 Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, § 84, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 43. 
 316 Id. art. 6, § 111, para. 1, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 62. 
 317 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142. 
 318 See Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, § 111, para. 4, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 63. 
 319 See id. art. 6, § 84, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 43. In addition, the Act contains formal 
independence requirements for supervisory board members. See id. art. 6, § 105, translated in ROSE, supra 
note 306, at 60 (codifying the incompatibility of management and supervisory board membership). The 
German Corporate Governance Code provides: 
A Supervisory Board member is considered independent if he/she has no business or personal 
relations with the company or its Management Board which cause a conflict of interests. Not 
more than two former members of the Management Board shall be members of the Supervisory 
Board and Supervisory Board members shall not exercise directorships or similar positions or 
advisory tasks for important competitors of the enterprise. 
. . . .  
Management Board members may not become members of the Supervisory Board of the 
company within two years after the end of their appointment unless they are appointed upon a 
motion presented by shareholders holding more than 25% of the voting rights in the company. 
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they are formally separate—a person cannot be a member of both the 
management and supervisory board321—in practice, the management board and 
the supervisory board cooperate closely in management of the corporation.322 
The similarities between the German and American systems end, however, 
with codetermination—mandatory labor representation on the supervisory 
board.323 The general rule in the AG is that the members of the supervisory 
board are elected by the shareholders at the annual meeting.324 However, for 
corporations that are subject to the codetermination laws, the applicability of 
which depends in large part upon the corporation’s number of employees, a 
portion of the members of the supervisory board must be elected by the 
employees.325 For firms with over two thousand employees, the 
codetermination rules are fully applicable and require exactly half of the 
members of the supervisory board to be elected by employee 
representatives.326 However, the president of the supervisory board, who casts 
the deciding vote in cases of deadlock, is always a representative of the 
shareholder constituency, not the employee constituency, which suggests that, 
in spite of evenly divided representation, shareholders will often have a 
slightly stronger voice.327 
 
Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex [DCGK] [German Corporate Governance Code], Feb. 26, 2002, 
BANZ. at [11], § 5.4.2, 5.4.4, last amended May 26, 2010 (Ger.), translated in GOV’T COMM’N, GERMAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 11 (2010), available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/ 
download/kodex_2010/German-Corporate-Governance-Code-2010.pdf. 
 320 See Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, § 111, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 62–63. 
 321 Id. art. 6, § 105, para. 1, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 60. 
 322 See Johannes Semler, The Practice of the German Aufsichtsrat, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 267 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998). 
 323 See Gelter, supra note 305, at 802–05 (describing the effects of codetermination); Katharina Pistor, 
Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 163, 164–80 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (explaining in detail the history and 
operation of codetermination). 
 324 Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, § 101, para. 1, translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 56. 
 325 See id. (mandating that supervisory board members be elected by shareholders “unless they are to be 
appointed to the supervisory board or elected as representatives of the employees pursuant to the 
Codetermination Act, the Supplemental Codetermination Act, the One-Third Co-determination Act or the Act 
on Employee Co-determination within Cross-border Mergers”); see also id. art. 6, § 96, translated in ROSE, 
supra note 306, at 51 (requiring employee participation on the supervisory board when the company is subject 
to certain codetermination acts). 
 326 Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Co-Determination Act], May 4, 1976, BGBL. I at 1153, §§ 1, 7, 
last amended by Gesetz [G], Mar. 23, 2002, BGBL. I at 1130 (Ger.), translated in Act on Co-Determination by 
Employees (Co-Determination Act), BMWI, http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/__Archiv/labour-
law/act-on-co-determination-by-employees (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 327 Id. § 29, para. 2, translated in Act on Co-Determination by Employees (Co-Determination Act), supra 
note 326. 
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Codetermination of the supervisory board is a structural solution designed 
to guarantee that German corporations remain accountable to both shareholders 
and employees. A rich literature has developed to explain the origin and the 
persistence of this structural compromise.328 For our purposes, however, it is 
important to reflect only on the structural means of enforcing this 
compromise—the use of distinctive electors. Shareholders vote for shareholder 
representatives and employees vote for employee (often union) representatives, 
an arrangement designed to ensure the accountability of board members to 
these respective interests.329 The two sets of interests then work together 
through their representatives on the supervisory board. 
This board structure presents an appealing model for clearinghouse 
governance because it presents a formal means of guaranteeing accountability, 
not, in the case of clearinghouses, to employee interests but rather to the public 
interest in managing systemic risk. The parallel in the context of 
clearinghouses would thus be a mechanism for electing board members to 
render them accountable to the public interest of containing systemic risk, 
rather than to the commercial interests underwriting the clearinghouse. 
Defining the electors of this class of public representatives remains a 
challenge—the public interest in mitigating systemic risk is not so easily 
identified with a group of individuals as is the interest of employees in 
corporate governance. However, as a structural means of guaranteeing that the 
 
 328 See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL 
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 29–33, 71–81 (2003) (describing Germany’s historical involvement with 
codetermination and its present impact); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial 
Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 169 
(2009) (discussing the current debate regarding  codetermination efficiency). 
 329 Technically, all board members have the same obligation to promote the interests of a corporation, and 
employee representatives have no special duty to employees. See Stock Corporation Act, art. 6, § 116, 
translated in ROSE, supra note 306, at 65 (“§ 93 on the duty of care and responsibility of members of the 
management board shall . . . apply analogously to the duty of care and responsibility of the members of the 
supervisory board.”). As summarized by commentators: 
There are no additional statutory rules, and there is apparently no case law in Germany 
addressing whether there should be differences in the standards of care applicable to management 
directors as compared to supervisory directors. However, there appears to be unanimous 
agreement in the literature that the duties of the members of the two boards are the same in 
principle, although they differ in practice due to the different tasks assigned by the law to the two 
boards. 
Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: Substantive Grounds for 
Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 614, 774–75; accord Klaus J. 
Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate 
Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338, 1360 (1984) (“Under co-determination the standard formula used to prescribe 
the object of the board member’s duty of loyalty is the interest of the enterprise, whatever that may be.”). 
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public interest in clearinghouse governance is represented, the supervisory 
board structure of German public companies presents a promising model. 
B. Similar Suggestions in the Proposed Rules 
Seeking foreign guidance to solve domestic problems is often 
controversial.330 And the German corporate governance model, in particular, 
has been criticized as inefficient.331 Such criticisms, however, are often 
motivated by an underlying theory of the firm—shareholder primacy—that is 
hostile to any significantly enhanced role for labor in the fundamental 
governance structure of the corporation.332 While this may be a sensible 
perspective in most debates over corporate governance, the free-riding and 
moral hazard problems inherent in clearinghouse governance, together with the 
public–private purpose of clearinghouses, render it largely inapplicable here. 
This Article seeks to use the German import not as a means of increasing the 
bargaining power of labor but rather as a model from which to adapt a 
structural solution to the free-riding and moral hazard problems inherent in 
clearinghouse governance. 
Moreover, the concept of a “constituency director” has arisen in several 
domestic contexts, including public companies and in pension fund 
governance.333 Likewise, by way of analogy, the Depository Trust Clearing 
Corporation has a board of between fifteen and twenty-five members, which 
 
 330 For more on this controversy, see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 347–68 (2008); John O. 
McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007); and 
Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme 
Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006). 
 331 See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of German 
Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863, 885–86 (2004) (laying out “two possible explanations for the 
negative effect of codetermination on the public value of the firm”: either the firm is run less efficiently or 
labor alters “the objective function of the firm”). 
 332 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
442 (2001) (“Of course, asserting the primacy of shareholder interests in corporate law does not imply that the 
interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go unprotected. It merely indicates that the most efficacious 
legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of nonshareholder constituencies—or at least all constituencies 
other than creditors—lie outside of corporate law. For workers, this includes the law of labor contracting, 
pension law, health and safety law, and antidiscrimination law. For consumers, it includes product safety 
regulation, warranty law, tort law governing product liability, antitrust law, and mandatory disclosure of 
product contents and characteristics. For the public at large, it includes environmental law and the law of 
nuisance and mass torts.”). 
 333 See generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1075–77 (1998) (describing the origin, 
structure, and prevalence of Taft–Hartley pension plans, which require equal representation by employers and 
employees on the trust board). 
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must include two shareholder designees as well as representatives of clearing-
agency participants, representatives of management, and nonparticipant 
representatives in proportions determined by a governance committee.334 
Representative board structures, in other words, are not entirely alien to the 
United States. Perhaps most importantly, however, the basic approach offered 
by this model—that is, the establishment of a formal body separately 
accountable to the public purpose of managing systemic risk—can also be 
found in several suggestions made by both the CFTC and the SEC in their rule-
making processes.335 
The CFTC in fact comes quite close to recommending a supervisory-board 
structure similar to the one outlined above in requiring each clearinghouse 
within its regulatory purview to form a Risk-Management Committee of the 
board, the membership of which must be comprised 35% of independent 
directors and 10% of end-user representatives.336 Under the proposed rules, the 
Risk-Management Committee is generally charged with holding regular 
meetings and reporting to the board and, in particular, is given responsibility 
for three critical clearinghouse functions: (1) advising on the clearinghouse’s 
risk model and default procedures, (2) determining standards for and reviewing 
applications for clearinghouse membership, and (3) deciding which products 
are eligible for clearing.337 As described above, these are the key means by 
which clearinghouses will manage systemic risk. By creating a committee of 
the board affirmatively charged with overseeing these matters, the CFTC has 
gone some distance in creating a distinct body charged with the central work of 
containing systemic risk. This is not entirely different from what this Article 
recommends under the structure of the supervisory board. 
However, the CFTC’s vision of the Risk-Management Committee, 
focusing largely on director independence and, in part, on end-user 
 
 334 BD. OF DIRS., DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORP., BOARD MISSION STATEMENT AND CHARTER 4–
5 (2012), available at http://www.dtcc.com/legal/compliance/governance/DTCC_BOD_Mission_and_Charter. 
pdf. 
 335 This approach is also arguably inherent in Dodd–Frank, which can be read expansively to establish the 
clearinghouse as the agent entrusted to manage the systemic risk inherent in derivatives transactions. See supra 
Part I.C.3; see also TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD 
GOVERNMENT (2006) (applying economic models to political institutions to evaluate public governance 
structures). 
 336 Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap 
Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,740 (proposed 
Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 37, 38, 39, 40). 
 337 Id. at 63,750. The Risk-Management Committee is also specifically charged with reviewing the 
performance of the Chief Compliance Officer. Id. 
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representation, does not sufficiently address the fundamental problems of free-
riding and moral hazard. As argued at length above, directors who are formally 
independent do not necessarily have the optimal incentives to manage systemic 
risk,338 and the incentives of end users, in particular, are poorly suited to this 
goal.339 Successful risk management in the clearinghouse context requires 
more than formal independence and end-user representation. It requires a body 
that is separately charged by its electors to contain systemic risk. This is close 
to the vision articulated by the CFTC in the Risk-Management Committee but 
with important differences explored in the next section. 
In contrast to the CFTC’s vision, the SEC’s proposed rule does not require 
the clearinghouses over which it has regulatory authority to form a Risk-
Management Committee but rather leaves the formation of such a committee 
up to the discretion of each clearinghouse.340 If a clearinghouse does elect to 
form such a committee, however, the SEC requires either 35% or majority 
independence, depending upon whether the clearinghouse follows the 
governance-focused or voting-interest-focused rule set.341 Again, as this 
Article argues throughout, systemic risk is not a problem that independence 
alone will solve. 
The SEC does, however, come close to recommending a kind of 
supervisory body in another part of its proposed rule. In discussing the 
nominating committees of clearinghouse boards, the SEC alludes to the 
possible consideration of other structural alternatives, “such as allowing a 
security-based swap clearing agency to have a board of trustees responsible for 
nominating candidates for the Board.”342 The SEC goes on to solicit further 
comment on the “compositional requirements or other limits imposed on the 
board of trustees” and on how “such a board of trustees [should] be 
appointed.”343 A board of trustees with oversight responsibilities for other 
board functions bears at least a passing resemblance to the supervisory body 
advocated by this Article. Indeed, one way of describing the supervisory body 
outlined above is a group of trustees with a specific charge to represent the 
public’s interest in containing systemic risk. 
 
 338 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 339 See supra Part II.B. 
 340 Proposed SEC Rule Regarding Ownership and Governance, supra note 113, at 65,897; see also id. at 
65,930 (“A security-based swap clearing agency may establish such other committees of the Board, including 
a risk committee, as it deems appropriate.”). 
 341 Id. at 65,897. 
 342 Id. at 65,899. 
 343 Id. 
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Although each of the regulatory agencies can thus be seen to have 
entertained structural alternatives similar to the supervisory body this Article is 
proposing, both the SEC and the CFTC ultimately turned away from these 
alternatives in favor of the familiar but inapt solution of formal independence. 
Prior sections of this Article have critiqued the agencies’ approach. The 
following section sketches an alternative. 
C. Supervisory Directors for Systemic Risk 
So far, this Part has advocated the establishment of a formal body 
separately accountable to the public purpose of managing systemic risk. It has 
yet to answer how such a body would come to be, to whom such a body would 
be accountable, and how such a body would interact with the other organs of 
clearinghouse governance. The paragraphs that follow attempt to outline 
possible answers to these questions while remaining cognizant of the fact that 
the drafting of highly particularized rules lies outside the scope of a law review 
article. 
An initial consideration is whether it would be advisable to split 
clearinghouse boards formally into two, following the example of the German 
AG. However, considering that much of the German dual-board structure can 
be seen as a mere variation on the basic locus of authority in firms, creating 
management and supervisory boards where American firms create officers and 
directors, it seems unnecessary to depart from the unitary-board structure 
customary in American corporate governance. Such a departure, moreover, 
would require much greater regulatory interference in the basic organs of 
corporate governance and risk unintended consequences. Nevertheless, it is 
important that the clearinghouse board includes representatives who see as 
their central role the control of systemic risk, rather than the pursuit of 
commercial goals through the clearinghouse, and borrowing from the example 
of codetermination, it would seem that the best way to ensure that these 
representatives fulfill this role is to make these representatives separately 
elected. Clearinghouse boards would thus be dual not in the sense of having 
management and supervisory boards but rather in the sense of containing two 
separately elected classes of directors: one with traditional fiduciary 
responsibilities to shareholders, which this Article will refer to as “traditional 
directors,” and another charged with the public role of overseeing systemic 
risk, which this Article will refer to as “supervisory directors.” 
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To effectuate this dual-board structure, the electors of clearinghouse boards 
would likewise need to be split into two classes—into the electors of the 
traditional directors, on the one hand, and the electors of the supervisory 
directors, on the other. As regards the electors of the traditional directors, 
because the special requirements of the clearinghouse—that is, the 
management and control of systemic risk—are to be the central focus of the 
supervisory directors, there would seem to be no reason to interfere with the 
basic norm of shareholder primacy in electing the traditional directors. This 
Article therefore recommends the abandonment of the voting caps and 
independence requirements recommended by the SEC and the CFTC in favor 
of a system that allows the traditional directors to be elected by whatever 
commercial interests come to own the clearinghouse. A consequence of this 
approach may be that the major dealers come to dominate the traditional 
directors, but this is not necessarily a negative outcome in light of the 
importance, described above, in matching control with risk bearing. Moreover, 
the supervisory directors would stand as a counterweight to any excesses of 
traditional directors under the influence of the major dealers. 
With regard to the supervisory directors, it is not enough, as this Article 
argued at length above, simply to exclude the interests of the major dealers. 
Rather, it is necessary to define a class of electors with the control of systemic 
risk as their principal consideration. This poses a challenge. As a public good, 
the control of systemic risk is theoretically in the interest of every taxpayer and 
every participant in the financial system. However, direct democratic election 
of clearinghouse board members seems impractical for a great many reasons, 
not least of which is the fact that it seems unlikely that a large number of 
ordinary voters understand derivatives trading sufficiently well to know who a 
good overseer of counterparty credit risk might be.344 Neither, presumably, do 
ordinary politicians.345 It therefore seems sensible for this responsibility to 
 
 344 Although 57% of Americans gave themselves an A or B grade for their knowledge of personal finance 
in a recent national survey, 11% gave themselves a D or F, with the remainder accepting the gentleman’s C. 
See HARRIS INTERACTIVE INC., THE 2011 CONSUMER FINANCIAL LITERACY SURVEY: FINAL REPORT 24 (2011), 
available at http://www.nfcc.org/newsroom/FinancialLiteracy/files2011/NFCC_2011Financial%20Literacy 
Survey_FINALREPORT_033011.pdf. Moreover, there is evidence of grade inflation. Most Americans scored 
less than three out of five on a very basic financial-literacy quiz prepared for the FINRA Investor Education 
Foundation. See APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
INITIAL REPORT OF RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE 2009 NATIONAL SURVEY 41 (2009), available at http:// 
www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundation/documents/foundation/p120536.pdf. 
 345 Consider the comments of Democratic strategist James Carville accounting for the inability of 
politicians to understand and explain the financial crisis clearly by admitting that he too was “totally stumped 
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devolve upon those public servants who are most likely to understand 
counterparty credit risk and how it might best be managed—that is, the 
regulators responsible for managing systemic risk in the context of derivatives 
transactions. 
The regulators charged with this responsibility include, most obviously, the 
SEC and the CFTC. But a significant role in designing clearinghouse 
architecture has also been played by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Treasury Department. Each of these agencies 
ought to be given some role in the election of supervisory directors.346 Note, 
however, that this Article is not recommending that the regulators be directly 
involved in clearinghouse governance. Rather, their role is to elect private 
parties with the knowledge and expertise to serve in this role. In this way, the 
supervisory directors should be accountable to this public interest without 
creating a direct role for public regulators on these quasi-private boards. 
Lest this governance arrangement seem utterly unheard of, it is worth 
noting that there is in fact a close parallel in an organization with a charge that 
is in some ways similar to DCOs. The Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC) is the federal organization charged with recovering 
investor funds from “bankrupt and otherwise financially troubled brokerage 
firms.”347 By law, SIPC has a seven-member board, and one member is 
appointed from the Treasury Department, another from the Federal Reserve 
Board, and five by the President, of which three are appointed as 
representatives of the securities industry and two are appointed to represent 
investors.348 Making clearinghouse board members presidential appointees 
subject to Senate confirmation seems unnecessary and perhaps unwise,349 but 
SIPC illustrates that the practice of using public regulators to appoint members 
of quasi-private boards is not without precedent. 
 
by derivatives.” See James Carville, Daddy, Tell Me, What Exactly Is a Derivative?, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Mar. 25, 2009, at 11. 
 346 The voting interest could be divided among these agencies according to their expertise or the 
importance of their particular agency’s role in managing financial risk. Alternatively, for reasons of political 
expediency, equal 20% interests could be allocated to each of the five bodies. 
 347 Why Was SIPC Created?, SEC. INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP., http://sipc.org/Who/WhySIPC.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 348 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(c)(2) (2006). 
 349 See generally Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Seek to Speed System of Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2011, at A1 (describing the onerous confirmation process often devolving into deadlock and recent efforts to 
overcome it). 
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Moreover, an additional benefit of this electoral system may be to render 
the supervisory directors less subject to capture by the various commercial 
interests. Regulatory-capture theory teaches that regulators may come to serve 
the interests that they have been put in place to police.350 Because they are 
separately answerable to five distinct regulatory bodies, however, the 
supervisory directors may be less susceptible to capture. To exert control over 
the supervisory directors, the commercial interests would have to capture the 
agendas of several different regulatory agencies and coordinate their voting in 
support of their own slate. This may not be impossible, of course, but it is at 
least more difficult than capturing the agenda of a single regulator. In any 
event, the more common corporate governance problem of groupthink, in 
which supposedly independent directors come to represent management 
interests,351 is here effectively controlled by making supervisory directors 
answer directly to a group of regulators expressly charged with protecting the 
public from systemic risk. 
Finally, what should be the allocation of board power between the 
traditional directors and the supervisory directors? Here again, this Article 
recommends following the model of German codetermination and dividing 
board membership equally between traditional directors and supervisory 
directors.352 Such an arrangement ensures that the public purpose of containing 
systemic risk will be treated as at least equal with the private purposes of 
clearinghouse owners. This of course raises the issue of how to resolve board 
deadlocks, a point on which the recommendations of this Article differ from 
 
 350 See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD 
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 14–25 (2008) (describing the “cynical view” that certain groups are able to get 
regulations passed that favor their interests to the detriment of other groups); George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (applying the concept of regulatory capture to 
the co-opting of regulatory agencies by special interest groups such that the agency comes to promote the 
private group interest over the public interest intended from the regulation). 
 351 See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND 
FIASCOES 9–10 (2d ed. 1983) (defining groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation 
to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” and describing how it can result in “selective bias . . . in 
the way the group reacts to factual information and relevant judgments from experts,” who “show interest in 
facts and opinions that support their initially preferred policy . . . but . . . tend to ignore facts and opinions that 
do not support [the policy]”). For discussion of groupthink in the boardroom, see James D. Cox & Harry L. 
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate 
Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985); and Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last 
Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947–53 (2003). 
 352 Significant committees, likewise, would need to be proportional, as indeed the regulators have 
suggested with regard to the nominating committee and, in the case of the CFTC, the risk committee. See 
supra text accompanying notes 259–67. 
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the German model, which effectively gives control in the case of a tie to the 
management board.353 Rather than allocating blanket authority to one side or 
the other to cast the deciding vote in all cases, this Article recommends 
allocating tie-breaking authority on an issue-by-issue basis. So, for all 
operational decisions, the tie-breaking vote would be allocated to a traditional 
director, but for risk-management issues—such as how the clearinghouse 
models the risk of derivatives instruments, what the clearinghouse requires of 
its members in terms of credit quality and contributions to collateral and 
reserve funds, and what products the clearinghouse accepts for clearing—the 
tie-breaking vote would be allocated to a supervisory director. This 
arrangement would allow each class of directors to be involved in all aspects of 
board decision-making but, in the (hopefully) rare case of persistent 
disagreement, create separate spheres of influence for each. 
While some details remain to be specified, the thrust of this Article’s 
proposals should by now be clear.354 Its central policy recommendation, simply 
stated, is to establish a separately elected class of directors who will remain 
accountable to the public interest in clearinghouse governance and whose 
authority will be generally coequal with those members of the clearinghouse 
board elected by the various commercial interests. Understanding that this is 
not the appropriate forum to pursue a finely tuned body of rules, this Article 
will recommend simply that the details follow from that basic statement of 
intent. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the problem of systemic risk embedded in 
derivatives transactions and on the clearinghouses that Congress and the 
various regulatory agencies have engineered to solve it. The success or failure 
of the clearinghouse solution depends on how well these emerging institutions 
are governed, especially with regard to risk management. Unfortunately, the 
incentives of each of the parties most interested in clearinghouse governance 
 
 353 See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
 354 Among the central details to be worked out is how exactly the supervisory directors ought to go about 
measuring and monitoring risk on a day-to-day basis. While this level of detail is beyond the scope of this 
Article, focused as it is on structural governance questions, recent work by Frank Partnoy, Mark Flannery, and 
Joel Houston suggests a market-based approach by which the risk manager would take into account not only 
changes in the value of the contracts held by the clearinghouse but also changes in value of any CDS contracts 
written on the clearinghouse’s counterparties, thus using existing CDSs to provide an early warning of 
declining credit quality and potentially trigger additional collateral contributions. Mark J. Flannery et al., 
Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2010). 
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are skewed from the perspective of managing systemic risk. Moreover, the 
solution that the regulatory agencies have devised to respond to these incentive 
problems, focusing on voting limits and formal independence, fails adequately 
to address the underlying problem. 
The underlying problem facing clearinghouse governance is pervasive free-
riding created by the fact that the control of systemic risk has the character of a 
public good. Partially as a result of this pervasive free-rider problem, the 
incentives of each of the parties with a commercial interest in the 
clearinghouse are infected with moral hazard. All of this reflects the public–
private nature of derivatives clearinghouses. They are privately owned 
institutions producing private benefits for their owners and participants, 
charged at the same time with the public good of containing systemic risk. 
Because none of the private parties can be expected to fully internalize the cost 
of this charge, none of the private parties can be wholly entrusted with 
responsibility for clearinghouse governance. 
Because private parties cannot be trusted with this responsibility, this 
Article recommends the establishment of a separate body to protect the public 
interest in clearinghouse governance. To fully insulate this body from the 
commercial interests guiding other aspects of clearinghouse governance, this 
body must be accountable to a set of electors whose guiding concern is the 
control of systemic risk. A model for this body can be found in the board 
structure of the German public corporation, which has developed a system to 
render fully half of its top-level board accountable to a nonshareholder 
constituency. In the case of the derivatives clearinghouse, the nonshareholder 
constituency would not be employees but rather those agencies of government 
responsible for ensuring the containment of systemic risk in clearinghouses—
the CFTC and the SEC, along with the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Treasury. These public bodies would be 
charged with electing half of the representatives to the clearinghouse board as 
a means of ensuring that the clearinghouse treats its public purpose as coequal 
with its private one. 
 
